situation rule in Kansas

1991"Provident also cites Akins v. Illinois Bankers Life Assurance Co., 166 Kan. 648 , 203 P.2d 180 (1949), in support of its argument.

1991"Provident also cites Akins v. Illinois Bankers Life Assurance Co., 166 Kan. 648 , 203 P.2d 180 (1949), in support of its argument.

1949(PMllipson v. Watson, 149 Kan. 395 , 87 P. 2d 567 .) (Our italics.) (p. 43Í.) The language relied on is the italicized portion of the foregoing statement.

1949(PMllipson v. Watson, 149 Kan. 395 , 87 P. 2d 567 .) (Our italics.) (p. 43Í.) The language relied on is the italicized portion of the foregoing statement.

1949In such a situation the rule is that if the motion for a new trial raises nothing more than purely legal questions involved in the decision the appeal is too late (Palmer v. Helmer, 159 Kan. 647 , 157 P. 2d 531 ), but if it pertains to alleged trial errors, such as rulings on the admission of evidence, or other rulings of the court pertaining to the trial itself, or re-glares the consideration of all the evidence, the competency of witnesses and the weighing of the testimony, the ruling of the trial court upon the motion for a new trial is regarded as a ruling upon those questions, from which

1949In such a situation the rule is that if the motion for a new trial raises nothing more than purely legal questions involved in the decision the appeal is too late (Palmer v. Helmer, 159 Kan. 647 , 157 P. 2d 531 ), but if it pertains to alleged trial errors, such as rulings on the admission of evidence, or other rulings of the court pertaining to the trial itself, or re-glares the consideration of all the evidence, the competency of witnesses and the weighing of the testimony, the ruling of the trial court upon the motion for a new trial is regarded as a ruling upon those questions, from which

2014State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 632 , 316 P.3d 136 (2014).

2014State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 632 , 316 P.3d 136 (2014).

2008The typical situation for a claim such as this is found in an old case, Rezac v. Zima, 96 Kan. 752, 754 , 153 Pac. 500 (1915), in which the court noted: “A broker or agent who undertakes to procure insurance for another is bound to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain insurance in accordance toith his agreement and to notify his principal if he is unable to do so.

2008The typical situation for a claim such as this is found in an old case, Rezac v. Zima, 96 Kan. 752, 754 , 153 Pac. 500 (1915), in which the court noted: “A broker or agent who undertakes to procure insurance for another is bound to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain insurance in accordance toith his agreement and to notify his principal if he is unable to do so.

1979Fenly v. Revell, 170 Kan. 705 , 228 P.2d 905 (1951).

1979Fenly v. Revell, 170 Kan. 705 , 228 P.2d 905 (1951).

1977We cannot approve the wholesale admission of repetitious, grotesque and bloody photographs which add nothing to the state's case. ( State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 .) But this is not the situation at bar.

1977We cannot approve the wholesale admission of repetitious, grotesque and bloody photographs which add nothing to the state's case. ( State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 .) But this is not the situation at bar.

1962(See Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 179 Kan. 525 [Syl. ¶3], 297 P. 2d 159 ; Albin v. Munsell, 189 Kan. 304, 311 , 369 P. 2d 323 .) In any event, after serious consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties, we are convinced the evidence in this case presents a situation where what was said by Mr. Chief Justice Harvey in Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45 , 204 P. 2d 752 , is clearly applicable and, when applied, must be regarded as decisive of the claim now under consideration.

1962(See Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 179 Kan. 525 [Syl. ¶3], 297 P. 2d 159 ; Albin v. Munsell, 189 Kan. 304, 311 , 369 P. 2d 323 .) In any event, after serious consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties, we are convinced the evidence in this case presents a situation where what was said by Mr. Chief Justice Harvey in Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45 , 204 P. 2d 752 , is clearly applicable and, when applied, must be regarded as decisive of the claim now under consideration.

