situation bar in Pennsylvania

2019Co., 253 F.Supp.3d 796 (E.D.Pa. 2017) (Scottsdale), for the proposition that “Pennsylvania contract law does not permit a party ‘to claim the benefits of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens,’” and that “this sort of ‘cherry picking’ is ‘precisely the situation the doctrine of equitable estoppel seeks to prevent.’” Appellant’s Brief at 52.

2019In fact, this sort of “cherry picking” is “precisely the situation the doctrine of equitable estoppel seeks to prevent.” Id.

1996The situation at bar is completely distinguishable from the facts before the court in Commonwealth v. Frain, 538 Pa. 236 , 648 A.2d 285 (1994).

1996The situation at bar is completely distinguishable from the facts before the court in Commonwealth v. Frain, 538 Pa. 236 , 648 A.2d 285 (1994).

1969The second presumption does not of itself destroy the first but requires some proof of facts and circumstances to be given the effect of overcoming the first; as for instance, the long lapse of time during which the other party may be presumed to have died, the question of legitimacy of a child of the second marriage, the fact that the other spouse had likewise remarried and proof that the decedent, whose heirs are attacking the second marriage, had himself recognized the validity of it.’ ” The Supreme Court went on to say: “To hold that the presumption of innocence and the presumption of the

1969The second presumption does not of itself destroy the first but requires some proof of facts and circumstances to be given the effect of overcoming the first; as for instance, the long lapse of time during which the other party may be presumed to have died, the question of legitimacy of a child of the second marriage, the fact that the other spouse had likewise remarried and proof that the decedent, whose heirs are attacking the second marriage, had himself recognized the validity of it.’ ” The Supreme Court went on to say: “To hold that the presumption of innocence and the presumption of the

2020We further elucidated the strict waiver principle in McMillen v. 84 Lumber, Inc., 649 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1994).

2020PSP’s obligations in this case are, and remain, exclusively ministerial in nature, and nothing in the plain reading of the statute indicates that PSP’s responsibilities under SORNA expand beyond the mere ministerial.6 To that end, we conclude PSP’s argument that it was denied due process when it was not initially served with notice of the PCRA court’s Order to be without merit, as nothing in the statute compels service upon PSP, and PSP possessed no adjudicatory interest in the underlying matter.7 ____________________________________________ 6 We note that the situation at bar is readily disti

2020There, the Supreme Court determined that because the defendant had been convicted in federal court, PSP was “required … to determine the Pennsylvania crime which is similar to his federal offense.” Konyk, 183 A.3d at 986-87 .

2008See Fortney v. Callenberger, 801 A.2d 594 (Pa.Super.2002) (holding that general release is not applicable to claims which could not be contemplated prior to the execution of the release); Vaughn v. Didizian, 436 Pa.Super. 436 , 648 A.2d 38 (1994) (same).

2008See Fortney v. Callenberger, 801 A.2d 594 (Pa.Super.2002) (holding that general release is not applicable to claims which could not be contemplated prior to the execution of the release); Vaughn v. Didizian, 436 Pa.Super. 436 , 648 A.2d 38 (1994) (same).

2008Co. v. Colbert; 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002).

2008Co. v. Colbert; 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002).

2007Recently, in Commonwealth v. Judge, 591 Pa. 126 , 916 A.2d 511 (2007), we examined a situation where the claim sought did not implicate any of the remedies available pursuant to the PCRA and, accordingly, we held that habeas review was warranted.

2007Recently, in Commonwealth v. Judge, 591 Pa. 126 , 916 A.2d 511 (2007), we examined a situation where the claim sought did not implicate any of the remedies available pursuant to the PCRA and, accordingly, we held that habeas review was warranted.

2004Sperry, 373 U.S. at 387-90 , 83 S.Ct. 1322 .

2004Sperry, 373 U.S. at 387-90 , 83 S.Ct. 1322 .

2000(Alcoa), 542 Pa. 614 , 669 A.2d 338 , 340 (1996). [5] Three hundred weeks is the equivalent of five years, nine months and one week. [6] To the extent that the Commonwealth Court's decision in Fortely is inconsistent with our decision today, it is hereby rejected. [7] A separate question arises whether section 301(c)(2) would permit death benefits to be awarded in a situation where a claim based upon disability occurring within 300 weeks would not meet the procedural or substantive requirements of the Act as of the time the death claim is filed.

2000(Alcoa), 542 Pa. 614 , 669 A.2d 338 , 340 (1996). [5] Three hundred weeks is the equivalent of five years, nine months and one week. [6] To the extent that the Commonwealth Court's decision in Fortely is inconsistent with our decision today, it is hereby rejected. [7] A separate question arises whether section 301(c)(2) would permit death benefits to be awarded in a situation where a claim based upon disability occurring within 300 weeks would not meet the procedural or substantive requirements of the Act as of the time the death claim is filed.

