situation claim in Connecticut

1999In State v. Conroy, 194 Conn. 623, 632-33 , 484 A.2d 448 (1984), our Supreme Court addressed a situation in which defense counsel was threatened with contempt of court in the presence of the jury during closing argument.

1999In State v. Conroy, 194 Conn. 623, 632-33 , 484 A.2d 448 (1984), our Supreme Court addressed a situation in which defense counsel was threatened with contempt of court in the presence of the jury during closing argument.

1997Thus, in a situation in which defense counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, a successful habeas petitioner need not establish actual prejudice. cf. Phillips v. Warden, 220 Conn. 112 (1991).

1996An example of a situation where a waiver arises is when an insurer settles a case "voluntarily and with knowledge of facts indicating non coverage. . . ." Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. Sears, Roebuck, 621 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. (1980).

1981On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred because “the doctrine of part performance does not apply in a situation where a claim is being made against an estate for an oral promise to devise land.” We have held that acts on 'the part of the promisee may be sufficient to take a contract out of the statute “if they are such as clearly refer to some contract in relation to the matter in dispute.” Rienzo v. Cohen, 112 Conn. 427, 429 , 152 A. 394 (1930); see Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 108 , 82 A.2d 362 (1951).

1981On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred because “the doctrine of part performance does not apply in a situation where a claim is being made against an estate for an oral promise to devise land.” We have held that acts on 'the part of the promisee may be sufficient to take a contract out of the statute “if they are such as clearly refer to some contract in relation to the matter in dispute.” Rienzo v. Cohen, 112 Conn. 427, 429 , 152 A. 394 (1930); see Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 108 , 82 A.2d 362 (1951).

1981“The doctrine of part performance arose from the necessity of preventing the statute against frauds from becoming an engine of fraud.” Harmonie Club, Inc. v. Smirnow, 106 Conn. 243, 249 , 137 A. 769 (1927). “[T]he acts of part performance generally ‘must be such as are done by the party seeking to enforce the contract, in pursuance of the contract, and with the design of carrying the same into execution, and must also be done with the assent, express or implied, or knowledge of the other party, and be such acts as alter the relations of the parties.’ Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 120 , 26 A

1981“The doctrine of part performance arose from the necessity of preventing the statute against frauds from becoming an engine of fraud.” Harmonie Club, Inc. v. Smirnow, 106 Conn. 243, 249 , 137 A. 769 (1927). “[T]he acts of part performance generally ‘must be such as are done by the party seeking to enforce the contract, in pursuance of the contract, and with the design of carrying the same into execution, and must also be done with the assent, express or implied, or knowledge of the other party, and be such acts as alter the relations of the parties.’ Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 120 , 26 A

1981“The doctrine of part performance arose from the necessity of preventing the statute against frauds from becoming an engine of fraud.” Harmonie Club, Inc. v. Smirnow, 106 Conn. 243, 249 , 137 A. 769 (1927). “[T]he acts of part performance generally ‘must be such as are done by the party seeking to enforce the contract, in pursuance of the contract, and with the design of carrying the same into execution, and must also be done with the assent, express or implied, or knowledge of the other party, and be such acts as alter the relations of the parties.’ Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 120 , 26 A

1981“The doctrine of part performance arose from the necessity of preventing the statute against frauds from becoming an engine of fraud.” Harmonie Club, Inc. v. Smirnow, 106 Conn. 243, 249 , 137 A. 769 (1927). “[T]he acts of part performance generally ‘must be such as are done by the party seeking to enforce the contract, in pursuance of the contract, and with the design of carrying the same into execution, and must also be done with the assent, express or implied, or knowledge of the other party, and be such acts as alter the relations of the parties.’ Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 120 , 26 A

1975Section of Antitrust Law 26, 29; see, e.g., New Haven Water Co. v. Mauro Construction Co., 144 Conn. 195, 199 , 128 A.2d 531 ; Levitt v. Public Utilities Commission, 114 Conn. 628, 634 , 159 A. 878 ; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 40.

1975Section of Antitrust Law 26, 29; see, e.g., New Haven Water Co. v. Mauro Construction Co., 144 Conn. 195, 199 , 128 A.2d 531 ; Levitt v. Public Utilities Commission, 114 Conn. 628, 634 , 159 A. 878 ; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 40.

1965YII Slattery v. Hartford-Cornnecticut Trust Co., 115 Conn. 163 (1932), invoked by the plaintiff in support of his position, will now be considered.

