situation bar in California

1961Even were the evidence insufficient to *811 support the alleged change, we would be inclined to consider this situation an exception to the so-called `changed circumstance' rule, warranting adherence to the view taken in Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal.2d 118, 123 [ 338 P.2d 450 ], that it is not an `iron-clad' rule but subject to exceptions where despite the fact no change of circumstances is apparent, the welfare of the child might require the previous order of custody be changed. ( Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719 [ 68 P.2d 719 ].) [5] Following the trend, first suggested in the Foster case, supra, 8 Ca

1961Even were the evidence insufficient to *811 support the alleged change, we would be inclined to consider this situation an exception to the so-called `changed circumstance' rule, warranting adherence to the view taken in Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal.2d 118, 123 [ 338 P.2d 450 ], that it is not an `iron-clad' rule but subject to exceptions where despite the fact no change of circumstances is apparent, the welfare of the child might require the previous order of custody be changed. ( Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719 [ 68 P.2d 719 ].) [5] Following the trend, first suggested in the Foster case, supra, 8 Ca

1961Even were the evidence insufficient to *811 support the alleged change, we would be inclined to consider this situation an exception to the so-called `changed circumstance' rule, warranting adherence to the view taken in Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal.2d 118, 123 [ 338 P.2d 450 ], that it is not an `iron-clad' rule but subject to exceptions where despite the fact no change of circumstances is apparent, the welfare of the child might require the previous order of custody be changed. ( Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719 [ 68 P.2d 719 ].) [5] Following the trend, first suggested in the Foster case, supra, 8 Ca

1961Even were the evidence insufficient to *811 support the alleged change, we would be inclined to consider this situation an exception to the so-called `changed circumstance' rule, warranting adherence to the view taken in Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal.2d 118, 123 [ 338 P.2d 450 ], that it is not an `iron-clad' rule but subject to exceptions where despite the fact no change of circumstances is apparent, the welfare of the child might require the previous order of custody be changed. ( Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719 [ 68 P.2d 719 ].) [5] Following the trend, first suggested in the Foster case, supra, 8 Ca

2018Defense counsel explained, 'I cannot disclose to the court privileged communications relating to that, but I'm in a position where I am not willing to call Mr. Johnson as a witness despite his desire to testify.' In response to the court's question, Johnson indicated defense counsel had accurately described the situation and defense counsel indicated he would '[n]ot voluntarily' call Johnson as a witness." ( Johnson, supra , 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 613 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805 .) After the trial court, misunderstanding the situation, told the defendant that his counsel had decided it was not in his i

2018Defense counsel explained, 'I cannot disclose to the court privileged communications relating to that, but I'm in a position where I am not willing to call Mr. Johnson as a witness despite his desire to testify.' In response to the court's question, Johnson indicated defense counsel had accurately described the situation and defense counsel indicated he would '[n]ot voluntarily' call Johnson as a witness." ( Johnson, supra , 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 613 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805 .) After the trial court, misunderstanding the situation, told the defendant that his counsel had decided it was not in his i

1959In Estate of Good, 146 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 304 P.2d 190 ], we said (p. 706) : “We have had occasion to remark before in a similar situation that a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to justify findings, consisting of mere assertion without a fair statement of the evidence, is entitled to no consideration, when it is apparent, as it is here, that a substantial amount of evidence was received on behalf of the respondents.

1958Nichols v. Mitchell, 32 Cal.2d 598 [ 197 P.2d 550 ], says (p. 600) : “Such contention requires defendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.” As we said in Estate of Good, 146 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 304 P.2d 196 ], (p. 706) : “We have had occasion to remark before in a similar situation that a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to justify findings, consisting of mere assertion without a fair statement of the evidence, is entitled to no consideration, when it is apparent, as it is here, that a substantial amount of evidence was received on beh

1956It is the rule that the order of transfer has the effect of setting aside the judgment of the District Court of Appeal and of lodging the cause in this court and placing it in the same situation as a cause originally commenced here." The case bears no analogy to the situation at bar and affords no support for appellant's contention. [1b] The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Pioneer case, 40 Cal.2d 852 [ 257 P.2d 1 ], is silent on the subject of costs to Lelande.

1956It is the rule that the order of transfer has the effect of setting aside the judgment of the District Court of Appeal and of lodging the cause in this court and placing it in the same situation as a cause originally commenced here." The case bears no analogy to the situation at bar and affords no support for appellant's contention. [1b] The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Pioneer case, 40 Cal.2d 852 [ 257 P.2d 1 ], is silent on the subject of costs to Lelande.

