situation bar in Kentucky

2018Id. at 802 .

1991In Stucker v. Bibble, overruling Smith v. Webber, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 346 (1955) and Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198 , 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949), because the plaintiff did not move to send the jury back our Court refused to consider whether the personal injury award was inadequate, applying to this situation the rule of patent irregularity: “[W]hen a deficiency or irregularity in a verdict is at once discernible upon the return of the verdict, any party adversely affected and desiring to invoke judicial relief must call the matter to the court’s attention then and there and afford the trial judge the o

1991In Stucker v. Bibble, overruling Smith v. Webber, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 346 (1955) and Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198 , 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949), because the plaintiff did not move to send the jury back our Court refused to consider whether the personal injury award was inadequate, applying to this situation the rule of patent irregularity: “[W]hen a deficiency or irregularity in a verdict is at once discernible upon the return of the verdict, any party adversely affected and desiring to invoke judicial relief must call the matter to the court’s attention then and there and afford the trial judge the o

1991In Stucker v. Bibble, overruling Smith v. Webber, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 346 (1955) and Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198 , 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949), because the plaintiff did not move to send the jury back our Court refused to consider whether the personal injury award was inadequate, applying to this situation the rule of patent irregularity: “[W]hen a deficiency or irregularity in a verdict is at once discernible upon the return of the verdict, any party adversely affected and desiring to invoke judicial relief must call the matter to the court’s attention then and there and afford the trial judge the o

1978See City of Louisville v. Louisville Feed and Seed Co., Ky., 433 S.W.2d 638 (1968); Fryar v. Stovall, Ky., 504 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

1977Joseph Co. v. City of Ashland, 223 Ky. 203 , 3 S.W.2d 218 (1928) is analogous to the situation at bar.

1977Joseph Co. v. City of Ashland, 223 Ky. 203 , 3 S.W.2d 218 (1928) is analogous to the situation at bar.

1977In a brief filed by an amicus curiae it is maintained that the Liter line of cases is not applicable to this situation because the claim for a penalty is an “ ‘extrinsic byproduct’ of this transaction . . . not dependent upon the lender’s contractual obligations.” This reasoning was adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 29 N.C.

1977App. 78 , 223 S.E.2d 831 (1976).

1969Neither do we regard the situation at bar comparable to that which obtained in Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, Ky., 263 S.W.2d 124 .

1967In City of Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237 , 133 S.W.2d 49 , 126 A.L.R. 905 , this court recognized and followed the general rule, which is thus stated in an accurate headnote: "If an injured person exercises reasonable care to minimize his damages by selecting a physician or surgeon to treat his injuries, he may recover damages to the full extent of his injuries, even though the physician employed omits to use the most approved remedy, or the best means of cure or fails to exercise as high a degree of skill and care as another physician might have exercised." Id., 133 S.W.2d 49 , Headnote 8.

1967In City of Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237 , 133 S.W.2d 49 , 126 A.L.R. 905 , this court recognized and followed the general rule, which is thus stated in an accurate headnote: "If an injured person exercises reasonable care to minimize his damages by selecting a physician or surgeon to treat his injuries, he may recover damages to the full extent of his injuries, even though the physician employed omits to use the most approved remedy, or the best means of cure or fails to exercise as high a degree of skill and care as another physician might have exercised." Id., 133 S.W.2d 49 , Headnote 8.

1967Reliance is had upon Merritt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 727 , but we find the situation at bar readily distinguishable from that in Merritt.

1966Cf. Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46 , 336 P.2d 1045 (in which the plaintiff observed that indicator showed the elevator to be at hand); Piccolo v. Giant Mills, 21 N.J.Super. 383 , 91 A.2d 265 (in which the plaintiff had a right to place some reliance upon the raised gates as indicative of the elevator’s presence); Phegley v. Graham, Mo., 215 S.W.2d 499 , 6 A.L.R.2d 382 (in which the elevator was presumably so equipped as prevented its being opened unless the car was at the floor level — a circumstance known to the plaintiff); Baker v. Best, 107 S.W. 1192 , 33 Ky.Law Rep. 1 (an elevato

1966Cf. Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46 , 336 P.2d 1045 (in which the plaintiff observed that indicator showed the elevator to be at hand); Piccolo v. Giant Mills, 21 N.J.Super. 383 , 91 A.2d 265 (in which the plaintiff had a right to place some reliance upon the raised gates as indicative of the elevator’s presence); Phegley v. Graham, Mo., 215 S.W.2d 499 , 6 A.L.R.2d 382 (in which the elevator was presumably so equipped as prevented its being opened unless the car was at the floor level — a circumstance known to the plaintiff); Baker v. Best, 107 S.W. 1192 , 33 Ky.Law Rep. 1 (an elevato

1966The situation at bar is distinguishable from that presented in Lyons v. Thomas, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 798 .

1966Cf. Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46 , 336 P.2d 1045 (in which the plaintiff observed that indicator showed the elevator to be at hand); Piccolo v. Giant Mills, 21 N.J.Super. 383 , 91 A.2d 265 (in which the plaintiff had a right to place some reliance upon the raised gates as indicative of the elevator’s presence); Phegley v. Graham, Mo., 215 S.W.2d 499 , 6 A.L.R.2d 382 (in which the elevator was presumably so equipped as prevented its being opened unless the car was at the floor level — a circumstance known to the plaintiff); Baker v. Best, 107 S.W. 1192 , 33 Ky.Law Rep. 1 (an elevato

1966Cf. Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46 , 336 P.2d 1045 (in which the plaintiff observed that indicator showed the elevator to be at hand); Piccolo v. Giant Mills, 21 N.J.Super. 383 , 91 A.2d 265 (in which the plaintiff had a right to place some reliance upon the raised gates as indicative of the elevator’s presence); Phegley v. Graham, Mo., 215 S.W.2d 499 , 6 A.L.R.2d 382 (in which the elevator was presumably so equipped as prevented its being opened unless the car was at the floor level — a circumstance known to the plaintiff); Baker v. Best, 107 S.W. 1192 , 33 Ky.Law Rep. 1 (an elevato

1966Cf. Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46 , 336 P.2d 1045 (in which the plaintiff observed that indicator showed the elevator to be at hand); Piccolo v. Giant Mills, 21 N.J.Super. 383 , 91 A.2d 265 (in which the plaintiff had a right to place some reliance upon the raised gates as indicative of the elevator’s presence); Phegley v. Graham, Mo., 215 S.W.2d 499 , 6 A.L.R.2d 382 (in which the elevator was presumably so equipped as prevented its being opened unless the car was at the floor level — a circumstance known to the plaintiff); Baker v. Best, 107 S.W. 1192 , 33 Ky.Law Rep. 1 (an elevato

1966Cf. Chiappe v. Eichenbaum, 169 Cal.App.2d 46 , 336 P.2d 1045 (in which the plaintiff observed that indicator showed the elevator to be at hand); Piccolo v. Giant Mills, 21 N.J.Super. 383 , 91 A.2d 265 (in which the plaintiff had a right to place some reliance upon the raised gates as indicative of the elevator’s presence); Phegley v. Graham, Mo., 215 S.W.2d 499 , 6 A.L.R.2d 382 (in which the elevator was presumably so equipped as prevented its being opened unless the car was at the floor level — a circumstance known to the plaintiff); Baker v. Best, 107 S.W. 1192 , 33 Ky.Law Rep. 1 (an elevato