approved instruction in Kansas

1972In the opinion in the case of Deposit Co. v. City of Stafford, 93 Kan. 539 , 144 Pac. 852 , the authorities on this question were reviewed at length, and the court approved the doctrine of the case of Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227, where it was held that the rights of the surety related back to the date of the original contract, and that the contractors could not transfer to a bank any greater right in the funds than they themselves possessed, which rights were subordinate to those of the owner and the sureties.

1921In the opinion in the case of Deposit Co. v. City of Stafford, 93 Kan. 539 , 144 Pac. 852 , the authorities on this question were reviewed at length, and the court approved the doctrine of the case of Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227 , where it was held that the rights of the surety related back to the date of the original contract, and that the contractors could not transfer to a bank any greater right in the funds than they themselves possessed, which rights were subordinate to those of the owner and the sureties.

1972In the opinion in the case of Deposit Co. v. City of Stafford, 93 Kan. 539 , 144 Pac. 852 , the authorities on this question were reviewed at length, and the court approved the doctrine of the case of Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227, where it was held that the rights of the surety related back to the date of the original contract, and that the contractors could not transfer to a bank any greater right in the funds than they themselves possessed, which rights were subordinate to those of the owner and the sureties.

1972In the opinion in the case of Deposit Co. v. City of Stafford, 93 Kan. 539 , 144 Pac. 852 , the authorities on this question were reviewed at length, and the court approved the doctrine of the case of Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227, where it was held that the rights of the surety related back to the date of the original contract, and that the contractors could not transfer to a bank any greater right in the funds than they themselves possessed, which rights were subordinate to those of the owner and the sureties.

1945Co. v. Mitchell, 56 Kan. 324 , 43 Pac. 244 , this court approved an instruction which defined reckless conduct as an indifference to the rights of others, an indifference whether wrong is done or not; and which told the jury that the defendant could be held liable only for injuries inflicted which were willful, wanton, or malicious, or which were so grossly negligent as to amount to wantonness.

1945Co. v. Mitchell, 56 Kan. 324 , 43 Pac. 244 , this court approved an instruction which defined reckless conduct as an indifference to the rights of others, an indifference whether wrong is done or not; and which told the jury that the defendant could be held liable only for injuries inflicted which were willful, wanton, or malicious, or which were so grossly negligent as to amount to wantonness.

2021See State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 79-81 , 253 P.3d 5 (2011); State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 483-85 , 243 P.3d 343 (2010).

2021See State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 79-81 , 253 P.3d 5 (2011); State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 483-85 , 243 P.3d 343 (2010).

2021App. 2d 418 , Syl. ¶ 5, 17 P.3d 966 (2001), a panel of this court approved an instruction patterned after what was then PIK Crim. 3d 60.09, despite the absence of an instruction for the underlying felony: "Use of PIK Crim. 3d 60.09 is favored when the State charges obstruction of an officer in the discharge of his or her duty.

1994App. 2d 609, 617-19 , 780 P.2d 1118 (1989), the Court of Appeals concluded that words added to the approved instruction on witness credibility were inappropriate and required reversal of DeVries’ conviction of felony theft.

1990In State v. Buffington, 71 Kan. 804 , 81 Pac. *519 465 (1905), the court approved an instruction “ ‘that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf, and you have a right to consider his evidence and are to give it such faith and credit as you believe it entitled to receive.’ ” 71 Kan. at 810 .

1990In State v. Buffington, 71 Kan. 804 , 81 Pac. *519 465 (1905), the court approved an instruction “ ‘that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf, and you have a right to consider his evidence and are to give it such faith and credit as you believe it entitled to receive.’ ” 71 Kan. at 810 .

1990In State v. Killion, 95 Kan. 371, 383 , 148 Pac. 643 (1915), the court approved an instruction which told the jury that the defendant was a competent witness; that the fact that he was charged with a crime should not affect his credibility; that his evidence should be considered with all other evidence and circumstances; and that the jury might take into consideration his interest in the case. 95 Kan. at 383 .

1990In State v. Killion, 95 Kan. 371, 383 , 148 Pac. 643 (1915), the court approved an instruction which told the jury that the defendant was a competent witness; that the fact that he was charged with a crime should not affect his credibility; that his evidence should be considered with all other evidence and circumstances; and that the jury might take into consideration his interest in the case. 95 Kan. at 383 .

