73 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1927–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Midland v. Goerlitzgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 374 (“Although litigation actions of governmental entities underlay our decisions in Reata and similar cases, we did not hold that those actions effected waivers of immunity; rather, they were factors considered in defining the contours of immunity.”); City of Midland v. Goerlitz, 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006) (remanding to give plaintiff an “opportunity to argue . . . that the City’s immunity from suit either does not exist pursuant to our decision in Reata or that it has been waived by [Chapter 271]”); City of Houston v. United Water Servs., 201 S.W.3d 690, 2008It claims that "[i]n several cases, the supreme court has characterized the Reata rule as a situation in which immunity simply does not exist , rather than a situation in which governmental immunity is waived ." Id. (citing City of Midland v. Goerlitz , 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. United Water Servs. , 201 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. 2006); Metro. | 3 | 3 |
City of Houston v. United Water Services, Inc.green2 sentences2018See, e.g., Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 374 (“Although litigation actions of governmental entities underlay our decisions in Reata and similar cases, we did not hold that those actions effected waivers of immunity; rather, they were factors considered in defining the contours of immunity.”); City of Midland v. Goerlitz, 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006) (remanding to give plaintiff an “opportunity to argue . . . that the City’s immunity from suit either does not exist pursuant to our decision in Reata or that it has been waived by [Chapter 271]”); City of Houston v. United Water Servs., 201 S.W.3d 690, 2008It claims that "[i]n several cases, the supreme court has characterized the Reata rule as a situation in which immunity simply does not exist , rather than a situation in which governmental immunity is waived ." Id. (citing City of Midland v. Goerlitz , 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. United Water Servs. , 201 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. 2006); Metro. | 3 | 3 |
Ex Parte McJunkinsgreen2 sentences2014I note that this is not a situation where the challenge is to the procedures employed with respect to the cumulation order, which was the situation in Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39, 39 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (op. on reh'g). 2014Because it would grant relief only under circumstances in which no preservation of error is required and would deny relief when error has been preserved, the majority opinion’s reasoning to 2 I note that this is not a situation where the challenge is to the procedures employed with respect to the cumulation order, which was the situation in Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39, 39 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Tome v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 , 115 S. Ct. at 701 ; Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 ; see also Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297 , 316–17 (Tex. Crim. 2018See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 , 115 S. Ct. at 701 ; Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 ; see also Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297 , 316–17 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Klein v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 , 115 S. Ct. at 701 ; Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 ; see also Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297 , 316–17 (Tex. Crim. 2018See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 , 115 S. Ct. at 701 ; Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 ; see also Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297 , 316–17 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Department of Family & Protective Servicesgreen2 sentences2016The Guerra court found significant the Legislature’s failure “to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver’s license] suspension” and noted that the Legislature “could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance.” Id. at 649 ; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392-93 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”); In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2009) (holding statute was 2015The Guerra court found significant the Legislature’s failure “to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver’s license] suspension” and noted that the Legislature “could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance.” Id. at 649 ; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392–93 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet 8 the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”); In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2009) (holding statute w | 2 | 2 |
Texas a & M University-Kingsville v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2016See Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 522 (once the Legislature has decided to waive immunity for a class of claims, the inclusion of settlements within the waiver is consistent with that decision); Tex. A&M Univ. 2011It is important to note that the Lawson plurality expressly avowed this rule, id., and found a waiver of immunity in the situation at bar only because it concluded that the Legislature intended one. | 2 | 2 |
Crosstex Energy Services, L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.green2 sentences2016The Guerra court found significant the Legislature’s failure “to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver’s license] suspension” and noted that the Legislature “could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance.” Id. at 649 ; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392-93 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”); In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2009) (holding statute was 2015The Guerra court found significant the Legislature’s failure “to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver’s license] suspension” and noted that the Legislature “could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance.” Id. at 649 ; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392–93 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet 8 the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”); In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2009) (holding statute w | 2 | 2 |