2000The plaintiffs’ argument, in large measure, relies on the recent Superior Court case of Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm Inc., 727 A.2d 135 (Pa. Super. 1999).

1998We acknowledge, albeit reluctantly, that the situation at bar is one of those “rare eases” where the Confrontation Clause impels the conclusion that “ ‘the Rape Shield Law must bow to the need to permit an accused an opportunity to present genuinely exculpatory evidence_Id, 606 A.2d at 457 , quoting Commonwealth v. Nieves, supra, 582 A.2d at 346 .

1998We acknowledge, albeit reluctantly, that the situation at bar is one of those “rare eases” where the Confrontation Clause impels the conclusion that “ ‘the Rape Shield Law must bow to the need to permit an accused an opportunity to present genuinely exculpatory evidence_Id, 606 A.2d at 457 , quoting Commonwealth v. Nieves, supra, 582 A.2d at 346 .

1996It is true that under certain circumstances a claimant who is receiving partial disability benefits and who petitions for total disability benefits may meet his burden by proving that through no fault of his own his earning power is once again adversely affected, and that the original disability continues, Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 537 Pa. 223 , 642 A.2d 1083 (1994); Dillon v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Collieries), 536 Pa. 490 , 640 A.2d 386 (1994); however, this case does not involve a situation where that principle is disposi

1996It is true that under certain circumstances a claimant who is receiving partial disability benefits and who petitions for total disability benefits may meet his burden by proving that through no fault of his own his earning power is once again adversely affected, and that the original disability continues, Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 537 Pa. 223 , 642 A.2d 1083 (1994); Dillon v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Collieries), 536 Pa. 490 , 640 A.2d 386 (1994); however, this case does not involve a situation where that principle is disposi

1996It is true that under certain circumstances a claimant who is receiving partial disability benefits and who petitions for total disability benefits may meet his burden by proving that through no fault of his own his earning power is once again adversely affected, and that the original disability continues, Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 537 Pa. 223 , 642 A.2d 1083 (1994); Dillon v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Collieries), 536 Pa. 490 , 640 A.2d 386 (1994); however, this case does not involve a situation where that principle is disposi

1996It is true that under certain circumstances a claimant who is receiving partial disability benefits and who petitions for total disability benefits may meet his burden by proving that through no fault of his own his earning power is once again adversely affected, and that the original disability continues, Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 537 Pa. 223 , 642 A.2d 1083 (1994); Dillon v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Collieries), 536 Pa. 490 , 640 A.2d 386 (1994); however, this case does not involve a situation where that principle is disposi

1995In DeVita , the Commonwealth Court held that defense counsel could cross-examine plaintiff’s medical experts through the use of out of court medical reports “concerning discrepancies between details contained in the reports and the experts’ observation . . . .” DeVita, supra at 114 , 647 A.2d at 640-42 .

1994Id. at 320-21 , 88 A.2d at 67 .

1994Id. at 320-21 , 88 A.2d at 67 .

1991The Court did not define the standard of materiality applicable in this situation, but suggested that the standard might be more lenient to the defense than in the situation in which the defense makes no request or only a general request. 427 U.S. at 106 , 96 S.Ct. at 2399 .

1991The Court did not define the standard of materiality applicable in this situation, but suggested that the standard might be more lenient to the defense than in the situation in which the defense makes no request or only a general request. 427 U.S. at 106 , 96 S.Ct. at 2399 .

1991In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) the United States Supreme Court stressed, “[a]s a general rule a search or seizure without a warrant is deemed unreasonable for constitutional purposes.” While the majority correctly states “that exigent circumstances excusing the warrant requirement arise where the need for prompt police action is imperative”, 1 I note that such a situation is the exception to the rule.

1991In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) the United States Supreme Court stressed, “[a]s a general rule a search or seizure without a warrant is deemed unreasonable for constitutional purposes.” While the majority correctly states “that exigent circumstances excusing the warrant requirement arise where the need for prompt police action is imperative”, 1 I note that such a situation is the exception to the rule.

1989Two years later, in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. 580 , 544 A.2d 1381 (1988), we followed the holding of Samuels and held that § 5945.1 does not apply to a situation in which defense counsel seeks only to examine materials in the possession of the rape crisis center.

1989Two years later, in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. 580 , 544 A.2d 1381 (1988), we followed the holding of Samuels and held that § 5945.1 does not apply to a situation in which defense counsel seeks only to examine materials in the possession of the rape crisis center.