14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alexander v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026“Each element of the privilege inquiry is fact specific.” Id. at 440 ¶ 9. ¶22 Whether a confidential behavioral health professional-client relationship exists is initially a subjective inquiry and requires courts to examine “the nature of the work performed and . . . the circumstances under which the confidences were divulged.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 162 (1984)). 2026Courts examining the circumstances of the communication “must decide whether the party consulting the [behavioral health professional] believes that he or she is approaching the [behavioral health professional] in a professional capacity and with the intent of securing [behavioral health services].” Id. (quoting State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 448 (App. 1994)). ¶23 Here, there is no evidence that A.R. intended to consult M.G. for the purpose of securing behavioral health services. | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019A parent is bound to his silence; he “cannot testify for his . . . own advantage and then invoke the privilege and claim the right to be free from cross-examination.” Montoya, 173 Ariz. at 131 (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958), and State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 91 (1965)). 1992Brown, 356 U.S. at 155-56 , 78 S.Ct. at 627 ; Taylor, 99 Ariz. at 91 , 407 P.2d at 63 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Fodorgreen1 sentence2026Courts examining the circumstances of the communication “must decide whether the party consulting the [behavioral health professional] believes that he or she is approaching the [behavioral health professional] in a professional capacity and with the intent of securing [behavioral health services].” Id. (quoting State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 448 (App. 1994)). ¶23 Here, there is no evidence that A.R. intended to consult M.G. for the purpose of securing behavioral health services. | 1 | 1 |
Maggard v. Kinneygreen1 sentence2025See Goldman v. Sahl, 248 Ariz. 512 , 522-23, ¶ 31 (App. 2020) (recognizing that a privilege is not an immunity); see also Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 560 (Ky. 2019) (“A privilege is not synonymous with or equivalent to immunity because it does not relieve the holder of the burdens of litigation or even, necessarily, the imposition of liability.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ledvina v. Cerasanigreen1 sentence2025Id.; Ledvina, 213 Ariz. at 575, ¶ 15 . | 1 | 1 |
Logerquist v. Danforthgreen1 sentence2025Nevertheless, because a judgment dismissing a claim may be affirmed for any reason supported by the record, Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 (App. 1996), we address the BBG Defendants’ “privilege” argument. ¶23 In Goldman, the court addressed whether claims for defamation and abuse of process can be predicated on the filing of a bar charge. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McDanielgreen1 sentence2019State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583 , 587 n.2 (1983) (adverse inference may not be argued from party’s failure to call a witness who “can be physically produced but cannot be compelled to testify”); State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194 (1983) (“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.”). | 1 | 1 |
Green Acres Trust v. Londongreen2 sentences2005See Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613 , 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984) (outlining the privilege); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 57 cmt. c ("The privilege is also a defense to other claims where publication or communication is an element of the claim----"). 2005See Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613 , 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984) (outlining the privilege); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 57 cmt. c ("The privilege is also a defense to other claims where publication or communication is an element of the claim----"). | 1 | 1 |
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanekgreen1 sentence1990Compare, e.g., Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (the privilege applies to rule 36 requests for admission) with Phelps Dodge, 7 Ariz.App. 277 , 438 P.2d 424 (the privilege does not apply to rule 36 requests for admission). | 1 | 1 |
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Superior Court in and for County of Cochisegreen2 sentences1990Compare, e.g., Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (the privilege applies to rule 36 requests for admission) with Phelps Dodge, 7 Ariz.App. 277 , 438 P.2d 424 (the privilege does not apply to rule 36 requests for admission). 1990Compare, e.g., Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (the privilege applies to rule 36 requests for admission) with Phelps Dodge, 7 Ariz.App. 277 , 438 P.2d 424 (the privilege does not apply to rule 36 requests for admission). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bradford Lund v. Hon. Myers
green
2 sentences2022Cf. Lund v. Myers, 232 Ariz. 309 , 311–12 ¶¶ 12–13 (2013) (noting that a party in receipt of allegedly privileged documents must suspend use of such documents, immediately notify the alleged privilege holder, and present the information to the trial court to resolve the privilege dispute). ¶21 The parties did not have the benefit of our guidance in Clements when the trial court originally considered the privilege claim. 2015Such review may be required if the receiving party makes a factual showing to support a reasonable, good faith belief that the document is not privileged.” Id. at 312, ¶ 15 , 305 P.3d 374 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), and Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 573, ¶ 35 , 212 P.3d 902 (App.2009)). | 2 | 2015–2022 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2019A parent is bound to his silence; he “cannot testify for his . . . own advantage and then invoke the privilege and claim the right to be free from cross-examination.” Montoya, 173 Ariz. at 131 (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958), and State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 91 (1965)). 1992Brown, 356 U.S. at 155-56 , 78 S.Ct. at 627 ; Taylor, 99 Ariz. at 91 , 407 P.2d at 63 . | 2 | 1992–2019 |
Marsin v. Udall
green
1 sentence2024“The privilege to challenge the judge’s fairness carries with it the concomitant right to willingly submit to trial.” Marsin, 78 Ariz. at 312 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Montoya v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2019A parent is bound to his silence; he “cannot testify for his . . . own advantage and then invoke the privilege and claim the right to be free from cross-examination.” Montoya, 173 Ariz. at 131 (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958), and State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 91 (1965)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Corrales
green
1 sentence2019State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583 , 587 n.2 (1983) (adverse inference may not be argued from party’s failure to call a witness who “can be physically produced but cannot be compelled to testify”); State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194 (1983) (“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.”). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Zolin
green
2 sentences2015Such review may be required if the receiving party makes a factual showing to support a reasonable, good faith belief that the document is not privileged.” Id. at 312, ¶ 15 , 305 P.3d 374 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), and Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 573, ¶ 35 , 212 P.3d 902 (App.2009)). 2015Such review may be required if the receiving party makes a factual showing to support a reasonable, good faith belief that the document is not privileged.” Id. at 312, ¶ 15 , 305 P.3d 374 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), and Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 573, ¶ 35 , 212 P.3d 902 (App.2009)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kline v. Kline
green
2 sentences2015Such review may be required if the receiving party makes a factual showing to support a reasonable, good faith belief that the document is not privileged.” Id. at 312, ¶ 15 , 305 P.3d 374 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), and Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 573, ¶ 35 , 212 P.3d 902 (App.2009)). 2015Such review may be required if the receiving party makes a factual showing to support a reasonable, good faith belief that the document is not privileged.” Id. at 312, ¶ 15 , 305 P.3d 374 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), and Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 573, ¶ 35 , 212 P.3d 902 (App.2009)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Briscoe v. LaHue
green
2 sentences1985In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 , 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), the court held that a policeman could not be sued for perjury committed in the plaintiff's criminal trial. 1985In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 , 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), the court held that a policeman could not be sued for perjury committed in the plaintiff's criminal trial. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Schmerber v. California
green
1 sentence1976The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” 86 S.Ct. at 1832 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Wade
green
2 sentences1976In the later case of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the court stated: “We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness pri- or to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. 1976In the later case of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the court stated: “We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness pri- or to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.