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11 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Barozgreen1 sentence2024See 2017-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 17-18 , 404 P.3d 769 (holding that the objective element was not satisfied because the defendant voluntarily entered and provoked the situation and did not claim that he saw any weapons or knew that anyone at the residence carried guns). | 1 | 1 |
Sherman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015This is not an appropriate situation to rule on subjective entrapment as a 9 matter of law, see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (ruling on the 10 issue as a matter of law only because the Court was “not choosing between conflicting 11 witnesses, nor judging credibility”), particularly on appeal via application of the right 12 for any reason doctrine, see State v. Wilson, 1998-NMCA-084, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 390 , 13 962 P.2d 636 (“Appellate courts usually apply the right for any reason basis of 14 affirmance to strictly legal questions.”). | 1 | 1 |
Castillo Ex Rel. Castillo v. County of Santa Fegreen2 sentences1997See Castillo, 107 N.M. at 207 , 755 P.2d at 51 . 13. 1997See Castillo, 107 N.M. at 207 , 755 P.2d at 51 . 13. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ortega
green
1 sentence2016Our 17 Supreme Court has instructed that in such a situation when defense counsel is unable 18 to make a proffer, he or she can request “immunity limited to an in camera hearing, 19 which [allows] the district court to hear [the witness’s] testimony and gauge its 42 1 importance.” Ortega, 2014-NMSC-017, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2015This is not an appropriate situation to rule on subjective entrapment as a 9 matter of law, see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (ruling on the 10 issue as a matter of law only because the Court was “not choosing between conflicting 11 witnesses, nor judging credibility”), particularly on appeal via application of the right 12 for any reason doctrine, see State v. Wilson, 1998-NMCA-084, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 390 , 13 962 P.2d 636 (“Appellate courts usually apply the right for any reason basis of 14 affirmance to strictly legal questions.”). 2015This is not an appropriate situation to rule on subjective entrapment as a 9 matter of law, see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (ruling on the 10 issue as a matter of law only because the Court was “not choosing between conflicting 11 witnesses, nor judging credibility”), particularly on appeal via application of the right 12 for any reason doctrine, see State v. Wilson, 1998-NMCA-084, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 390 , 13 962 P.2d 636 (“Appellate courts usually apply the right for any reason basis of 14 affirmance to strictly legal questions.”). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Daly
green
1 sentence2007“In a situation where defense counsel has previously represented one of the State’s witnesses, a per se conflict of interest exists if the professional relationship between counsel and the witness is contemporaneous with counsel’s representation of defendant.” Id. at 450 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Orosco
green
1 sentence2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Medina
green
2 sentences1987In People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App.3d 438 , 116 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1974), the court reversed a conviction in a situation where the immunity agreement provided that the accomplice must not deviate in her testimony from her earlier recorded statement given to police. 1987In People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App.3d 438 , 116 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1974), the court reversed a conviction in a situation where the immunity agreement provided that the accomplice must not deviate in her testimony from her earlier recorded statement given to police. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Fitzgerald v. Valdez
green
2 sentences1973In Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 776 , 427 P.2d 655, 659 , (1967), this court discussed the meaning of emancipation in terms of altering the family relationship so that a child is no longer subject to parental care and discipline, rather than by operation of law as we are here concerned. 1973In Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 776 , 427 P.2d 655, 659 , (1967), this court discussed the meaning of emancipation in terms of altering the family relationship so that a child is no longer subject to parental care and discipline, rather than by operation of law as we are here concerned. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Minnesota v. Blasius
green
2 sentences1970In this situation the principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States and adhered to by the lower Federal courts and the courts of the various states that if the break in the interstate journey was caused by the exigencies or conveniences of the chosen means of transportation, considerations of the safety of the goods during transit, or natural causes over which the taxpayer has no control, the continuity of the transit remains unimpaired, and the immunity of the goods from state or local taxation is consequently unaffected; but if the interruption in the journey occurred 1970In this situation the principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States and adhered to by the lower Federal courts and the courts of the various states that if the break in the interstate journey was caused by the exigencies or conveniences of the chosen means of transportation, considerations of the safety of the goods during transit, or natural causes over which the taxpayer has no control, the continuity of the transit remains unimpaired, and the immunity of the goods from state or local taxation is consequently unaffected; but if the interruption in the journey occurred | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele
green
2 sentences1970In this situation the principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States and adhered to by the lower Federal courts and the courts of the various states that if the break in the interstate journey was caused by the exigencies or conveniences of the chosen means of transportation, considerations of the safety of the goods during transit, or natural causes over which the taxpayer has no control, the continuity of the transit remains unimpaired, and the immunity of the goods from state or local taxation is consequently unaffected; but if the interruption in the journey occurred 1970In this situation the principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States and adhered to by the lower Federal courts and the courts of the various states that if the break in the interstate journey was caused by the exigencies or conveniences of the chosen means of transportation, considerations of the safety of the goods during transit, or natural causes over which the taxpayer has no control, the continuity of the transit remains unimpaired, and the immunity of the goods from state or local taxation is consequently unaffected; but if the interruption in the journey occurred | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Hopkins v. Martinez
green
2 sentences1967Hopkins v. Martinez, 73 N.M. 275 , 387 P.2d 852 (1963). 1967Hopkins v. Martinez, 73 N.M. 275 , 387 P.2d 852 (1963). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Greathouse v. Greathouse
green
1 sentence1958This court on appeal held that the issuance of a restraining order by the divorce court restraining the husband and the corporation from disposing of the stock until further order “effectively conferred jurisdiction of the res on the divorce court and subjected the shares of stock to the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the marital status of the parties.” [ 64 N.M. 21 , 322 P.2d 1076 .] We are of the opinion, however, that the situation at bar is distinguishable from that in the Greathouse case in at least three important particulars and that as to the property involved the int | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.