privilege immunity in Michigan

1993The marital communication privilege is "a rule of public policy; the privilege being the privilege of the spouse making the communication, the lips of both being sealed, unless both, otherwise, personally consent.” Sweikhart v Hanrahan, 184 Mich 201, 207 ; 150 NW 833 (1915).

1993The marital communication privilege is "a rule of public policy; the privilege being the privilege of the spouse making the communication, the lips of both being sealed, unless both, otherwise, personally consent.” Sweikhart v Hanrahan, 184 Mich 201, 207 ; 150 NW 833 (1915).

2026Powers v Fisher, 279 Mich 442, 452 ; 272 NW 737 (1937); Rutherford v Chrysler Motors Corp, 60 Mich App 392, 398 ; 231 NW2d 413 (1975).

2026Powers v Fisher, 279 Mich 442, 452 ; 272 NW 737 (1937); Rutherford v Chrysler Motors Corp, 60 Mich App 392, 398 ; 231 NW2d 413 (1975).

2026“As a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of [governmental] funding, its recourse is to decline the funds.” Agency for Int’l Dev v Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc, 570 US 205, 214 ; 133 S Ct 2321 ; 186 L Ed 2d 398 (2013).

2026“As a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of [governmental] funding, its recourse is to decline the funds.” Agency for Int’l Dev v Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc, 570 US 205, 214 ; 133 S Ct 2321 ; 186 L Ed 2d 398 (2013).

2026But the fact that districts may not be able to guess at the long- term consequences of those actions does not make the statute unconstitutionally vague. -8- held that “good faith” is the opposite of “a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty.” Medley v Canady, 126 Mich App 739, 747-748 ; 337 NW2d 909 (1983).

2026But the fact that districts may not be able to guess at the long- term consequences of those actions does not make the statute unconstitutionally vague. -8- held that “good faith” is the opposite of “a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty.” Medley v Canady, 126 Mich App 739, 747-748 ; 337 NW2d 909 (1983).

2026Powers v Fisher, 279 Mich 442, 452 ; 272 NW 737 (1937); Rutherford v Chrysler Motors Corp, 60 Mich App 392, 398 ; 231 NW2d 413 (1975).

2026Powers v Fisher, 279 Mich 442, 452 ; 272 NW 737 (1937); Rutherford v Chrysler Motors Corp, 60 Mich App 392, 398 ; 231 NW2d 413 (1975).

2026MULTIPLE-OBJECT CHALLENGE “The [SSAA] was created to determine the manner in which state monies are disbursed to local school districts and the manner in which those funds may be used by the districts.” Holland- West Ottawa-Saugatuck Consortium v Holland Ed Ass’n, 199 Mich App 245, 249 ; 501 NW2d 261 (1993).

2026MULTIPLE-OBJECT CHALLENGE “The [SSAA] was created to determine the manner in which state monies are disbursed to local school districts and the manner in which those funds may be used by the districts.” Holland- West Ottawa-Saugatuck Consortium v Holland Ed Ass’n, 199 Mich App 245, 249 ; 501 NW2d 261 (1993).

2024“Judicial proceedings may include any hearing before a tribunal or administrative board that performs a judicial function.” Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260 , 2 Courts refer to the concept of immunity for action taken in a judicial proceeding by several names including quasi-judicial immunity, witness immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, and litigation privilege. -4- 265; 725 NW2d 470 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted), citing Couch, 193 Mich App at 294 . “[I]mmunity extends to every step in the proceeding and covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at is

2024Michigan courts have expanded the privilege or immunity accorded to statements made during the course of judicial proceedings beyond defamation claims, applying it to actions for negligence, Maiden, 461 Mich at 117 , intentional torts, Dabkowski v Davis, 364 Mich 429, 432-433 ; 111 NW2d 68 (1961), and tortious interference with a contractual or economic relationship, Meyer v Hubbell, 117 Mich App 699, 710-711 ; 324 NW2d 139 (1982).