2026(Cf. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 387 .) Nevertheless, Carter has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s failure to request the limiting instruction fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

2021(In re Podesto, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 937 .) But we do not foreclose the possibility of a situation where a claim concerning inadequacy of a statement of reasons can be forfeited. “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” ’ ” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 .) In Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 , for example, the court explained that the doct

2021(In re Podesto, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 937 .) But we do not foreclose the possibility of a situation where a claim concerning inadequacy of a statement of reasons can be forfeited. “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” ’ ” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 .) In Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331 , for example, the court explained that the doct

2017(Fahlen, at p. 687.) However, this holding is relevant only at the second step of our review, when we examine whether a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust alternative remedies precludes us from reaching the merits of a claim. ( Westlake, supra, 17 Cal.3d 465 .) Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains ‘“[t]his is not a situation where the plaintiff is claiming that a statement made during the process was defamatory; or that the process itself was not fair, as in Kibler[, supra, 39 Cal.4th 192 .]” Nor is this ‘“a situation where the claim arises out of the process itself, as in Nessonl supra, 204 Cal.App.

2017(Fahlen, at p. 687.) However, this holding is relevant only at the second step of our review, when we examine whether a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust alternative remedies precludes us from reaching the merits of a claim. ( Westlake, supra, 17 Cal.3d 465 .) Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains ‘“[t]his is not a situation where the plaintiff is claiming that a statement made during the process was defamatory; or that the process itself was not fair, as in Kibler[, supra, 39 Cal.4th 192 .]” Nor is this ‘“a situation where the claim arises out of the process itself, as in Nessonl supra, 204 Cal.App.

2017(Fahlen, at p. 687.) However, this holding is relevant only at the second step of our review, when we examine whether a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust alternative remedies precludes us from reaching the merits of a claim. ( Westlake, supra, 17 Cal.3d 465 .) Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains ‘“[t]his is not a situation where the plaintiff is claiming that a statement made during the process was defamatory; or that the process itself was not fair, as in Kibler[, supra, 39 Cal.4th 192 .]” Nor is this ‘“a situation where the claim arises out of the process itself, as in Nessonl supra, 204 Cal.App.

2016It can be highly prejudicial if not properly handled by the trial court….” (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744 .) Moreover, an expert “is not allowed to give an opinion on whether a witness is telling the truth because the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert’s opinion would assist the trier of fact. [Citations.]” (People v. Long (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 865, 871 ; see also People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34 , 39–40 [lay opinion about the veracity of a witness is inadmissible].) In People v. Coffman and Marlow

2016(Harvey, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 668 .) The defendant in Harvey had never conceded she had the requisite mental state, instead testifying she could not recall what her mental state was.

2016It can be highly prejudicial if not properly handled by the trial court….” (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744 .) Moreover, an expert “is not allowed to give an opinion on whether a witness is telling the truth because the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert’s opinion would assist the trier of fact. [Citations.]” (People v. Long (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 865, 871 ; see also People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34 , 39–40 [lay opinion about the veracity of a witness is inadmissible].) In People v. Coffman and Marlow

2016The Margosians assert that instead of applying this rule, the trial court applied the rule that relates to a situation where no inquiry is made, which prescribes three conditions that must be satisfied before the creditor has a duty to disclose: “(a) ‘the creditor has reason to believe’ that those facts materially increase the risk ‘beyond that which the surety intends to assume’; (b) the creditor ‘has reason to believe that the facts are unknown to the surety’; and (c) the creditor ‘has a reasonable opportunity to communicate’ the facts to the surety.” (Sumitomo, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 93 .)

2015(McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1657, 1661 (McCoy); Bank of America, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 626 .) The McCoy court noted the general rule allowing a retrial after a reversal is premised on a situation where an error of law occurred during the proceedings that prevented the appellant from receiving a fair trial.

2014Respondent notes that prior consistent statements may be admitted under Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b) when there is a charge that the witness’s testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated, and recent fabrication ‘“may be inferred when it is shown that a witness did not speak about an important matter at a time when it would have been natural for him to do so.”’ (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 803 .) This situation is an exception to Evidence Code section 791’s requirement that the consistent statement be made before an improper motive is alleged 9 to have arisen.

2014(People v. Gentry (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 462, 473 ; see also People v. Williams (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 995, 1011-1012 .) Defendant counters that the prosecutor did not offer the evidence for this purpose and did not obtain a ruling from the trial court that the evidence would be admissible for this purpose.

2014(People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 507-509 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919 .) 17 Again, Moreno’s argument (and by extension Silva’s argument) is limited to only the burglary count. 22 necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087 .) Our Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘[w]hen we review challenges to a jury instruction as being incorrect or incomplete, we evalu