privilege immunity in Pennsylvania

2000The heart of these cases, derived from In Re “B”, 482 Pa. 471 , 394 A.2d 419 (1978), is that a mother, who voluntarily submits to an examination by a court-appointed expert, who is to evaluate her ability to provide adequate care for her child, would not be detrimentally relying on any statutorily-created privilege, and as such, the privilege would not bar the admission of such evaluation in a juvenile proceeding.

2000The heart of these cases, derived from In Re “B”, 482 Pa. 471 , 394 A.2d 419 (1978), is that a mother, who voluntarily submits to an examination by a court-appointed expert, who is to evaluate her ability to provide adequate care for her child, would not be detrimentally relying on any statutorily-created privilege, and as such, the privilege would not bar the admission of such evaluation in a juvenile proceeding.

2016Notably, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 624 Pa. 405 , 86 A.3d 771 (2014), the Court recently undertook to reinforce the high collateral order threshold—even in the context of an order of a variety that otherwise would have qualified categorically (i.e., an order in derogation of a privilege claim premised on the work product doctrine)— explaining “the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed in order to buttress the final order doctrine and in recognition that a party may seek an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Appellate Rule 312.” Id. at 421 , 86 A.3d at 780 . .

2016Notably, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 624 Pa. 405 , 86 A.3d 771 (2014), the Court recently undertook to reinforce the high collateral order threshold—even in the context of an order of a variety that otherwise would have qualified categorically (i.e., an order in derogation of a privilege claim premised on the work product doctrine)— explaining “the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed in order to buttress the final order doctrine and in recognition that a party may seek an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Appellate Rule 312.” Id. at 421 , 86 A.3d at 780 . .

2015Id. at 763-764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1974The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling “communications” or “testimony,” but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Id. at 763-64 . 9 Applying this analysis to the facts before it, the Court found that “[n]ot even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis.

2015Id. at 763-764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1976Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

2021Id. (discussing Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 249 (Pa. 2011) (“[o]nce putatively privileged material is in the open, the bell has been rung, and cannot be unrung by a later appeal.”).

2021Although Trustee’s counsel admitted that she could not “speak for K&L Gates bills because they belong to K&L Gates” and that she had “no knowledge of” those bills, she noted that the redacted time sheets for both firms bore corresponding notations for “protected information litigation” and “confidential [communications] with counsel relating to the litigation matters, not relating to the trust administration or trust management.”13 Trustee’s counsel also quoted this Court’s holding in Levy v. Senate of Pennsylvania, 65 A.3d 361 (Pa. 2013), that “descriptions of legal services that address the

2017Durham, 772 A.2d at 69 , citing Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1196 (noting doctrine of tort immunity existed prior to the enactment of the Tort Claims Act, which did not abrogate the immunity).

2016In Williams , which also involved an appeal pursuant to Rule 313, we resolved a two-pronged attack on a PCRA court’s discovery order that granted the post-conviction petitioner access to the prosecutor’s trial notes regarding witness interviews, premised upon the petitioner's argument that the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), defeated the relevant work product protection. 86 A.3d at 775-76 .

2016In Williams , which also involved an appeal pursuant to Rule 313, we resolved a two-pronged attack on a PCRA court’s discovery order that granted the post-conviction petitioner access to the prosecutor’s trial notes regarding witness interviews, premised upon the petitioner's argument that the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), defeated the relevant work product protection. 86 A.3d at 775-76 .

1992Id., 360 A.2d at 905 .

1988Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 (1986); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-1 , 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329-30 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

1988Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 (1986); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-1 , 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329-30 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

1988Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 (1986); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-1 , 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329-30 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

1988Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 , 106 S.Ct. 2317 (1986); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-1 , 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329-30 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

1985Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., supra. Abuse of a conditional privilege is indicated when the publication is actuated by malice or negligence, Baird v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., supra, is made for a purpose other than that for which the privilege is given, Rankin v. Phillippe, 206 Pa. Super. 26 , 211 A.2d 56 (1965), [is made] to a person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the privilege, or includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.

1984Id.

1984Id.

1974Since the privilege is not available to it, appellant, a corporation, cannot invoke the privilege to challenge the constitutionality of §2601 of the Public Authorities Law.” 392 U.S. at 288-89 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 1097 .

1974Since the privilege is not available to it, appellant, a corporation, cannot invoke the privilege to challenge the constitutionality of §2601 of the Public Authorities Law.” 392 U.S. at 288-89 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 1097 .

1973See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379-80 , 282 A. 2d 351 (1971). [12] See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246 , 199 A. 2d 411 (1964) (which suggests that 19 P.S. § 683 applies only to adverse testimony gained "through the [marital] relationship and in the confidence which that relationship inspires") ( Wilkes confuses 19 P.S. § 683 with 19 P.S. § 684 — the privilege to bar confidential communications) and, if applied here, would require a contrary result to that reached by the Court); Commonwealth v. Clanton, 395 Pa. 521 , 151 A. 2d 88 (1959) (holding that 19 P.S. § 683 does not apply wh

1973See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379-80 , 282 A. 2d 351 (1971). [12] See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246 , 199 A. 2d 411 (1964) (which suggests that 19 P.S. § 683 applies only to adverse testimony gained "through the [marital] relationship and in the confidence which that relationship inspires") ( Wilkes confuses 19 P.S. § 683 with 19 P.S. § 684 — the privilege to bar confidential communications) and, if applied here, would require a contrary result to that reached by the Court); Commonwealth v. Clanton, 395 Pa. 521 , 151 A. 2d 88 (1959) (holding that 19 P.S. § 683 does not apply wh

1971The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” (Italics supplied.) The distinction made in the Schmerber case has been recognized in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 577 .

1970Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); and, Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117 , 213 A. 2d 670 (1965).” In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), the Court said (page 276): “Answers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying.” A. Scope of Pennsylvania Immunity Grant Kiecobene contends that the Pennsylvania Statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide immunity against the use of the fruits of the compelled testimony in connection

1970Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); and, Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117 , 213 A. 2d 670 (1965)." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), the Court said (page 276): "Answers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying." *411 A. Scope of Pennsylvania Immunity Grant Riccobene contends that the Pennsylvania Statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide immunity against the use of the fruits of the compelled testimony in connec