2024Michigan courts have expanded the privilege or immunity accorded to statements made during the course of judicial proceedings beyond defamation claims, applying it to actions for negligence, Maiden, 461 Mich at 117 , intentional torts, Dabkowski v Davis, 364 Mich 429, 432-433 ; 111 NW2d 68 (1961), and tortious interference with a contractual or economic relationship, Meyer v Hubbell, 117 Mich App 699, 710-711 ; 324 NW2d 139 (1982).

2024“Judicial proceedings may include any hearing before a tribunal or administrative board that performs a judicial function.” Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260 , 2 Courts refer to the concept of immunity for action taken in a judicial proceeding by several names including quasi-judicial immunity, witness immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, and litigation privilege. -4- 265; 725 NW2d 470 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted), citing Couch, 193 Mich App at 294 . “[I]mmunity extends to every step in the proceeding and covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at is

2024“Judicial proceedings may include any hearing before a tribunal or administrative board that performs a judicial function.” Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260 , 2 Courts refer to the concept of immunity for action taken in a judicial proceeding by several names including quasi-judicial immunity, witness immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, and litigation privilege. -4- 265; 725 NW2d 470 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted), citing Couch, 193 Mich App at 294 . “[I]mmunity extends to every step in the proceeding and covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at is

2024“Judicial proceedings may include any hearing before a tribunal or administrative board that performs a judicial function.” Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260 , 2 Courts refer to the concept of immunity for action taken in a judicial proceeding by several names including quasi-judicial immunity, witness immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, and litigation privilege. -4- 265; 725 NW2d 470 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted), citing Couch, 193 Mich App at 294 . “[I]mmunity extends to every step in the proceeding and covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at is

2024Michigan courts have expanded the privilege or immunity accorded to statements made during the course of judicial proceedings beyond defamation claims, applying it to actions for negligence, Maiden, 461 Mich at 117 , intentional torts, Dabkowski v Davis, 364 Mich 429, 432-433 ; 111 NW2d 68 (1961), and tortious interference with a contractual or economic relationship, Meyer v Hubbell, 117 Mich App 699, 710-711 ; 324 NW2d 139 (1982).

2024Michigan courts have expanded the privilege or immunity accorded to statements made during the course of judicial proceedings beyond defamation claims, applying it to actions for negligence, Maiden, 461 Mich at 117 , intentional torts, Dabkowski v Davis, 364 Mich 429, 432-433 ; 111 NW2d 68 (1961), and tortious interference with a contractual or economic relationship, Meyer v Hubbell, 117 Mich App 699, 710-711 ; 324 NW2d 139 (1982).

2022As explained in Postill v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 118 Mich App 608 , 619- 620; 325 NW2d 511 (1982): In the common law of defamation, a defense of privilege exists.

2022As explained in Postill v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 118 Mich App 608 , 619- 620; 325 NW2d 511 (1982): In the common law of defamation, a defense of privilege exists.

2020Id.

2003Garden City also argues, however, that the public policy behind the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq., should prevent the enforcement of the subpoena, because the act expressly excludes public disclosure of “personnel records of law enforcement agencies.” MCL 15.243(l)(s)(ix); Sutton v Oak Park, 251 Mich App 345, 349 ; 650 NW2d 404 (2002).

2003Garden City also argues, however, that the public policy behind the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq., should prevent the enforcement of the subpoena, because the act expressly excludes public disclosure of “personnel records of law enforcement agencies.” MCL 15.243(l)(s)(ix); Sutton v Oak Park, 251 Mich App 345, 349 ; 650 NW2d 404 (2002).

1998The Arizona Supreme Court decided whether a defendant was denied the right to due process and a fair trial in State v Corrales, 138 Ariz 583; 676 P2d 615 (1983). 10 First, the court held that merely calling a witness to the stand and procuring his invocation of the privilege is not a violation of either prong of the Namet rule.

1998The Arizona Supreme Court decided whether a defendant was denied the right to due process and a fair trial in State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583 , 676 P.2d 615 (1983). [10] First, the court held that merely calling a witness to the stand and procuring his invocation of the privilege is not a violation of either prong of the Namet rule.