1962(See Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 179 Kan. 525 [Syl. ¶3], 297 P. 2d 159 ; Albin v. Munsell, 189 Kan. 304, 311 , 369 P. 2d 323 .) In any event, after serious consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties, we are convinced the evidence in this case presents a situation where what was said by Mr. Chief Justice Harvey in Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45 , 204 P. 2d 752 , is clearly applicable and, when applied, must be regarded as decisive of the claim now under consideration.

1962(See Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 179 Kan. 525 [Syl. ¶3], 297 P. 2d 159 ; Albin v. Munsell, 189 Kan. 304, 311 , 369 P. 2d 323 .) In any event, after serious consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties, we are convinced the evidence in this case presents a situation where what was said by Mr. Chief Justice Harvey in Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45 , 204 P. 2d 752 , is clearly applicable and, when applied, must be regarded as decisive of the claim now under consideration.

1962(See Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 179 Kan. 525 [Syl. ¶3], 297 P. 2d 159 ; Albin v. Munsell, 189 Kan. 304, 311 , 369 P. 2d 323 .) In any event, after serious consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties, we are convinced the evidence in this case presents a situation where what was said by Mr. Chief Justice Harvey in Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45 , 204 P. 2d 752 , is clearly applicable and, when applied, must be regarded as decisive of the claim now under consideration.

1962(See Winfough v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 179 Kan. 525 [Syl. ¶3], 297 P. 2d 159 ; Albin v. Munsell, 189 Kan. 304, 311 , 369 P. 2d 323 .) In any event, after serious consideration of all arguments advanced by the parties, we are convinced the evidence in this case presents a situation where what was said by Mr. Chief Justice Harvey in Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45 , 204 P. 2d 752 , is clearly applicable and, when applied, must be regarded as decisive of the claim now under consideration.

1961We also keep in mind the further rule that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show fully a situation where the doctrine is applicable, otherwise there may be an attempt to shift the burden of proof in negligence cases by merely asserting that the doctrine is applicable (Johnson v. Latimer, 180 Kan. 720 , 308 P. 2d 65 ).

1961We also keep in mind the further rule that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show fully a situation where the doctrine is applicable, otherwise there may be an attempt to shift the burden of proof in negligence cases by merely asserting that the doctrine is applicable (Johnson v. Latimer, 180 Kan. 720 , 308 P. 2d 65 ).

1960It will be observed in the line of authorities indicated by the Niccum case 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 144.3, is quoted (Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946 , 96 P. 2d 849 ; and Leach v. Leach, supra), and in the other line of authorities adhering to the Wear case 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 147.1, is quoted (White v. White, supra).

1960It will be observed in the line of authorities indicated by the Niccum case 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 144.3, is quoted (Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946 , 96 P. 2d 849 ; and Leach v. Leach, supra), and in the other line of authorities adhering to the Wear case 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 147.1, is quoted (White v. White, supra).

1960A careful study of the facts there presented will disclose the doctrine stated in Leach v. Leach, 184 Kan. 335 , 336 P. 2d 425 , there applied, is not applicable to the situation governed by the rule of law set forth in Wear v. Wear, supra, and the cases heretofore cited adhering thereto.

1960A careful study of the facts there presented will disclose the doctrine stated in Leach v. Leach, 184 Kan. 335 , 336 P. 2d 425 , there applied, is not applicable to the situation governed by the rule of law set forth in Wear v. Wear, supra, and the cases heretofore cited adhering thereto.

1946As I review the record it clearly discloses a situation where the rule stated in Ray v. Allen, 159 Kan. 167 , 152 P. 2d 851 , that— “Following Bell v. Johnson, 142 Kan. 360 , 46 P. 2d 886 , it is held: where the plaintiff, who is the only witness in his own behalf, testifies to a state of facts which precludes his recovery the effect cannot be avoided, and he is bound thereby.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) should be applied.

1946As I review the record it clearly discloses a situation where the rule stated in Ray v. Allen, 159 Kan. 167 , 152 P. 2d 851 , that— “Following Bell v. Johnson, 142 Kan. 360 , 46 P. 2d 886 , it is held: where the plaintiff, who is the only witness in his own behalf, testifies to a state of facts which precludes his recovery the effect cannot be avoided, and he is bound thereby.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) should be applied.

