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6 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1921–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Husaingreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Husain, 291 F.R.D. 209, 218 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rosati v. Kuzman
green
1 sentence2016Defendant specifically cites the analysis adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263 , 266 (R.I.1995) (holding that "the mere presence of a third party per se does not constitute a waiver thereof. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2006Ed. 2d at 916-17 . “[B]oth federal and state courts have usually held that [the Fifth Amendment] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements . . . the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony’, but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Id. at 764 , 16 L. 2006Ed. 2d at 916-17 . “[B]oth federal and state courts have usually held that [the Fifth Amendment] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements . . . the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony’, but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Id. at 764 , 16 L. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
McKillop v. Onslow County
green
1 sentence2000McKillop v. Onslow County, 139 N.C. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Plemmons
green
2 sentences1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( 1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. . Webster
green
2 sentences1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( 1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. . Jones
green
2 sentences1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( 1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. . Holland
neutral
2 sentences1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( 1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. McNeely
green
2 sentences1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( 1968If the explanation given by the Court in these simple terms was not thought to be sufficient, it became the privilege of defense counsel to ask for further instructions.” Other instances in which the Supreme Court has held it was not *204 error for the trial judge, absent a special request, to define words or phrases for the jury, may be found in: State v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610 , 6 S.E. 2d 217 (the words “feloniously” and “willfully” as used in an indictment for murder, where the court had otherwise fully charged the jury on the law of murder); State v. Webster, 218 N.C. 692 , 12 S.E. 2d 272 ( | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Walker v. Sauvinet
green
1 sentence1921Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S., 90 ; Montana Co. v. Mining Co., 152 U. S., 171 ; Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S., 212 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Marvin v. Trout
green
1 sentence1921Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S., 90 ; Montana Co. v. Mining Co., 152 U. S., 171 ; Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S., 212 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.