situation defense in New Jersey

1930"Applying to this situation the rule of the cases in this court and in the court of errors and appeals ( Dennis v. Jones, 44 N.J.

1929The first undisputed offer to rescind is made by the answer filed March, 1921, eight months after the transaction, five months after they discovered the fraud in October, two months after defendants state they knew completely to what extent they had been defrauded, over a month after they had used the rents from the property, and this offer was made only after they had been restrained from collecting further rents." "Applying to this situation the rule of the cases in this court and in the court of errors and appeals [ Dennis v. Jones, 44 N.J.

2005For example, while factually dissimilar, State v. Tyler, supra, 176 N.J. 171 , 821 A. 2d 1139 , illuminates the manner in which the trial judge's error here compels reversal.

2005For example, while factually dissimilar, State v. Tyler, supra, 176 N.J. 171 , 821 A. 2d 1139 , illuminates the manner in which the trial judge's error here compels reversal.

2003The Court distinguished this situation from a claim of exemption: When the statutory language is unclear and the legislative history is wanting, the doubt referred to in [Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 , 38 S.Ct. 53 , 62 L.Ed. 211 (1917) ] exists and its principle is applicable.

2003The Court distinguished this situation from a claim of exemption: When the statutory language is unclear and the legislative history is wanting, the doubt referred to in [Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 , 38 S.Ct. 53 , 62 L.Ed. 211 (1917) ] exists and its principle is applicable.

2000Referring to State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 , 388 A. 2d 218 (1978), and State v. Trent, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979), the Court went on to explain the considerations in detail: What Miller and Trent contemplate and caution against, however, is the substitution of a juror in a situation where the presumption that jurors follow instructions is unreasonable or untenable.

2000Referring to State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 , 388 A. 2d 218 (1978), and State v. Trent, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979), the Court went on to explain the considerations in detail: What Miller and Trent contemplate and caution against, however, is the substitution of a juror in a situation where the presumption that jurors follow instructions is unreasonable or untenable.

2000Referring to State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 , 388 A. 2d 218 (1978), and State v. Trent, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979), the Court went on to explain the considerations in detail: What Miller and Trent contemplate and caution against, however, is the substitution of a juror in a situation where the presumption that jurors follow instructions is unreasonable or untenable.

2000Referring to State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 , 388 A. 2d 218 (1978), and State v. Trent, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979), the Court went on to explain the considerations in detail: What Miller and Trent contemplate and caution against, however, is the substitution of a juror in a situation where the presumption that jurors follow instructions is unreasonable or untenable.

1999Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 613-14 , 677 A. 2d 1106 . [4] In Knight , we left open the question whether, as a matter of state law, we would apply the Bagley materiality standard where the defendant has made a specific request for Brady materials. 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A. 2d 642 .

1999Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 613-14 , 677 A. 2d 1106 . [4] In Knight , we left open the question whether, as a matter of state law, we would apply the Bagley materiality standard where the defendant has made a specific request for Brady materials. 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A. 2d 642 .

1999Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 613-14 , 677 A. 2d 1106 . [4] In Knight , we left open the question whether, as a matter of state law, we would apply the Bagley materiality standard where the defendant has made a specific request for Brady materials. 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A. 2d 642 .

1999Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 613-14 , 677 A. 2d 1106 . [4] In Knight , we left open the question whether, as a matter of state law, we would apply the Bagley materiality standard where the defendant has made a specific request for Brady materials. 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A. 2d 642 .

1999See Williams, supra, 80 N.J. at 482 , 404 A.2d 34 (holding that Rule 3:13-3 "applies to written statements or memoranda reporting or summarizing the oral statements made by any witness ... the State may call ... at trial only in a situation where the defense intends to use the statement or memoranda at trial”); Mingo, supra, 77 N.J. at 587 , 392 A.2d 590 (holding that Rule 3:13-3 does not require discovery of expert’s report defense does not intend to use at trial).