1946As I review the record it clearly discloses a situation where the rule stated in Ray v. Allen, 159 Kan. 167 , 152 P. 2d 851 , that— “Following Bell v. Johnson, 142 Kan. 360 , 46 P. 2d 886 , it is held: where the plaintiff, who is the only witness in his own behalf, testifies to a state of facts which precludes his recovery the effect cannot be avoided, and he is bound thereby.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) should be applied.

1946As I review the record it clearly discloses a situation where the rule stated in Ray v. Allen, 159 Kan. 167 , 152 P. 2d 851 , that— “Following Bell v. Johnson, 142 Kan. 360 , 46 P. 2d 886 , it is held: where the plaintiff, who is the only witness in his own behalf, testifies to a state of facts which precludes his recovery the effect cannot be avoided, and he is bound thereby.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) should be applied.

1932(Whiteley v. Watson, 93 Kan. 671 , 145 Pac. 568 .) The judgment is affirmed.

1932(Whiteley v. Watson, 93 Kan. 671 , 145 Pac. 568 .) The judgment is affirmed.

1928In Brizendine v. Railroad Co., 96 Kan. 691 , 158 Pac. 495 , this court said: “Rule followed that general knowledge of a situation does not bar recovery on the ground of assumption of risk unless the injured party appreciated the danger.” (Syl.

1922(Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 , 13 A. S. R. 147, and note; Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365 , 30 L.

1922(Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 , 13 A. S. R. 147, and note; Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365 , 30 L.

1914In this situation the rule announced in Railway Co. v. Ryan, 69 Kan. 538 , 77 Pac. 267 , applies.

1914In this situation the rule announced in Railway Co. v. Ryan, 69 Kan. 538 , 77 Pac. 267 , applies.

1914It was there held : “Where, upon the trial of an action for personal injuries, plaintiff testified that she alighted from an east-bound street car and passed back of it and to the northward upon a parallel track four feet distant on which cars traveled in an opposite direction, without looking for an approaching car, and sustained injury, and that by looking eastward along the space between the parallel tracks, after passing by the end of the. standing car, she could have seen an approaching car for a distance of two blocks, it is held, that it is error to overrule a demurrer to plaintiff’s ev

1914It was there held : “Where, upon the trial of an action for personal injuries, plaintiff testified that she alighted from an east-bound street car and passed back of it and to the northward upon a parallel track four feet distant on which cars traveled in an opposite direction, without looking for an approaching car, and sustained injury, and that by looking eastward along the space between the parallel tracks, after passing by the end of the. standing car, she could have seen an approaching car for a distance of two blocks, it is held, that it is error to overrule a demurrer to plaintiff’s ev

1912In this situation the doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied in Burgess v. Hixon, 75 Kan. 201 , 88 Pac. 1076 , and followed in Thayer v. Schaben, 79 Kan. 856 , 98 Pac. 1134 , applies.

1912In this situation the doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied in Burgess v. Hixon, 75 Kan. 201 , 88 Pac. 1076 , and followed in Thayer v. Schaben, 79 Kan. 856 , 98 Pac. 1134 , applies.

1912In this situation the doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied in Burgess v. Hixon, 75 Kan. 201 , 88 Pac. 1076 , and followed in Thayer v. Schaben, 79 Kan. 856 , 98 Pac. 1134 , applies.

1912In this situation the doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied in Burgess v. Hixon, 75 Kan. 201 , 88 Pac. 1076 , and followed in Thayer v. Schaben, 79 Kan. 856 , 98 Pac. 1134 , applies.

1907All persons entering upon possession of property pendente lite are presumed to have entered under the defendant in the litigation. (3 Freeman, Executions, 3d ed., § 475.) The supreme court of California, in deciding this proposition, said in Wetherbee v. Dunn, 36 Cal. 147, 150 , 95 Am.