1983In State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251 , 417 P.2d 261 (1966), after Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 41 L.Ed. 528 , 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896), this court approved such an instruction, 197 Kan. at 260 , though we indicated it was better for the instruction to be given before the jury retires which is exactly what occurred herein.

1983In State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251 , 417 P.2d 261 (1966), after Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 41 L.Ed. 528 , 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896), this court approved such an instruction, 197 Kan. at 260 , though we indicated it was better for the instruction to be given before the jury retires which is exactly what occurred herein.

1983In *483 State v. Boyd, 206 Kan. 597 , 481 P.2d 1015 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 927 (1972), this court reiterated if such an instruction was to be given, trial courts were well advised to submit the same before the jury retired, not afterwards. 206 Kan. at 601 .

1983In *483 State v. Boyd, 206 Kan. 597 , 481 P.2d 1015 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 927 (1972), this court reiterated if such an instruction was to be given, trial courts were well advised to submit the same before the jury retired, not afterwards. 206 Kan. at 601 .

1983In State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251 , 417 P.2d 261 (1966), after Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 41 L.Ed. 528 , 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896), this court approved such an instruction, 197 Kan. at 260 , though we indicated it was better for the instruction to be given before the jury retires which is exactly what occurred herein.

1983In State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251 , 417 P.2d 261 (1966), after Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 41 L.Ed. 528 , 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896), this court approved such an instruction, 197 Kan. at 260 , though we indicated it was better for the instruction to be given before the jury retires which is exactly what occurred herein.

1983In *483 State v. Boyd, 206 Kan. 597 , 481 P.2d 1015 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 927 (1972), this court reiterated if such an instruction was to be given, trial courts were well advised to submit the same before the jury retired, not afterwards. 206 Kan. at 601 .

1981Rep. 208 .) In that case the covenant was to clear a part of the land, and the court approved the rule allowing the diminution in rental value as the measure of damages, saying that this is ordinarily the measure of recovery." 77 Kan. at 254 .

1981Rep. 208 .) In that case the covenant was to clear a part of the land, and the court approved the rule allowing the diminution in rental value as the measure of damages, saying that this is ordinarily the measure of recovery.” 77 Kan. at 254 .

1979In State v. Sauvage, 201 Kan. at 556 , the court cited the following as an approved instruction: “A person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when, as a result of the consumption of alcoholic beverages, he has lost control of his mental faculties and bodily functions to the extent that he is unable to operate his vehicle as a person exercising ordinary care would under like circumstances.

1970In Green v. Higbe, 176 Kan. 596 , 272 P. 2d 1084 , this court stated: “The right of way and the right to assume absence of negligence by others does not absolve the possessor of the prior right of the consequence of his own independent negligent acts. . . .” (Syl. ¶ 4.) In Jarboe v. Pine, 189 Kan. 44 , 366 P. 2d 783 , this rule was elaborated: “The driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, even though he be in law the favored driver, or the driver with the right of way, and even though he has the right to assume others traveling on the public street or highway will comply with

1970In Green v. Higbe, 176 Kan. 596 , 272 P. 2d 1084 , this court stated: “The right of way and the right to assume absence of negligence by others does not absolve the possessor of the prior right of the consequence of his own independent negligent acts. . . .” (Syl. ¶ 4.) In Jarboe v. Pine, 189 Kan. 44 , 366 P. 2d 783 , this rule was elaborated: “The driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, even though he be in law the favored driver, or the driver with the right of way, and even though he has the right to assume others traveling on the public street or highway will comply with

1970In De grato *738 v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713 , 228 P. 2d 527 , this court approved the rule that the driver of a motor vehicle has the duty of keeping a proper lookout at all times, the extent of the observation being dependent upon the circumstances then existing, and such duty includes the obligation to keep a lookout for such vehicles even as may be negligently on the highway.

1970In De grato *738 v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713 , 228 P. 2d 527 , this court approved the rule that the driver of a motor vehicle has the duty of keeping a proper lookout at all times, the extent of the observation being dependent upon the circumstances then existing, and such duty includes the obligation to keep a lookout for such vehicles even as may be negligently on the highway.

