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11 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1947–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp.green1 sentence2021See Rain, 626 F.3d at 378 (“[A]ppellants’ breach of contract claim is largely indistinguishable from a tort claim alleging injury flowing from statements made in a judicial proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgiagreen2 sentences1999Comm’n, supra; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 (1976) (“This Court’s decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental.” (Citations omitted.)); United Bldg. & Const. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. at 219 , 104 S.Ct. at 1028 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 259 (“Public employment ... is qualitatively different from employment in the private sector; it is a subspecies of the broader opportunity to pursue a common calling. 1999Comm’n, supra; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 (1976) (“This Court’s decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental.” (Citations omitted.)); United Bldg. & Const. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. at 219 , 104 S.Ct. at 1028 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 259 (“Public employment ... is qualitatively different from employment in the private sector; it is a subspecies of the broader opportunity to pursue a common calling. | 1 | 1 |
United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camdengreen2 sentences1999Comm’n, supra; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 (1976) (“This Court’s decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental.” (Citations omitted.)); United Bldg. & Const. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. at 219 , 104 S.Ct. at 1028 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 259 (“Public employment ... is qualitatively different from employment in the private sector; it is a subspecies of the broader opportunity to pursue a common calling. 1999Comm’n, supra; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 (1976) (“This Court’s decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental.” (Citations omitted.)); United Bldg. & Const. v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. at 219 , 104 S.Ct. at 1028 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 259 (“Public employment ... is qualitatively different from employment in the private sector; it is a subspecies of the broader opportunity to pursue a common calling. | 1 | 1 |
Barnard v. Thorstenngreen2 sentences1991To determine whether such provisions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has fashioned the following rule, stated succinctly in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552-553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1299 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559, 568 (1989): “When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ‘(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.’ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v 1991To determine whether such provisions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has fashioned the following rule, stated succinctly in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552-553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1299 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559, 568 (1989): “When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ‘(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.’ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v | 1 | 1 |
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedmangreen2 sentences1991To determine whether such provisions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has fashioned the following rule, stated succinctly in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552-553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1299 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559, 568 (1989): “When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ‘(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.’ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v 1991To determine whether such provisions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has fashioned the following rule, stated succinctly in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552-553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1299 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559, 568 (1989): “When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ‘(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.’ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Canady
green
2 sentences2022As we have explained, because “[t]he attorney-client privilege and the work product exception may result in the exclusion of evidence which is otherwise relevant and material and are 9 antagonistic to the notion of the fullest disclosure of the facts, courts are obligated to strictly limit the privilege and exception to the purpose for which they exist.” Id. at 438 , 460 S.E.2d at 684 . 2022As we have explained, because “[t]he attorney-client privilege and the work product exception may result in the exclusion of evidence which is otherwise relevant and material and are 9 antagonistic to the notion of the fullest disclosure of the facts, courts are obligated to strictly limit the privilege and exception to the purpose for which they exist.” Id. at 438 , 460 S.E.2d at 684 . | 3 | 1998–2022 |
United States v. Wade
green
2 sentences1980The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling `communications' or `testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical evidence' does not violate it." See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 764 , 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (compelled use of suspect's voice for identification); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), (compulsory appearance of suspect in pretrial lineup). 1980The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling `communications' or `testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical evidence' does not violate it." See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 764 , 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (compelled use of suspect's voice for identification); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), (compulsory appearance of suspect in pretrial lineup). | 2 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Dionisio
green
2 sentences1980The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect *503 or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 , 35 L. 1980The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect *503 or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 , 35 L. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Supreme Court of NH v. Piper
green
2 sentences1991To determine whether such provisions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has fashioned the following rule, stated succinctly in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552-553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1299 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559, 568 (1989): “When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ‘(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.’ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v 1991To determine whether such provisions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has fashioned the following rule, stated succinctly in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552-553 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1299 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559, 568 (1989): “When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ‘(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.’ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v | 1 | 1991–1991 |
In Re Lockwood
green
2 sentences1959In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116 , 14 S. Ct. 1082 , 38 L. 1959In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116 , 14 S. Ct. 1082 , 38 L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
United States v. Skinner
green
1 sentence1954In support of this position the Attorney General cites State v. Weissengoff, 89 W.Va. 297 , 109 S.E. 707 ; State v. Davidson, 242 Wis. 406 , 8 N.W.2d 275 , 145 A.L.R. 1411 ; and United States v. Skinner, D.C., 218 F. 870 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
State v. Davidson
green
2 sentences1954In support of this position the Attorney General cites State v. Weissengoff, 89 W.Va. 297 , 109 S.E. 707 ; State v. Davidson, 242 Wis. 406 , 8 N.W.2d 275 , 145 A.L.R. 1411 ; and United States v. Skinner, D.C., 218 F. 870 . 1954In support of this position the Attorney General cites State v. Weissengoff, 89 W.Va. 297 , 109 S.E. 707 ; State v. Davidson, 242 Wis. 406 , 8 N.W.2d 275 , 145 A.L.R. 1411 ; and United States v. Skinner, D.C., 218 F. 870 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
State v. Weissengoff
green
1 sentence1954In support of this position the Attorney General cites State v. Weissengoff, 89 W.Va. 297 , 109 S.E. 707 ; State v. Davidson, 242 Wis. 406 , 8 N.W.2d 275 , 145 A.L.R. 1411 ; and United States v. Skinner, D.C., 218 F. 870 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Maxwell v. Dow
green
2 sentences1947A trial by jury in. a State court is not a privilege or an immunity which a State is forbidden to abridge, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 , 20 S. Ct. 448 , 44 L. ed. 597; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 , 37 S. Ct. 255 , 61 L. ed. 678. 1947A trial by jury in. a State court is not a privilege or an immunity which a State is forbidden to abridge, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 , 20 S. Ct. 448 , 44 L. ed. 597; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 , 37 S. Ct. 255 , 61 L. ed. 678. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Hawkins v. Bleakly, Auditor of the State of Iowa, Et Al.
green
1 sentence1947A trial by jury in. a State court is not a privilege or an immunity which a State is forbidden to abridge, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 , 20 S. Ct. 448 , 44 L. ed. 597; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 , 37 S. Ct. 255 , 61 L. ed. 678. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Hawkins v. Bleakly
green
1 sentence1947A trial by jury in. a State court is not a privilege or an immunity which a State is forbidden to abridge, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 , 20 S. Ct. 448 , 44 L. ed. 597; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 , 37 S. Ct. 255 , 61 L. ed. 678. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.