11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1956–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helveringgreen2 sentences2013See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182 , 55 S.Ct. 127 (“An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.”); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36 , 78 S.Ct. 1033 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income — created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was “at a special disadvantage in detecting errors”). 2013See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182 , 55 S.Ct. 127 (“An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.”); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36 , 78 S.Ct. 1033 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income — created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was “at a special disadvantage in detecting errors”). | 1 | 1 |
Colony, Inc. v. Commissionergreen2 sentences2013See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182 , 55 S.Ct. 127 (“An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.”); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36 , 78 S.Ct. 1033 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income — created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was “at a special disadvantage in detecting errors”). 2013See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182 , 55 S.Ct. 127 (“An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.”); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36 , 78 S.Ct. 1033 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income — created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was “at a special disadvantage in detecting errors”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Agursgreen2 sentences2001In Bagley, the Court expanded on the “upon request” language, noting that “where the defense makes a specific request and the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence .... the standard might be more lenient than in the situation in which the defense makes no request or only a general request.” 473 U.S. at 681 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (“When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”)). 2001In Bagley, the Court expanded on the “upon request” language, noting that “where the defense makes a specific request and the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence .... the standard might be more lenient than in the situation in which the defense makes no request or only a general request.” 473 U.S. at 681 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (“When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”)). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Commissiongreen1 sentence1988Ordinarily, “ ‘[i]f the agency fails to make a finding on a material, contested issue of fact, this court cannot fill the gap by making its own determination from the record, but must remand the case for findings on that issue.’ ” Nursing Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 512 A.2d 301, 303 (D.C.1986) (quoting Colton v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 484 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C.1984)); Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 411 A.2d 635, 639 (D.C.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Colton v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1988Ordinarily, “ ‘[i]f the agency fails to make a finding on a material, contested issue of fact, this court cannot fill the gap by making its own determination from the record, but must remand the case for findings on that issue.’ ” Nursing Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 512 A.2d 301, 303 (D.C.1986) (quoting Colton v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 484 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C.1984)); Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 411 A.2d 635, 639 (D.C.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Nursing Services, Inc. v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1988Ordinarily, “ ‘[i]f the agency fails to make a finding on a material, contested issue of fact, this court cannot fill the gap by making its own determination from the record, but must remand the case for findings on that issue.’ ” Nursing Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 512 A.2d 301, 303 (D.C.1986) (quoting Colton v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 484 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C.1984)); Lee v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 411 A.2d 635, 639 (D.C.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Goodwin v. District of Columbia Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1985Therefore, where the later general statute does not present an irreconciliable conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification of or exception to the general law. 1A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.15 (4th ed.1972) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Goodwin v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 343 A.2d 63, 65-66 (D.C.1975). 1985Therefore, where the later general statute does not present an irreconciliable conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification of or exception to the general law. 1A SUTHERLAND; STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.15 (4th ed.1972) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Goodwin v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 343 A.2d 63, 65-66 (D.C.1975). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George Gray, Jr.green2 sentences1980It has been stated that a flexible rule is “responsive to the underlying rationale of the corroboration requirement — the avoidance of baseless accusations — and it is far more consonant with the realities of the trial situation than a rule which would compel the Government to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim’s testimony and again by independent evidence.” United States v. Gray, supra 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 477 F.2d at 445 . 1980It has been stated that a flexible rule is “responsive to the underlying rationale of the corroboration requirement — the avoidance of baseless accusations — and it is far more consonant with the realities of the trial situation than a rule which would compel the Government to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim’s testimony and again by independent evidence.” United States v. Gray, supra 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 477 F.2d at 445 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences2001In Bagley, the Court expanded on the “upon request” language, noting that “where the defense makes a specific request and the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence .... the standard might be more lenient than in the situation in which the defense makes no request or only a general request.” 473 U.S. at 681 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (“When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”)). 2001In Bagley , the Court expanded on the "upon request" language, noting that "where the defense makes a specific request and the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence.... the standard might be more lenient than in the situation in which the defense makes no request or only a general request." 473 U.S. at 681 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ("When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.")). | 2 | 1988–2001 |
Dyson v. United States
green
2 sentences1984Instead, we are guided by the well-settled standard recently enunciated in Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432 (D.C.1982) where, significantly, it appears that, as in the case before us, appellant made but one motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case. 1984Instead, we are guided by the well-settled standard recently enunciated in Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432 (D.C.1982) where, significantly, it appears that, as in the case before us, appellant made but one motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case. | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2001In Kyles , the Court reiterated what it had said in Bagley, that “regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ). 2001In Kyles , the Court reiterated what it had said in Bagley, that “regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Williams v. United States
green
2 sentences1992A principal purpose of the plain error rule “is to permit trial courts fully to consider issues and thereby avoid potential error.” Williams v. United States, 382 A.2d 1 , 7 n. 12 (D.C.1978). 1992A principal purpose of the plain error rule "is to permit trial courts fully to consider issues and thereby avoid potential error." Williams v. United States, 382 A.2d 1 , 7 n. 12 (D.C.1978). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp.
green
2 sentences1990Recently, in Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31 (D.C.1989), we declined to extend another outmoded doctrine, which was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent in analogous federal cases, but to which this court was committed under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), even though it was arguably difficult to articulate a persuasive distinction between the situation to which the doctrine applied and the circumstances to which we were asked to extend it. 1990Recently, in Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31 (D.C.1989), we declined to extend another outmoded doctrine, which was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent in analogous federal cases, but to which this court was committed under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), even though it was arguably difficult to articulate a persuasive distinction between the situation to which the doctrine applied and the circumstances to which we were asked to extend it. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
M. A. P. v. Ryan
green
2 sentences1990Recently, in Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31 (D.C.1989), we declined to extend another outmoded doctrine, which was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent in analogous federal cases, but to which this court was committed under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), even though it was arguably difficult to articulate a persuasive distinction between the situation to which the doctrine applied and the circumstances to which we were asked to extend it. 1990Recently, in Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31 (D.C.1989), we declined to extend another outmoded doctrine, which was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent in analogous federal cases, but to which this court was committed under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), even though it was arguably difficult to articulate a persuasive distinction between the situation to which the doctrine applied and the circumstances to which we were asked to extend it. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Nolan v. Werth
green
2 sentences1956In such a situation the principle laid down in Nolan v. Werth, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 33 , 142 F.2d 9 , is controlling. 1956In such a situation the principle laid down in Nolan v. Werth, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 33 , 142 F.2d 9 , is controlling. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.