32 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1882–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burkett v. Stategreen2 sentences2016“Even if justified, a reasonable suspicion only permits the officer to temporarily freeze the situation for inquiry and does not give him all the rights attendant to an arrest.” Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). [38] The only arguably relevant facts that Officers Smith and Casavan were able to articulate as a basis for invading Jacobs’s privacy are that he appeared to be a juvenile who should have been in school that afternoon,6 walked away from 6 Officer Smith did not specifically state that Jacobs himself appeared to be a juvenile; he merely referred to Jacobs “and 2016“Even if justified, a reasonable suspicion only permits the officer to temporarily freeze the situation for inquiry and does not give him all the rights attendant to an arrest.” Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). [38] The only arguably relevant facts that Officers Smith and Casavan were able to articulate as a basis for invading Jacobs’s privacy are that he appeared to be a juvenile who should have been in school that afternoon, 6 walked away from two marked vehicles that approached him, and disregarded Officer Smith’s order to stop. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2010State v. Campbell, 905 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2000See State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Bence v. Breiergreen1 sentence1980While it is thus significant that Bence, unlike the case at bar, involved a situation in which the standard of “unbecoming” and “detrimental” conduct appeared to “abut on sensitive first amendment freedoms,” Bence v. Breier, supra at 1190, we acknowledge that much of the essential reasoning expressed in that case has heretofore been adopted by our Supreme Court in an action involving the prohibition of “unprofessional conduct” by optometrists. | 1 | 1 |
Breed v. Jonesgreen1 sentence1977See 421 U.S. at 538, n. 18 . *352 Such is the situation at bar. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ward v. Yarnelle
green
2 sentences2009The Ward Court reasoned that where a mortgage is "for the purpose of raising funds to complete" a project and where the mortgagee and mechanic's lienholders have notice of each other's interests, "[they all engaged in a common enterprise, and none of them [is] in a situation to claim priority; their equities are equal." Ward, 91 N.E. at 15 . 1980Indeed, the court found the parties to have been engaged in somewhat of a “common enterprise”: They all engaged in a common enterprise, and none of them are in a situation to claim prioritpes]; their equities are equal. 91 N.E. at 15 . 7 In the present case, however, Wegmiller was not on notice of Bene ficial’s loan at the time materials were furnished for construction. | 2 | 1980–2009 |
In Re the Marriage of Coomer
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Harper v. State
green
1 sentence2010Harper, 922 N.E.2d at 79 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2007"Even if the stop is justified, a reasonable suspicion only allows the officer to temporarily *682 freeze the situation for inquiry and does not give him all the rights attendant to an arrest." Id. 2007“Even if the stop is justified, a reasonable suspicion only allows the officer to temporarily freeze the situation for inquiry and does not give him all the rights attendant to an arrest.” Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Louisville Cement Co. v. Mumaw
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 1222 . 2005Id. at 1222 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bell v. State
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Reeves v. State
green
2 sentences2001Id. 2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Charles Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp., Needmore Processing Division
green
1 sentence1994An example of a situation in which the doctrine of last clear chance would come into play was provided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp. (7th Cir.1990), 894 F.2d 246 : The classic last clear chance scenario is probably the case of a drunk sleeping on the tracks. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Tanner v. State
green
1 sentence1990This is unlike the situation where an instruction may be helpful in eliminating possible confusion of the jury, such as instructions on expert testimony, Lynn v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 297 , 392 N.E.2d 449 , a defendant's confession, Tanner v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 665 , and deposition testimony, Ingram, 547 N.E.2d at 829 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ingram v. State
green
1 sentence1990This is unlike the situation where an instruction may be helpful in eliminating possible confusion of the jury, such as instructions on expert testimony, Lynn v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 297 , 392 N.E.2d 449 , a defendant's confession, Tanner v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 665 , and deposition testimony, Ingram, 547 N.E.2d at 829 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Lynn v. State
green
2 sentences1990This is unlike the situation where an instruction may be helpful in eliminating possible confusion of the jury, such as instructions on expert testimony, Lynn v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 297 , 392 N.E.2d 449 , a defendant's confession, Tanner v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 665 , and deposition testimony, Ingram, 547 N.E.2d at 829 . 1990This is unlike the situation where an instruction may be helpful in eliminating possible confusion of the jury, such as instructions on expert testimony, Lynn v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 297 , 392 N.E.2d 449 , a defendant's confession, Tanner v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 665 , and deposition testimony, Ingram, 547 N.E.2d at 829 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Duncan v. State
green
2 sentences1983Here, rather than forcing a lawyer upon an accused, the trial court, on the morning of trial, relieved the accused of his lawyer, and permitted him to proceed pro se, in accord with his request and our decisions in German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67 , 373 N.E.2d 880 , and Duncan v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 770, 773 . 1983Here, rather than forcing a lawyer upon an accused, the trial court, on the morning of trial, relieved the accused of his lawyer, and permitted him to proceed pro se, in accord with his request and our decisions in German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67 , 373 N.E.2d 880 , and Duncan v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 770, 773 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
German v. State
green