1996Barnard v Thorstenn, 489 US 546, 552 ; 109 S Ct 1294 ; 103 L Ed 2d 559 (1989).

1996Barnard v Thorstenn, 489 US 546, 552 ; 109 S Ct 1294 ; 103 L Ed 2d 559 (1989).

1993(Emphasis added.) It has been said that " '[t]he exclusion of such communications when made in confidence between persons occupying the intimate relation of husband and wife is predicated on the necessity of fostering such relation and the greater injury likely to result from permitting their disclosure than the benefit to be gained thereby/ ” People v Ignofo, 315 Mich 626, 638 ; 24 NW2d 514 (1946) (quoting Salisbury at 532).

1993(Emphasis added.) It has been said that " '[t]he exclusion of such communications when made in confidence between persons occupying the intimate relation of husband and wife is predicated on the necessity of fostering such relation and the greater injury likely to result from permitting their disclosure than the benefit to be gained thereby/ ” People v Ignofo, 315 Mich 626, 638 ; 24 NW2d 514 (1946) (quoting Salisbury at 532).

1988Gaertner v Michigan, 385 Mich 49, 53 ; 187 NW2d 429 (1971).

1988Gaertner v Michigan, 385 Mich 49, 53 ; 187 NW2d 429 (1971).

1985However, Monia was distinguished from Michigan law in People v Reading, 307 Mich 616, 630 ; 12 NW2d 482 (1943), the *762 Court observing: "Obviously the Monia Case was controlled by a specific Federal enactment which in no way controls criminal procedure in this jurisdiction.” The statute at issue in Reading—3 Comp Laws 1929, § 17220—, like the statute in Monia , contained no express requirement that the priviledge be invoked, yet the Court refused to grant immunity to a witness who had never claimed that his testimony might be incriminating.

1985However, Monia was distinguished from Michigan law in People v Reading, 307 Mich 616, 630 ; 12 NW2d 482 (1943), the *762 Court observing: "Obviously the Monia Case was controlled by a specific Federal enactment which in no way controls criminal procedure in this jurisdiction.” The statute at issue in Reading—3 Comp Laws 1929, § 17220—, like the statute in Monia , contained no express requirement that the priviledge be invoked, yet the Court refused to grant immunity to a witness who had never claimed that his testimony might be incriminating.

1985Were the statute at issue in this case a federal one, as in Armour, defendant’s contention would have support from Monia, supra, where the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant need not claim the privilege if the immunity statute does not expressly require it.

1985Also instructive is Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), in which the Court had before it an act of the Legislature providing that the owner of an automobile driven by another with permission was subject to liability if it was negligently driven and caused damages to property or injury or death to a person, and further provided that neither the owner nor a driver was liable for injury or death caused to a guest passenger by negligent driving.

1985Also instructive is Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), in which the Court had before it an act of the Legislature providing that the owner of an automobile driven by another with permission was subject to liability if it was negligently driven and caused damages to property or injury or death to a person, and further provided that neither the owner nor a driver was liable for injury or death caused to a guest passenger by negligent driving.

1985The privilege of immunity from the sizeable collection fees involved under this ordinance was granted to one subclass of properties while the plaintiffs’ subclass was arbitrarily denied such benefit.” Alexander, supra, pp 38-39 .

1973United States v Goldfarb, 328 F2d 280 (CA 6, 1964), cert den, 377 US 976 ; 84 S Ct 1883 ; 12 L Ed 2d 746 (1964).

1973United States v Goldfarb, 328 F2d 280 (CA 6, 1964), cert den, 377 US 976 ; 84 S Ct 1883 ; 12 L Ed 2d 746 (1964).

1972For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 1 “The privilege is the privilege of the person making the communication, and can only be waived by him personally.” Maynard v Vinton, 59 Mich 139, 152 .

1921Reference to the comparatively early case of Bacon v. Railroad Co., 66 Mich. 166 , and to the late cases of Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699 (Ann.

1921Reference to the comparatively early case of Bacon v. Railroad Co., 66 Mich. 166 , and to the late cases of Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699 (Ann.