approved principle in South Carolina

1978Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co. , 216 S.C. 20 , 56 S.E. (2d) 585 (1949), and Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company , 242 S.C. 123 , 130 S.E. (2d) 370 (1963), this Court approved the principle that a plaintiff may assign a fractional share of his claim to an otherwise disinterested resident of another state which assignment could have two distinct effects: (1) Defeating diversity jurisdiction where the plaintiff assigns an interest to a resident of the same state as the defendant; (2) Allowing suit to be brought in South Carolina under what is now Code Section 15-5-150(1) on an out-of-st

1978Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co. , 216 S.C. 20 , 56 S.E. (2d) 585 (1949), and Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company , 242 S.C. 123 , 130 S.E. (2d) 370 (1963), this Court approved the principle that a plaintiff may assign a fractional share of his claim to an otherwise disinterested resident of another state which assignment could have two distinct effects: (1) Defeating diversity jurisdiction where the plaintiff assigns an interest to a resident of the same state as the defendant; (2) Allowing suit to be brought in South Carolina under what is now Code Section 15-5-150(1) on an out-of-st

1978Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co. , 216 S.C. 20 , 56 S.E. (2d) 585 (1949), and Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company , 242 S.C. 123 , 130 S.E. (2d) 370 (1963), this Court approved the principle that a plaintiff may assign a fractional share of his claim to an otherwise disinterested resident of another state which assignment could have two distinct effects: (1) Defeating diversity jurisdiction where the plaintiff assigns an interest to a resident of the same state as the defendant; (2) Allowing suit to be brought in South Carolina under what is now Code Section 15-5-150(1) on an out-of-st

1978Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co. , 216 S.C. 20 , 56 S.E. (2d) 585 (1949), and Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company , 242 S.C. 123 , 130 S.E. (2d) 370 (1963), this Court approved the principle that a plaintiff may assign a fractional share of his claim to an otherwise disinterested resident of another state which assignment could have two distinct effects: (1) Defeating diversity jurisdiction where the plaintiff assigns an interest to a resident of the same state as the defendant; (2) Allowing suit to be brought in South Carolina under what is now Code Section 15-5-150(1) on an out-of-st

2001To resolve the problem of disproportionate liability 3 which could arise from the recognition of bystander liability, the court approved the analysis of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968), in which the California Supreme Court adopted a “foreseeability” approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

2001To resolve the problem of disproportionate liability 3 which could arise from the recognition of bystander liability, the court approved the analysis of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968), in which the California Supreme Court adopted a “foreseeability” approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

1940Jur., 450 : “A prima facie case which meets the bailor’s burden in an action to recover for injuries to the thing bailed while in the bailee’s possession is made out, according to the weight of modern authority, by proof that the property was delivered in bailment to the defendant in good condition and was returned to him injured, at least where the injury is one which does not ordinarily occur in the exercise of the degree of care incumbent on the particular bailee.” *421 A like conclusion was reached by this Court in the case of Fleischman v. Southern Railway, 76 S. C., 237, 56 S. E., 974, 9

1929These distinctions have been recognized and applied in numerous decisions of this Court.” See, also, Kelly v. Keystone Lumber Co., 107 S. C., 96, 91 S. E., 978 , where the Court said: “Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, and his Honor, Judge Shipp, could not have directed a verdict.” In Pinckney v. Railway Co., 92 S. C., 528, 75 S. E., 964 , the Court said: “In order to escape liability on the ground of negligence of a fellow-servant, it must appear that the master was not negligent at all as to any of the proximate causes of plaintiff’s'injury.” In Elms v. Power Co., 79 S. C., 502,

1929These distinctions have been recognized and applied in numerous decisions of this Court.” See, also, Kelly v. Keystone Lumber Co., 107 S. C., 96, 91 S. E., 978 , where the Court said: “Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, and his Honor, Judge Shipp, could not have directed a verdict.” In Pinckney v. Railway Co., 92 S. C., 528, 75 S. E., 964 , the Court said: “In order to escape liability on the ground of negligence of a fellow-servant, it must appear that the master was not negligent at all as to any of the proximate causes of plaintiff’s'injury.” In Elms v. Power Co., 79 S. C., 502,

1929These distinctions have been recognized and applied in numerous decisions of this Court.” See, also, Kelly v. Keystone Lumber Co., 107 S. C., 96, 91 S. E., 978 , where the Court said: “Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, and his Honor, Judge Shipp, could not have directed a verdict.” In Pinckney v. Railway Co., 92 S. C., 528, 75 S. E., 964 , the Court said: “In order to escape liability on the ground of negligence of a fellow-servant, it must appear that the master was not negligent at all as to any of the proximate causes of plaintiff’s'injury.” In Elms v. Power Co., 79 S. C., 502,

1926In that case this Court approved the rule laid down in Baldwin v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 78 S. C., 419; 59 S. E., 67 , as follows: “The rule is, a person who is unable to read is bound to have the paper read to him before signing, just as a person who can read is bound to read it before signing.” But in the Britt case it was also said: “But as recognized in Baldwin v. Cable Co. [78 S. C., 419; 59 S. E., 67 ], supra, it is equally well settled that if the party who signs a written contract in ignorance of its contents without reading it or having it read is induced to sign- by conduct of t

1926In that case this Court approved the rule laid down in Baldwin v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 78 S. C., 419; 59 S. E., 67 , as follows: “The rule is, a person who is unable to read is bound to have the paper read to him before signing, just as a person who can read is bound to read it before signing.” But in the Britt case it was also said: “But as recognized in Baldwin v. Cable Co. [78 S. C., 419; 59 S. E., 67 ], supra, it is equally well settled that if the party who signs a written contract in ignorance of its contents without reading it or having it read is induced to sign- by conduct of t

1882The leading case in this line of decision is that of Supervisors v. Decker, 34 Wis., citing Brayton v. Jones, 5 Wis. 117 , and appendix.