1970In Green v. Higbe, 176 Kan. 596 , 272 P. 2d 1084 , this court stated: “The right of way and the right to assume absence of negligence by others does not absolve the possessor of the prior right of the consequence of his own independent negligent acts. . . .” (Syl. ¶ 4.) In Jarboe v. Pine, 189 Kan. 44 , 366 P. 2d 783 , this rule was elaborated: “The driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, even though he be in law the favored driver, or the driver with the right of way, and even though he has the right to assume others traveling on the public street or highway will comply with

1970In Green v. Higbe, 176 Kan. 596 , 272 P. 2d 1084 , this court stated: “The right of way and the right to assume absence of negligence by others does not absolve the possessor of the prior right of the consequence of his own independent negligent acts. . . .” (Syl. ¶ 4.) In Jarboe v. Pine, 189 Kan. 44 , 366 P. 2d 783 , this rule was elaborated: “The driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, even though he be in law the favored driver, or the driver with the right of way, and even though he has the right to assume others traveling on the public street or highway will comply with

1969In McCulley v. City of Wichita, 151 Kan. 214 , 98 P.2d 192 , this court approved the rule that the reasonableness of an ordinance involves a determination as to whether it is for the public benefit of the community in general, and whether the means adopted to produce the public benefit are reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

1969In McCulley v. City of Wichita, 151 Kan. 214 , 98 P.2d 192 , this court approved the rule that the reasonableness of an ordinance involves a determination as to whether it is for the public benefit of the community in general, and whether the means adopted to produce the public benefit are reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

1959S. 1957 Supp. 8-1006 provides: “The foregoing provisions of section 1 [8-1005] shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” *25 This court approved an instruction in State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704 , 339 P. 2d 45 , which quoted the pertinent portions of the above statutes and then continued as follows: “This presumption is not conclusive, but may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case, and if, upon consideration of all the e

1959S. 1957 Supp. 8-1006 provides: “The foregoing provisions of section 1 [8-1005] shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” *25 This court approved an instruction in State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704 , 339 P. 2d 45 , which quoted the pertinent portions of the above statutes and then continued as follows: “This presumption is not conclusive, but may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case, and if, upon consideration of all the e

1952In State v. Vinyard, 160 Kan. 66 , 159 P. 2d 493 , where defendant had been found guilty of the larceny of certain cattle, this court approved an instruction of the trial court (p. 72) of the essential elements of the offense charged in the information, which paraphrased so as to apply to the county and the name of the owners of the cattle reads as follows: (1) There must be a taking and carrying away of one or more of the calves described in Greenwood county. (2) Such calves must have been owned by Ulrich brothers. (3) The defendant must have taken the calves without the consent of the owners

1952In State v. Vinyard, 160 Kan. 66 , 159 P. 2d 493 , where defendant had been found guilty of the larceny of certain cattle, this court approved an instruction of the trial court (p. 72) of the essential elements of the offense charged in the information, which paraphrased so as to apply to the county and the name of the owners of the cattle reads as follows: (1) There must be a taking and carrying away of one or more of the calves described in Greenwood county. (2) Such calves must have been owned by Ulrich brothers. (3) The defendant must have taken the calves without the consent of the owners

1951In Craft v. The State of Kansas, 3 Kan. 450, 481 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, murder at the common law is defined as being: “Where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, and in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied.” In The State v. Estep, 44 Kan. 572, 574 , 24 Pac. 986 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, the court approved an instruction containing the same definition.

1951In Craft v. The State of Kansas, 3 Kan. 450, 481 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, murder at the common law is defined as being: *707 "Where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, and in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied." In The State v. Estep, 44 Kan. 572, 574 , 24 Pac. 986 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, the court approved an instruction containing the same definition.

1951In Craft v. The State of Kansas, 3 Kan. 450, 481 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, murder at the common law is defined as being: “Where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, and in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied.” In The State v. Estep, 44 Kan. 572, 574 , 24 Pac. 986 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, the court approved an instruction containing the same definition.

1951In Craft v. The State of Kansas, 3 Kan. 450, 481 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, murder at the common law is defined as being: *707 "Where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, and in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied." In The State v. Estep, 44 Kan. 572, 574 , 24 Pac. 986 , where the charge was murder in the first degree, the court approved an instruction containing the same definition.