Virts v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Virts v. State, 739 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. 2003Virts v. State , 739 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. John W. Downinggreen2 sentences2011United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.1985). 2011United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985). | 2 | 2 |
Caballero v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Caballero v. State , 919 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd) (complainant's fear may be established by circumstantial evidence). 2011See Caballero v. State, 919 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (complainant’s fear may be established by circumstantial evidence). | 2 | 2 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Guerragreen2 sentences2016The Guerra court found significant the Legislature’s failure “to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver’s license] suspension” and noted that the Legislature “could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance.” Id. at 649 ; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392-93 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”); In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2009) (holding statute was 2015The Guerra court found significant the Legislature’s failure “to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver’s license] suspension” and noted that the Legislature “could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance.” Id. at 649 ; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392–93 (“Although the plain meaning might suggest a jurisdictional bar, it does not meet 8 the requisite level of clarity to establish the statute as jurisdictional.”); In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2009) (holding statute w | 1 | 3 |
Tooke v. City of Mexiagreen2 sentences2015Reasoning that it was not the Court’s place to create a situation where immunity from suit would not apply, the Supreme Court further explained that is has “consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.” Tooke, 18 197 S.W.3d at 332; see also Gay, 457 S.W.3d at 505 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332 ); West Texas Mun. 2008It claims that "[i]n several cases, the supreme court has characterized the Reata rule as a situation in which immunity simply does not exist , rather than a situation in which governmental immunity is waived ." Id. (citing City of Midland v. Goerlitz , 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. United Water Servs. , 201 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. 2006); Metro. | 1 | 2 |
Moreno v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Alternatively, a waiver of the right to appeal may also be “valid, i.e., knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, when the waiver is made . . . post-sentencing” because like the situation in which the waiver is made as part of a bargained exchange “the defendant, at the time of the waiver, knows the likely consequences of the waiver.” Moreno v. State, 327 S.W.3d 267, 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stategreen1 sentence2023App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Charles Brown, L.L.P. v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc.green1 sentence2022See 11 Lanier Worldwide, 124 S.W.3d at 829, 900 . | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Albertgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 374 (“Although litigation actions of governmental entities underlay our decisions in Reata and similar cases, we did not hold that those actions effected waivers of immunity; rather, they were factors considered in defining the contours of immunity.”); City of Midland v. Goerlitz, 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006) (remanding to give plaintiff an “opportunity to argue . . . that the City’s immunity from suit either does not exist pursuant to our decision in Reata or that it has been waived by [Chapter 271]”); City of Houston v. United Water Servs., 201 S.W.3d 690, 2018See, e.g., Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 374 (“Although litigation actions of governmental entities underlay our decisions in Reata and similar cases, we did not hold that those actions effected waivers of immunity; rather, they were factors considered in defining the contours of immunity.”); City of Midland v. Goerlitz, 201 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. 2006) (remanding to give plaintiff an “opportunity to argue . . . that the City’s immunity from suit either does not exist pursuant to our decision in Reata or that it has been waived by [Chapter 271]”); City of Houston v. United Water Servs., 201 S.W.3d 690, | 1 | 1 |
Wilkerson v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Wilkerson, 173 S.W.3d at 533 . | 1 | 1 |
| Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakelygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cannon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Christopher L. Gay and Steven L. Carroll v. the City of Wichita Falls, Texasgreen1 sentence2015Reasoning that it was not the Court’s place to create a situation where immunity from suit would not apply, the Supreme Court further explained that is has “consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.” Tooke, 18 197 S.W.3d at 332; see also Gay, 457 S.W.3d at 505 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332 ); West Texas Mun. | 1 | 1 |
| City of DeSoto v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Almanza v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gornick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Landry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salazar v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Texas State Board of Chiropractic Examinersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Equitable Trust Co. v. Rolandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rogersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamilton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Martin Frankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Caldwell v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissionergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Milczanowski v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re WINSHIPgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Serrato v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hammons v. State
green