1961Campus v. McElligott, supra; Swearsky v. Stanley Dry Goods Co., 122 Conn. 7, 12 , 186 A. 556 ; Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, supra. The defendants place great reliance on Swearsky v. Stanley Dry Goods Co., supra. The opinion in that case gives, as an illustration of a situation where the rule promulgated in the charge in the instant case would be applicable, “the construction or repair of the walls of a building abutting the street line, [and] the repair or erection of signs or awnings on such walls, etc.” Id., 13.

1961Campus v. McElligott, supra; Swearsky v. Stanley Dry Goods Co., 122 Conn. 7, 12 , 186 A. 556 ; Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, supra. The defendants place great reliance on Swearsky v. Stanley Dry Goods Co., supra. The opinion in that case gives, as an illustration of a situation where the rule promulgated in the charge in the instant case would be applicable, “the construction or repair of the walls of a building abutting the street line, [and] the repair or erection of signs or awnings on such walls, etc.” Id., 13.

1955Austin, Nichols Co. v. Gross, 98 Conn. 782 , particularly invoked by the defendant, does not assist him in his claim of personal exoneration.

1955The situation at bar is not comparable to that in Meyers v. Maglaris, 15 Conn. Sup. 29 , which was decided for the defendant.

1948The words quoted are from Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Longshore Beach County Club, Inc., 127 Conn. 493 , 499 , a case not factually in point but one in which the quoted language is peculiarly adopted to the situation at bar.

1940Eq. 521, 91 Atl. 736 , the vice chancellor assumed that the refusal of the officials whose consent was necessary to effectuate the trust made it impossible to carry it out, but here such an assumption would be contrary to the facts as they have eventuated; and we have no need to consider what would have been the situation had a claim been made before the rescission of the original vote that the trust had failed.

1939An agreement by joint tenants that they will not sever the estate does not affect the legal title to the property but is binding only upon them personally, and it would not destroy the right of creditors of any of them to reach their interests any further than would any agreement of an owner of property with reference to the disposition of the title to it. / In such a situation the rule stated by us in Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 278 , 135 Atl. 555 , that one may not grant or devise to another an estate with a fixed legal incident and at the same time curtail him in the enjoyme

1939An agreement by joint tenants that they will not sever the estate does not affect the legal title to the property but is binding only upon them personally, and it would not destroy the right of creditors of any of them to reach their interests any further than would any agreement of an owner of property with reference to the disposition of the title to it. / In such a situation the rule stated by us in Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 278 , 135 Atl. 555 , that one may not grant or devise to another an estate with a fixed legal incident and at the same time curtail him in the enjoyme

1937In Rozycki v. Yantic Grain & Products Co., 99 Conn. 711 , 122 Atl. 717 , we had before us a situation where the vision of the plaintiff *217 driver was so impaired when he was driving along the roadway at night in the midst of a hard rain, that he could not see ahead for a distance of over twenty feet and did not discover a parked truck of the defendant until he was within ten or twelve feet of it, so close as to be unable to stop before striking it; the defendant, upon the issue of contributory negligence, claimed that the plaintiff was bound as matter of law to drive at a rate of speed which

1937In Rozycki v. Yantic Grain & Products Co., 99 Conn. 711 , 122 Atl. 717 , we had before us a situation where the vision of the plaintiff *217 driver was so impaired when he was driving along the roadway at night in the midst of a hard rain, that he could not see ahead for a distance of over twenty feet and did not discover a parked truck of the defendant until he was within ten or twelve feet of it, so close as to be unable to stop before striking it; the defendant, upon the issue of contributory negligence, claimed that the plaintiff was bound as matter of law to drive at a rate of speed which

1936Cone v. Cullen, supra; Water Commissioners v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 638 , 74 Atl. 938 ; Smith v. Water Commissioners, 38 Conn. 208, 218 .

1936Cone v. Cullen, supra; Water Commissioners v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 638 , 74 Atl. 938 ; Smith v. Water Commissioners, 38 Conn. 208, 218 .

1936Cone v. Cullen, supra; Water Commissioners v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 638 , 74 Atl. 938 ; Smith v. Water Commissioners, 38 Conn. 208, 218 .

1902Hartford v. Hartford Theological Seminary, 66 Conn. 475 ; United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546 .

1902Hartford v. Hartford Theological Seminary, 66 Conn. 475 ; United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546 .