1951In The State v. Ireland, 72 Kan. 265 , 83 Pac. 1036 , where the charge was assault with a deadly weapon, it was held: “Neither murder nor manslaughter is defined by the statutes of Kansas.

1951In The State v. Ireland, 72 Kan. 265 , 83 Pac. 1036 , where the charge was assault with a deadly weapon, it was held: “Neither murder nor manslaughter is defined by the statutes of Kansas.

1936In Cramer v. Overfield, 115 Kan. 580 , 223 Pac. 1100 , this court held: “The court adheres to its prior decisions where the sale of corporate stock is affected by false pretenses the price paid is some evidence of what the value would have been if the representations had been true; and that where the stock so sold was at the time worthless the amount paid therefor may be recovered as damages for the fraud.

1936In Cramer v. Overfield, 115 Kan. 580 , 223 Pac. 1100 , this court held: “The court adheres to its prior decisions where the sale of corporate stock is affected by false pretenses the price paid is some evidence of what the value would have been if the representations had been true; and that where the stock so sold was at the time worthless the amount paid therefor may be recovered as damages for the fraud.

1935(See, also, Gorges v. State Highway Comm., 135 Kan. 371 , 10 P. 2d 834 ; and Snyder v. State Highway Comm., 139 Kan. 150 , 30 P. 2d 102 .) The case of City of Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577 , 20 Pac. 217 , is cited by appellant as against the necessity of more care under some circumstances than others, but while ordinary care is held to be proper, yet the court approved the instruction given which concluded with the following words: “you may consider the knowledge of the plaintiff in relation to the dangerous condition of the walk,” and said in the third syllabus that “what constitutes ordinary

1935(See, also, Gorges v. State Highway Comm., 135 Kan. 371 , 10 P. 2d 834 ; and Snyder v. State Highway Comm., 139 Kan. 150 , 30 P. 2d 102 .) The case of City of Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577 , 20 Pac. 217 , is cited by appellant as against the necessity of more care under some circumstances than others, but while ordinary care is held to be proper, yet the court approved the instruction given which concluded with the following words: “you may consider the knowledge of the plaintiff in relation to the dangerous condition of the walk,” and said in the third syllabus that “what constitutes ordinary

1935(See, also, Gorges v. State Highway Comm., 135 Kan. 371 , 10 P. 2d 834 ; and Snyder v. State Highway Comm., 139 Kan. 150 , 30 P. 2d 102 .) The case of City of Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577 , 20 Pac. 217 , is cited by appellant as against the necessity of more care under some circumstances than others, but while ordinary care is held to be proper, yet the court approved the instruction given which concluded with the following words: “you may consider the knowledge of the plaintiff in relation to the dangerous condition of the walk,” and said in the third syllabus that “what constitutes ordinary

1935(See, also, Gorges v. State Highway Comm., 135 Kan. 371 , 10 P. 2d 834 ; and Snyder v. State Highway Comm., 139 Kan. 150 , 30 P. 2d 102 .) The case of City of Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577 , 20 Pac. 217 , is cited by appellant as against the necessity of more care under some circumstances than others, but while ordinary care is held to be proper, yet the court approved the instruction given which concluded with the following words: “you may consider the knowledge of the plaintiff in relation to the dangerous condition of the walk,” and said in the third syllabus that “what constitutes ordinary

1935(See, also, Gorges v. State Highway Comm., 135 Kan. 371 , 10 P. 2d 834 ; and Snyder v. State Highway Comm., 139 Kan. 150 , 30 P. 2d 102 .) The case of City of Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577 , 20 Pac. 217 , is cited by appellant as against the necessity of more care under some circumstances than others, but while ordinary care is held to be proper, yet the court approved the instruction given which concluded with the following words: “you may consider the knowledge of the plaintiff in relation to the dangerous condition of the walk,” and said in the third syllabus that “what constitutes ordinary

1933Co. v. Holloway, 191 U. S. 334 , involving a like question, the court approved an instruction, saying: “A man cannot shut his eyes and say he don’t want to see anything which a reasonable man could not help but see if he keeps his eyes open.

1928It 1.) In Brown v. Railroad Co., 11 Kan. 338 , 207 Pac. 196 , where the rule of the cases mentioned was followed, reference was made to an approved test of liability of a master for the torts of a servant.