situation bar in New York

2001The situation is then a warning in itself’ (Olsen v State of New York, 30 AD2d 759, 760 , affd 25 NY2d 665 ; see, Garcia v New York City Hous.

1999The situation is then a warning in itself’ (Olsen v State of New York, 30 AD2d 759, 760 , affd 25 NY2d 665 ; see also, Harrison v City of New York, 248 AD2d 592 ; Boehme v Edgar Fabrics, 248 AD2d 344 ; Hopson v Turf House, 252 AD2d 796 ; Huber v Malone, 229 AD2d 469 ; Bellofatto v Frengs, 246 AD2d 566 ; Zaffiris v O’Loughlin, 184 AD2d 696 ; Cimino v Town of Hempstead, 110 AD2d 805 , affd 66 NY2d 709 ).

2001The situation is then a warning in itself’ (Olsen v State of New York, 30 AD2d 759, 760 , affd 25 NY2d 665 ; see, Garcia v New York City Hous.

1999The situation is then a warning in itself’ (Olsen v State of New York, 30 AD2d 759, 760 , affd 25 NY2d 665 ; see also, Harrison v City of New York, 248 AD2d 592 ; Boehme v Edgar Fabrics, 248 AD2d 344 ; Hopson v Turf House, 252 AD2d 796 ; Huber v Malone, 229 AD2d 469 ; Bellofatto v Frengs, 246 AD2d 566 ; Zaffiris v O’Loughlin, 184 AD2d 696 ; Cimino v Town of Hempstead, 110 AD2d 805 , affd 66 NY2d 709 ).

2001Co., supra, 55 NY2d, at 136 ).” (Matter of Worcester Ins.

2000Co., supra, 55 NY2d, at 136 ).

2021Joseph's Hosp. , 245 AD2d 713 [3d Dept 1997], Matter of Boles v Sheehan Mem.

2021Joseph's Hosp. , 245 AD2d 713 [3d Dept 1997], Matter of Boles v Sheehan Mem.

2013We note that cases such as Steinbergin v Ali ( 99 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2012]), Singer v Gae Limo Corp. ( 91 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2012]), and Quinones v Ksieniewicz ( 80 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]), which rely on the fact that defendants’ doctors examined the plaintiff years after the accident, are inapplicable to the situation at bar.

2013We note that cases such as Steinbergin v Ali ( 99 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2012]), Singer v Gae Limo Corp. ( 91 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2012]), and Quinones v Ksieniewicz ( 80 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]), which rely on the fact that defendants’ doctors examined the plaintiff years after the accident, are inapplicable to the situation at bar.

2013We note that cases such as Steinbergin v Ali ( 99 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2012]), Singer v Gae Limo Corp. ( 91 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2012]), and Quinones v Ksieniewicz ( 80 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]), which rely on the fact that defendants’ doctors examined the plaintiff years after the accident, are inapplicable to the situation at bar.

2013We note that cases such as Steinbergin v Ali ( 99 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2012]), Singer v Gae Limo Corp. ( 91 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2012]), and Quinones v Ksieniewicz ( 80 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]), which rely on the fact that defendants’ doctors examined the plaintiff years after the accident, are inapplicable to the situation at bar.

2013We note that cases such as Steinbergin v Ali ( 99 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2012]), Singer v Gae Limo Corp. ( 91 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2012]), and Quinones v Ksieniewicz ( 80 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]), which rely on the fact that defendants’ doctors examined the plaintiff years after the accident, are inapplicable to the situation at bar.

2013We note that cases such as Steinbergin v Ali ( 99 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2012]), Singer v Gae Limo Corp. ( 91 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2012]), and Quinones v Ksieniewicz ( 80 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]), which rely on the fact that defendants’ doctors examined the plaintiff years after the accident, are inapplicable to the situation at bar.

1996Since the situation at bar does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, it would appear that the rational basis standard of review is appropriate to determine if the defendant’s action violated the Equal Protection Clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 ; Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 ).

