situation bar in Illinois

2012Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d at 161 . ¶ 22 Thereafter, in People v. Free, 112 Ill. 2d 154, 168 (1986), the court again stated that: “In a situation where defense counsel has represented a State’s witness, a per se conflict of interest will not be held to exist unless the professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with counsel’s representation of the defendant.” ¶ 23 The assistant public defender representing the defendant in Free had previously represented a witness who testified adversely to the defendant at a hearing on a motion to suppress prior to defendant’s

1986In a situation where defense counsel has represented a State's witness, a per se conflict of interest will not be held to exist unless the professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with counsel's representation of the defendant. ( People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill.2d 147, 161 ; People v. Strohl (1983), 118 Ill.

2026“This analysis also takes into account the disparity of bargaining power between the drafter of the contract and the party claiming unconscionability.” Id. (citing Razor, 222 Ill. 2d at 100 ). ¶ 76 Substantive unconscionability involves a situation in which a clause or term of the contract is totally one-sided or harsh.

2026“This analysis also takes into account the disparity of bargaining power between the drafter of the contract and the party claiming unconscionability.” Id. (citing Razor, 222 Ill. 2d at 100 ). ¶ 76 Substantive unconscionability involves a situation in which a clause or term of the contract is totally one-sided or harsh.

2021Kranzler, 2018 IL App (1st) 171169, ¶ 39 . ¶ 16 We have explained that “a marital settlement agreement is unconscionable if there is an absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. [Citation.] This general definition encompasses both procedural unconscionability—involving impropriety during the process of forming a contract that deprives a party of meaningful choice—and substantive unconscionability—a situation in which a clause or term in the contract is one-sided or harsh. [Citation.]” (Inte

2013Id.

2016"Substantive unconscionability is based on the fairness and obligations of the contract's terms, and it can be shown by contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, and significant cost-price disparity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tabassum, 377 Ill.

2016"Substantive unconscionability is based on the fairness and obligations of the contract's terms, and it can be shown by contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, and significant cost-price disparity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tabassum, 377 Ill.

2016“To rise to the level of being unconscionable, the settlement must be improvident, totally one-sided or oppressive.” Id. at 182 ; see also Arjmand, 2013 IL App (2d) 21 120639, ¶ 30 ("substantive unconscionability involves a situation in which a clause or term in the contract is totally one-sided or harsh.").

2016“To rise to the level of being unconscionable, the settlement must be improvident, totally one-sided or oppressive.” Id. at 182 ; see also Arjmand, 2013 IL App (2d) 21 120639, ¶ 30 ("substantive unconscionability involves a situation in which a clause or term in the contract is totally one-sided or harsh.").

2008Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 , 122 S.Ct. at 1241 , 152 L.Ed.2d at 301 .

2008Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 , 122 S.Ct. at 1241 , 152 L.Ed.2d at 301 .

2007Phillips, 197 Ill. 2d at 339 .

2007Phillips, 197 Ill.2d at 339 , 259 Ill.Dec. 12 , 757 N.E.2d 875 .

2003Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d at 111 , 545 N.E.2d at 657 .

2003Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d at 111 , 545 N.E.2d at 657 .

1999The certificate failed to contain a statement indicating that defense counsel had reviewed the proceedings of the plea of guilty, and we are not persuaded by the State’s assertion that strict compliance with Rule 604(d) “does not necessarily mean literalistic compliance which ignores the reality of the situation at bar.” Our supreme court has made it emphatically clear that strict compliance with each of the provisions set forth in Rule 604(d) is required (Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33 ), and, therefore, we will not ignore that policy.

1999The certificate failed to contain a statement indicating that defense counsel had reviewed the proceedings of the plea of guilty, and we are not persuaded by the State's assertion that strict compliance with Rule 604(d) "does not necessarily mean literalistic compliance which ignores the reality of the situation at bar." Our supreme court has made it emphatically clear that strict compliance with each of the provisions set forth in Rule 604(d) is required ( Janes , 158 Ill. 2d at 33 ), and, therefore, we will not ignore that policy.

1998In this respect, the Court noted that “[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 , 49 L.

1998In this respect, the Court noted that “[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 , 49 L.

1997We find the situation at bar more readily analogous to the case of Bucci v. Rustin , 227 Ill.

1997We find the situation at bar more readily analogous to the case of Bucci v. Rustin, 227 Ill.

1990(People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147, 161 ; People v. Strohl (1983), 118 Ill.

1986In a situation where defense counsel has represented a State's witness, a per se conflict of interest will not be held to exist unless the professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with counsel's representation of the defendant. ( People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill.2d 147, 161 ; People v. Strohl (1983), 118 Ill.

1973However, we will note the recent decision of this court in De Phillips v. Mortgage Associates, Inc., 8 Ill.App.3d 759 , 291 N.E.2d 329 , leave to appeal denied March 27, 1973.

1973However, we will note the recent decision of this court in De Phillips v. Mortgage Associates, Inc., 8 Ill.App.3d 759 , 291 N.E.2d 329 , leave to appeal denied March 27, 1973.

2026The State argued that defendant brought mental defenses up in the case by raising the issue of his mental health in the motion to suppress and had indicated an intent to use “some type of mental defense at trial.” The State cited People v. Comier, 2020 IL App (1st) 170500 , arguing that section 115-6 did not preclude the court from requiring a defendant to submit to a psychological examination in situations not specifically delineated under the statute. ¶6 Defendant argued that ordering him to submit to a psychological examination in this situation was a violation of his rights under the fifth

2026Defendant argued he had not given notice of an intent to use any of the specific defenses delineated under section 115- 6 and that a defendant’s mental state for the purposes of his ability to waive his Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) rights was not one of the exceptions delineated under section 115-6, therefore he should not be ordered to submit to an examination.

2026In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2013 IL App (2d) 120639, ¶ 30 . “ ‘Indicative of substantive unconscionability are contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, and significant cost-price disparity.’ ” Kinkel, 223 Ill. 2d at 28 (quoting Maxwell v. 30 Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 89 (1995)).

2023To again quote Justice Wolfson, “[a] policy need not provide coverage against all possible liabilities; if it provides coverage against some, the policy is not illusory.” Nicor, 362 Ill.

2023Hernandez v. Pritikin, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 41 . ¶ 22 The HAS entities have not shown that res judicata applies in this situation to bar the issuance of a subpoena.

2021Kranzler, 2018 IL App (1st) 171169, ¶ 39 . ¶ 16 We have explained that “a marital settlement agreement is unconscionable if there is an absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. [Citation.] This general definition encompasses both procedural unconscionability—involving impropriety during the process of forming a contract that deprives a party of meaningful choice—and substantive unconscionability—a situation in which a clause or term in the contract is one-sided or harsh. [Citation.]” (Inte

2020This testimony was properly admitted as substantive evidence of Rivera’s guilt. [Citation.] Thus, in contrast to the situation presented here, Rivera involved a situation where a defense witness said that he was involved in a crime with the defendant.” Id.