2 sentences2018See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 , 115 S. Ct. at 701 ; Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 ; see also Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297 , 316–17 (Tex. Crim. 2018See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 , 115 S. Ct. at 701 ; Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 ; see also Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297 , 316–17 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2015Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1562 , L.Ed. 2d 696 (2013). 14 In the situation at bar, probable cause was required in order for officers to secure a Blood Search Warrant. 2015Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1562 , L.Ed. 2d 696 (2013). 14 In the situation at bar, probable cause was required in order for officers to secure a Blood Search Warrant. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Chaney v. State
green
2 sentences2012Per Curiam Do not publish. 1 Incidentally, we do not ignore appellant’s argument that the holding in Chaney v. State, 314 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d) controls the situation at bar. 2012Incidentally, we do not ignore appellant’s argument that the holding in Chaney v. State, 314 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd) controls the situation at bar. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Bogany v. State
green
2 sentences1983Art. 44.24(b), V.A.C.C.P., provides: "(b) The courts of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm the judgment of the court below, or may reverse and remand for a new trial, or may reverse and dismiss the case, or may reform and correct the judgment or may enter any other appropriate order, as the law and nature of the case may require." In Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), we held that the authority of a court on appeal to reform a judgment under Art. 44.24, supra, does not extend to the situation where the error involves punishment unauthorized by law. 1983Art. 44.24(b), V.A.C.C.P., provides: “(b) The courts of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm the judgment of the court below, or may reverse and remand for a new trial, or may reverse and dismiss the case, or may reform and correct the judgment or may enter any other appropriate order, as the law and nature of the case may require.” In Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), we held that the authority of a court on appeal to reform a judgment under Art. 44.24, supra, does not extend to the situation where the error involves punishment unauthorized by law. | 2 | 1983–1988 |
Lockhart v. Fretwell
green
2 sentences2024In Fretwell, the Supreme Court addressed a situation where the defense attorney failed to lodge an objection that would have been meritorious under a court decision that existed at the time of trial.7 The case that supported the objection was later overruled.8 An intermediate federal appellate court concluded that prejudice had been shown because the objection would have been sustained under the caselaw that existed at the 5 See id. 408. 6 See id. 403. 7 506 U.S. at 366 . 8 Id. 2024In Fretwell, the Supreme Court addressed a situation where the defense attorney failed to lodge an objection that would have been meritorious under a court decision that existed at the time of trial.7 The case that supported the objection was later overruled.8 An intermediate federal appellate court concluded that prejudice had been shown because the objection would have been sustained under the caselaw that existed at the 5 See id. 408. 6 See id. 403. 7 506 U.S. at 366 . 8 Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrich
green
1 sentence2022Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 376 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Somer v. Bogart
green
2 sentences2022In this situation a presumption of gift arises, and no resulting trust exists until the presumption is rebutted.” Id. (citations omitted). –15– In Somer, we considered whether the presumption of gift arises in circumstances where title is taken in the name of a son-in-law. 2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Crockett v. State
green
1 sentence2020Rather, it merely sought leave to amend language in the original motion and 1 This circumstance distinguishes the situation at bar from that in Crockett v. State, 840 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Doe v. Messina
green
1 sentence2018That the events began with inappropriate behavior between children on a couch and turned into oral sex in a bathroom are also important bits of evidence serving to distinguish the situation at bar from those in an opinion upon which Dad and his children place much reliance, Doe v. Messina, 349 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Crystal Spurck v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
green
1 sentence2018Spurck, 396 S.W.3d at 222 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| West Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Republic Power Partners, L.P. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Taylor v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Missouri v. Seibert green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Martinez v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Bell v. Smith green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Clark v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Wilmans v. Harston green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Maldonado v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hardinge v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Rodriguez v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Ceniceros v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. John Cardillo, Lawrence Harris, Ralph Kaminsky, John Knapp, Louis Margolis, and Louis Piselli green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Reynolds v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Drakes v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Pack v. City of Fort Worth green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Barfield v. Howard M. Smith Company of Amarillo green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Smith v. State neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Seay v. State neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lee v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Seydler v. Keuper green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Ross v. McLelland green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Closner v. Gannaway green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Rose v. Baker green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Singleton v. Carmichael green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Newspapers, Inc. v. Love green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Petco Corporation v. Plummer green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Great American Reserve Insurance Co. v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Lange neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Panhandle & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Napier neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.