2 sentences1983Here, rather than forcing a lawyer upon an accused, the trial court, on the morning of trial, relieved the accused of his lawyer, and permitted him to proceed pro se, in accord with his request and our decisions in German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67 , 373 N.E.2d 880 , and Duncan v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 770, 773 . 1983Here, rather than forcing a lawyer upon an accused, the trial court, on the morning of trial, relieved the accused of his lawyer, and permitted him to proceed pro se, in accord with his request and our decisions in German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67 , 373 N.E.2d 880 , and Duncan v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 770, 773 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
City of Evansville v. Follis
green
2 sentences1981It has been held that where the facts are equally known or accessible to all parties concerned, as they were in the case at bar, there can be no estoppel .... ****** Since neither the City nor the landowners in the case at bar knew the exact location of the boundary line at the time the permit was issued, and since this information was readily accessible to both parties from public records, the requisite elements of estoppel are missing.” Id. at 403 , 315 N.E.2d at 728 . 1981It has been held that where the facts are equally known or accessible to all parties concerned, as they were in the case at bar, there can be no estoppel .... ****** Since neither the City nor the landowners in the case at bar knew the exact location of the boundary line at the time the permit was issued, and since this information was readily accessible to both parties from public records, the requisite elements of estoppel are missing.” Id. at 403 , 315 N.E.2d at 728 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wise v. State
green
2 sentences1981Wise v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 114, 118 ; Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8(d) (Burns 1979). 1981Wise v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 114, 118 ; Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (d) (Burns 1979). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Southerland v. Calvert
green
1 sentence1980We note that while an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute may not be first launched at the appellate level, Linville v. Shelby County Plan Commission, (1972) Ind., 281 N.E.2d 884 ; In re Wardship of Bender, (1976) Ind.App., 352 N.E.2d 797 , since allegations of error must be properly raised in the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review, Southerland v. Calvert, (1974) Ind.App., 320 N.E.2d 803 , this maxim is inapposite to the situation at bar. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Gard v. Allen County Department of Public Welfare
green
1 sentence1980We note that while an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute may not be first launched at the appellate level, Linville v. Shelby County Plan Commission, (1972) Ind., 281 N.E.2d 884 ; In re Wardship of Bender, (1976) Ind.App., 352 N.E.2d 797 , since allegations of error must be properly raised in the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review, Southerland v. Calvert, (1974) Ind.App., 320 N.E.2d 803 , this maxim is inapposite to the situation at bar. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Linville v. Shelby County Plan Commission
green
1 sentence1980We note that while an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute may not be first launched at the appellate level, Linville v. Shelby County Plan Commission, (1972) Ind., 281 N.E.2d 884 ; In re Wardship of Bender, (1976) Ind.App., 352 N.E.2d 797 , since allegations of error must be properly raised in the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review, Southerland v. Calvert, (1974) Ind.App., 320 N.E.2d 803 , this maxim is inapposite to the situation at bar. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cassidy v. INDIANA STATE BD. OF REGIS., ETC.
green
2 sentences1980Cassidy v. Indiana State Board of Registration & Examination, (1963) 244 Ind. 137 , 191 N.E.2d 492 . 1980Cassidy v. Indiana State Board of Registration & Examination, (1963) 244 Ind. 137 , 191 N.E.2d 492 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Sharpe v. Graydon
neutral
2 sentences1974Though such a reading of Sharpe, supra ( 99 Ind. 232 ) may be criticized as being too strict, such a reading finds support in recent decisions of other jurisdictions. 1974Though such a reading of Sharpe, supra ( 99 Ind. 232 ) may be criticized as being too strict, such a reading finds support in recent decisions of other jurisdictions. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
United States v. E. Graydon Shuford, United States of America v. Herman S. Jordan, Jr.
green
1 sentence1973McCarty v. State (1873), 44 Ind. 214 ; U.S. v. Shuford, 454 F. 2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
McCarty v. State
green
1 sentence1973McCarty v. State (1873), 44 Ind. 214 ; U.S. v. Shuford, 454 F. 2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. FIELDS
green
2 sentences1970It seems to me that the following argument presented by the State as appellee in Webb v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 341 , 259 N. E. 2d 651 , fits exactly the situation at bar. 1970It seems to me that the following argument presented by the State as appellee in Webb v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 341 , 259 N.E.2d 651 , fits exactly the situation at bar. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Webb v. State
neutral
2 sentences1970It seems to me that the following argument presented by the State as appellee in Webb v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 341 , 259 N. E. 2d 651 , fits exactly the situation at bar. 1970It seems to me that the following argument presented by the State as appellee in Webb v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 341 , 259 N.E.2d 651 , fits exactly the situation at bar. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Worster v. Caylor
green
2 sentences1957In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” Worster v. Caylor (1953), 231 Ind. 625, 632 , 110 N. E. 2d 337 . 1957In such a situation the presumption, inference or doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” Worster v. Caylor (1953), 231 Ind. 625, 632 , 110 N. E. 2d 337 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Lincoln v. French green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. Reyher, Admx. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Kaiser v. Happel neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Kickels v. Fein green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Coleman v. State green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Kilgore v. Gannon green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Conrad v. State green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Island Coal Co. v. Combs green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Thrash v. Starbuck neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Barkley v. Barkley neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Hedges green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Phillips v. Town of Albany green | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.