1995Since the situation at bar does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, it would appear that the rational basis standard of review is appropriate to determine if the City’s action violated the Equal Protection Clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 ; Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 ).

1996Since the situation at bar does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, it would appear that the rational basis standard of review is appropriate to determine if the defendant’s action violated the Equal Protection Clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 ; Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 ).

1995Since the situation at bar does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, it would appear that the rational basis standard of review is appropriate to determine if the City’s action violated the Equal Protection Clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 ; Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 ).

1986Accordingly, we agree with Special Term’s conclusion that the action accrued no later than October 22, 1976, but, in addition, we conclude that the continuous treatment exception enunciated in Borgia (supra) is applicable to the situation at bar.” (Cotto v City of New York, supra, p 749.) The principle that evolves from the foregoing cases is that if there is a direct referral from one hospital to another under circumstances evincing a continuation of prior treatment and there is some nexus between the two hospitals a question of whether there has been continuous treatment is presented for the

1984Accordingly, we agree with Special Term’s conclusion that the action accrued no later than October 22, 1976, but, in addition, we conclude that the continuous treatment exception enunciated in Borgia (supra) is applicable to the situation at bar.

1984The suspended petitioner had a statutory right to his full salary during the period of suspension and was not required to take any action to guarantee his receipt of the full amount of his salary (see, generally, Sinicropi v Bennett, 92 AD2d 309 , affd 60 NY2d 918 )”.

1983The suspended petitioner had a statutory right to his full salary during the period of suspension and was not required to take any action to guarantee his receipt of the full amount of his salary (see, generally, Sinicropi v Bennett, 92 AD2d 309 , affd 60 NY2d 918 ).

1984The suspended petitioner had a statutory right to his full salary during the period of suspension and was not required to take any action to guarantee his receipt of the full amount of his salary (see, generally, Sinicropi v Bennett, 92 AD2d 309 , affd 60 NY2d 918 )”.

1983The suspended petitioner had a statutory right to his full salary during the period of suspension and was not required to take any action to guarantee his receipt of the full amount of his salary (see, generally, Sinicropi v Bennett, 92 AD2d 309 , affd 60 NY2d 918 ).

1975The above authorities have not been overruled, insofar as the situation at bar is concerned, by Board of Regents v Roth ( 408 US 564 ) and Perry v Sindermann ( 408 US 593 ) (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., supra).

1975The above authorities have not been overruled, insofar as the situation at bar is concerned, by Board of Regents v Roth ( 408 US 564 ) and Perry v Sindermann ( 408 US 593 ) (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y, supra).

1975The above authorities have not been overruled, insofar as the situation at bar is concerned, by Board of Regents v Roth ( 408 US 564 ) and Perry v Sindermann ( 408 US 593 ) (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., supra).

1975The above authorities have not been overruled, insofar as the situation at bar is concerned, by Board of Regents v Roth ( 408 US 564 ) and Perry v Sindermann ( 408 US 593 ) (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y, supra).

1966Co., 246 N. Y. 388, 393 ). * * * “ The case (Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253 ) cited in the opinion of Special Term, does not control the situation at bar.

1962The case (Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253 ) cited in the opinion of Special Term, does not control the situation at bar.

1964A contract, once entered into, may provide that notices therein specified are effective if mailed, or that they must be received and not merely sent (Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441 ).

1951A contract, once entered into, may provide that notices therein specified are effective if mailed, or that they must be received and not merely sent (Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441 ).

1956(Kelsey v. Sargent, 100 N. Y. 602, 603 ; Spencer v. Fort Orange Paper Co., 74 App. Div. 74, 75 ; Mavholm v. Whale Creek Iron Works, 159 id. 578, 582; Richards v. Miller, 167 id. 443, 444; De Cordova v. Sanville, 171 id. 422, 424; Matter of Bird, 240 id. 747.) ‘1 In determining the propriety of the allowance of a bill of particulars in any given instance, an examination of the situation disclosed by the pleadings and the facts alleged therein in the light of the underlying applicable principles, is, except in purely routine applications, a much safer mode of decision than to attempt to find pre

