situation defense in Massachusetts

2014“Whether a statutory enactment applies prospectively or retrospectively is a question of legislative intent.” Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 448 Mass. 441, 448 (2007).

2014A. Whether Extraordinary Circumstances Warrant Relief Embry contends that the enactment of a new statute retroactively expanding the statute of limitations for negligent supervision in child abuse cases constitutes “extraordinary circumstances warranting] relief.” Harvard acknowledges that a postjudgment change in the law with retroactive application may qualify for such relief, but contends that in this situation that rule is inapplicable because the retroactivity provision in §4C 1 /2 is not broad enough to encompass this case. 3 “[R]ule 60(b)(6) permits a court to relieve a parly from final

2006See, e.g., Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 139 (1962), quoting Bouffard v. Canby, 292 Mass. 305, 309 (1935) (“It is only in exceptional cases that a jury ... may without the aid of expert medical opinion determine whether the conduct of a physician toward a patient is violative of the special duty which the law imposes . . .”).

2006See, e.g., Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 139 (1962), quoting Bouffard v. Canby, 292 Mass. 305, 309 (1935) (“It is only in exceptional cases that a jury ... may without the aid of expert medical opinion determine whether the conduct of a physician toward a patient is violative of the special duty which the law imposes . . .”).

2003Rather, significant and favorable results were achieved for the trustees who, through the expenditure of additional effort, successfully defended against claims that they had failed to provide air conditioning, constructively evicted Northern, interfered with Northern’s advantageous relations resulting in lost profits, and engaged in unfair and deceptive acts when they wrongfully threatened to evict Northern. 15 With respect to Counts 111, IV and V, the award appropriately reflects that “the plaintiff has dragged the defendant through a costly and ultimately fruitless exercise.” Bardon Trimoun

1996Craven v. State Ethics Commission, 390 Mass. 191, 198 (1983), established that‘‘[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of [an agency’s] members at a later adversary hearing.

1989See Delle Chiaie v. Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 527, 537-538 (1975). 6 In view of the situation with which the defense counsel was faced, we cannot conclude that his trial tactics were “manifestly unreasonable.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 314 Mass. 722, 728 (1978).

1986“The law is well settled that, in an action of tort for negligence causing bodily injury, the negligence of a physician, properly chosen, in treating that injury does not destroy the causal connection between that injury and the consequent suffering, even so much of the suffering as arises from the negligent treatment and would not have arisen if the injury had been properly treated.” Sacchetti v. Springer, 303 Mass. 480, 481 (1939), and cases cited.

1981Nor is this a situation governed by the principle that “where no express or implied promise or threat is made by the police, a suspect’s belief that his cooperation will benefit a relative will not invalidate an admission.” People v. Steger, 16 Cal.3d 539, 550 (1976).

1980See Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 27 (1976).

1980Cf. Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 225 (1977); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 369 Mass. 462, 468 (1976).

1980In view of this continuance, the delayed disclosure cannot be said to have forced defense counsel to make “difficult tactical decisions quickly in the heat of trial.” Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 25 (1978). 12 The defendant personally agreed to this strategy. 13 In this situation a defense tactic of recalling LaMier to impeach him through the use of certain portions of the interview as prior inconsistent statements might have allowed the Commonwealth to introduce other portions of the interview as explanatory of LaMier’s trial testimony.

1980Cf. Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 225 (1977); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 369 Mass. 462, 468 (1976).

1977Thus, knowledge of the wrongful character of the act is an essential element of the offense. 4 In this situation a requirement of notice to alert an offender that an offense had been committed seems as superfluous as the necessity of issuing a citation after an arrest for a motor vehicle violation, a procedure rejected as unnecessary in Commonwealth v. Gorman, supra. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mullins, 367 Mass. 733, 736 (1975). 5 For these reasons we answer both questions reserved and reported by the District Court judge in the negative. 6 So ordered. 1 Neither party has raised the question whether