1999See Williams, supra, 80 N.J. at 482 , 404 A.2d 34 (holding that Rule 3:13-3 "applies to written statements or memoranda reporting or summarizing the oral statements made by any witness ... the State may call ... at trial only in a situation where the defense intends to use the statement or memoranda at trial”); Mingo, supra, 77 N.J. at 587 , 392 A.2d 590 (holding that Rule 3:13-3 does not require discovery of expert’s report defense does not intend to use at trial).

1976In this situation the standard of “materiality” is somewhat less strict and imposes “a higher burden on the defendant.” Id. ___ U. S. at ___, 96 S. Ct. at 2401 .

1976In this situation the standard of “materiality” is somewhat less strict and imposes “a higher burden on the defendant.” Id. ___ U. S. at ___, 96 S. Ct. at 2401 .

1971If there is no saving clause he can and should be punished under the new law. ( Sekt v. Justice's Court, Supra [ 26 Cal.2d 297 ], at p. 305, 159 P.2d 17 .) In such a situation the rule of construction that statutes are normally to be interpreted to operate prospectively and retroactively (a rule embodied in Section 3 of the Penal Code) has been rebutted.

1971If there is no saving clause he can and should be punished under the new law. ( Sekt v. Justice's Court, Supra [ 26 Cal.2d 297 ], at p. 305, 159 P.2d 17 .) In such a situation the rule of construction that statutes are normally to be interpreted to operate prospectively and retroactively (a rule embodied in Section 3 of the Penal Code) has been rebutted.

1961In In re Shack's Will, 207 Misc. 953 , 140 N.Y.S. 2 d 744 ( Surr.

1958Hilley v. Blue Ridge Insurance Company, 235 N.C. 544 , 70 S.E. 2 d 570, 38 A.L.R. 2 d 1090 ( Sup. Ct. 1952); Auto Owners Protective Exchange of Kankakee, Ill. v. Edwards, 82 Ind. App. 558 , 136 N.E. 577 ( App. Ct. 1922); Libertin v. St.

1958Hilley v. Blue Ridge Insurance Company, 235 N.C. 544 , 70 S.E. 2 d 570, 38 A.L.R. 2 d 1090 ( Sup. Ct. 1952); Auto Owners Protective Exchange of Kankakee, Ill. v. Edwards, 82 Ind. App. 558 , 136 N.E. 577 ( App. Ct. 1922); Libertin v. St.

1958In view of the expressed basis of our decision, we find it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' further contention that extension or enlargement of a non-conforming use by means of a variance is absolutely barred by virtue of the decision in Ranney v. Istituto Pontificio Delle Maestre Filippini, 20 N.J. 189 (1955).

1958Hilley v. Blue Ridge Insurance Company, 235 N.C. 544 , 70 S.E. 2 d 570, 38 A.L.R. 2 d 1090 ( Sup. Ct. 1952); Auto Owners Protective Exchange of Kankakee, Ill. v. Edwards, 82 Ind. App. 558 , 136 N.E. 577 ( App. Ct. 1922); Libertin v. St.

1956Although the Workmen's Compensation Division is not a court ( Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356 (1949)), the sense of the rule justifies the view espoused by appellant that it ought to be applied in the present situation and a requirement for application for leave to appeal should not be imposed.

1949He accepted his latest re-appointment after the adoption of the statute he relies upon." In Hardy v. Orange, 61 N.J.L. 620 , a claim of tenure under a Veterans' Tenure Act was made by the holder of a position who had accepted appointment for a fixed term to a position where the term of the position was not fixed by statute, and the Court of Errors and Appeals held that the acceptance by Hardy, the prosecutor, of an appointment to the position of keeper of the Orange reservoir for a period of one year from June 1, 1896 (assuming that it was a position whose term was not fixed by law), was a wai

1941So, it was held in John v. State (1896), 6 Wyo. 203 ; 44 Pac.

1941So, it was held in John v. State (1896), 6 Wyo. 203 ; 44 Pac.