1935(Kelsey v. Sargent, 100 N. Y. 602, 603 ; Spencer v. Fort Orange Paper Co., 74 App. Div. 74, 75 ; Havholm v. Whale Creek Iron Works, 159 id. 578, 582; Richards v. Miller, 167 id. 443, 444; De Cordova v. Sanville, 171 id. 422, 424; Matter of Bird, 240 id. 747.) In determining the propriety of the allowance of a bill of particulars in any given instance, an examination of the situation disclosed by the pleadings and the facts alleged therein in the light of the underlying applicable principles, is, except in.purely routine applications, a much safer mode of decision than to attempt to find preced

1956(Kelsey v. Sargent, 100 N. Y. 602, 603 ; Spencer v. Fort Orange Paper Co., 74 App. Div. 74, 75 ; Mavholm v. Whale Creek Iron Works, 159 id. 578, 582; Richards v. Miller, 167 id. 443, 444; De Cordova v. Sanville, 171 id. 422, 424; Matter of Bird, 240 id. 747.) ‘1 In determining the propriety of the allowance of a bill of particulars in any given instance, an examination of the situation disclosed by the pleadings and the facts alleged therein in the light of the underlying applicable principles, is, except in purely routine applications, a much safer mode of decision than to attempt to find pre

1935(Kelsey v. Sargent, 100 N. Y. 602, 603 ; Spencer v. Fort Orange Paper Co., 74 App. Div. 74, 75 ; Havholm v. Whale Creek Iron Works, 159 id. 578, 582; Richards v. Miller, 167 id. 443, 444; De Cordova v. Sanville, 171 id. 422, 424; Matter of Bird, 240 id. 747.) In determining the propriety of the allowance of a bill of particulars in any given instance, an examination of the situation disclosed by the pleadings and the facts alleged therein in the light of the underlying applicable principles, is, except in.purely routine applications, a much safer mode of decision than to attempt to find preced

2020Thus, this is not a situation where the requirement of a CPL 710.30 notice was obviated because there was no question of the voluntariness of the challenged statement ( compare People v Chase , 85 NY2d 493, 500 , with People v Morris , 43 AD2d 599 , 600).

2020Thus, this is not a situation where the requirement of a CPL 710.30 notice was obviated because there was no question of the voluntariness of the challenged statement ( compare People v Chase , 85 NY2d 493, 500 , with People v Morris , 43 AD2d 599 , 600).

2020ENTER: Paul Kenny Chief Clerk Decision Date: January 30, 2020 Footnotes Footnote 1: The City Court's reliance on Peoples Commercial Bank v Greene Distrib. ( 149 AD2d 774 [1989]) in holding that tenant waived the defense of laches was misplaced, as that case involved a situation where the defense of laches was raised for the first time on appeal ( see id. at 775 ).

2020ENTER: Paul Kenny Chief Clerk Decision Date: January 30, 2020 Footnotes Footnote 1: The City Court's reliance on Peoples Commercial Bank v Greene Distrib. ( 149 AD2d 774 [1989]) in holding that tenant waived the defense of laches was misplaced, as that case involved a situation where the defense of laches was raised for the first time on appeal ( see id. at 775 ).

2019Finally, with regard to the legislative objective of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, respondents have not demonstrated a "substantial and realistic potential" for the unredacted reports to be used against the officers in a harassing or abusive manner ( Matter of Daily Gazette Co. v City of Schenectady , 93 NY2d at 159 ).

2019Moreover, defendant abandoned any purported request for substitution of counsel inasmuch as he repeatedly stated in response to questioning by the court that he was ready to proceed to trial with defense counsel, notwithstanding the court's offer to grant a 24-hour adjournment to allow defendant to discuss the situation with defense counsel ( see id. ; People v Clark , 24 AD3d 1225, 1226 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006]).

2018In such a situation, the Court of Appeals explained that the confirmation of the identity of the signer, through an affidavit, is sufficient without having to explain how the identity was confirmed ( see id. ).