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26 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1885–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Daygreen2 sentences2015Id. at 78-79 . 2003First, “where the legislature singles out one person or class of persons to receive a privilege or immunity not equally provided to others, such classification must be based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the unequally treated class, and the disparate treatment must be reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics.” Id. at 78-79 . | 3 | 11 |
Carvallaro v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017BDO Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1605-PL-1116 | January 9, 2017 Page 23 of 41 Seidman, 492 F.3d at 815 ; see Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002). 2017BDO Seidman, 492 F.3d at 815 ; see Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002). | 3 | 3 |
Dowd, Warden v. Stuckeygreen2 sentences2001We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." Id. at 78-79 (citing Dowd v. Stuckey, 222 Ind. 100, 104 , 51 N.E.2d 947, 948 (1943); Sch. 2001We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." Id. at 78-79 (citing Dowd v. Stuckey, 222 Ind. 100, 104 , 51 N.E.2d 947, 948 (1943); Sch. | 2 | 2 |
Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohengreen2 sentences1997Id. at 78-79 . 1996More pointedly, this means that where the legislature singles out one ... class of persons to receive a privilege or immunity not equally provided to others, such classification must be based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the unequally treated class, and the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics. *593 Id. at 78-79 . | 1 | 3 |
Dvorak v. City of Bloomingtongreen1 sentence2002We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be 'Jjust,' 'reasonable,' 'substantial,' 'not artificial, 'not capricious, and 'not arbitrary.! 644 N.E.2d 72, 78-79 (Ind.1994); see also Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 768 N.E.2d 490 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Corll v. Edward D. Jones & Co.green1 sentence1996Corll, 646 N.E.2d at 725 (some citations omitted). [4] See Ind.Evidence Rule 804(b)(3). [5] Although defendant does not raise the argument, we also note that Maretto's disclosures to Williams did not serve to waive the privilege because the privilege belongs to the client and can only be waived by conduct attributable to the client. | 1 | 1 |
School City of Elwood v. State Ex Rel. Griffingreen2 sentences1994We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." See Barrett v. Millikan (1901), 156 Ind. 510, 516 , 60 N.E. 310, 312 ("just, natural, and reasonable"); Hirth-Krause, 177 Ind. at 10 , 97 N.E. at 5 ("natural and substantial"); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 188 Ind. at 183 , 122 N.E. at 587-88 ("just and reasonable," not "manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary," resting on some "substantial and not merely artificial re 1994We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." See Barrett v. Millikan (1901), 156 Ind. 510, 516 , 60 N.E. 310, 312 ("just, natural, and reasonable"); Hirth-Krause, 177 Ind. at 10 , 97 N.E. at 5 ("natural and substantial"); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 188 Ind. at 183 , 122 N.E. at 587-88 ("just and reasonable," not "manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary," resting on some "substantial and not merely artificial re | 1 | 1 |
Barrett v. Millikangreen2 sentences1994We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." See Barrett v. Millikan (1901), 156 Ind. 510, 516 , 60 N.E. 310, 312 ("just, natural, and reasonable"); Hirth-Krause, 177 Ind. at 10 , 97 N.E. at 5 ("natural and substantial"); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 188 Ind. at 183 , 122 N.E. at 587-88 ("just and reasonable," not "manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary," resting on some "substantial and not merely artificial re 1994We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." See Barrett v. Millikan (1901), 156 Ind. 510, 516 , 60 N.E. 310, 312 ("just, natural, and reasonable"); Hirth-Krause, 177 Ind. at 10 , 97 N.E. at 5 ("natural and substantial"); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 188 Ind. at 183 , 122 N.E. at 587-88 ("just and reasonable," not "manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary," resting on some "substantial and not merely artificial re | 1 | 1 |
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences1994We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." See Barrett v. Millikan (1901), 156 Ind. 510, 516 , 60 N.E. 310, 312 ("just, natural, and reasonable"); Hirth-Krause, 177 Ind. at 10 , 97 N.E. at 5 ("natural and substantial"); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 188 Ind. at 183 , 122 N.E. at 587-88 ("just and reasonable," not "manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary," resting on some "substantial and not merely artificial re 1994We believe that this requirement incorporates and satisfies the often expressed concerns that such legislative classifications be "just," "natural," "reasonable," "substantial," "not artificial," "not capricious," and "not arbitrary." See Barrett v. Millikan (1901), 156 Ind. 510, 516 , 60 N.E. 310, 312 ("just, natural, and reasonable"); Hirth-Krause, 177 Ind. at 10 , 97 N.E. at 5 ("natural and substantial"); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 188 Ind. at 183 , 122 N.E. at 587-88 ("just and reasonable," not "manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary," resting on some "substantial and not merely artificial re | 1 | 1 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences1986The Court concluded that the blood test evidence was admissible since "[njot even a shadow of testimonial compulsion or enforced communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis." Id. at 765, 86 S.Ct. at 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d at 916. 1986The Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination is inapplicable to a blood-alcohol test. "[Bloth federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. - The - distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accuse | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lockwoodgreen2 sentences1938See In re Lockwood 154 U. S. 116 , 14 S. Ct. 1082 , 38 L. 1938See In re Lockwood 154 U. S. 116 , 14 S. Ct. 1082 , 38 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP
green
2 sentences2017BDO Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1605-PL-1116 | January 9, 2017 Page 23 of 41 Seidman, 492 F.3d at 815 ; see Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002). 2017BDO Seidman, 492 F.3d at 815 ; see Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002). | 3 | 2015–2017 |
Key v. State
green
2 sentences1996Key, 235 Ind. at 175 , 132 N.E.2d at 145 . 1996Key, 235 Ind. at 175 , 132 N.E.2d at 145 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Newton v. Yates
green
1 sentence1981When ruling on a party’s motion to compel discovery, the trial court must determine whether the information sought is relevant to the issues to be tried and if it is protected from discovery by a privilege or immunity. 3 Newton v. Yates, (1976) 170 *1177 Ind.App. 486, 353 N.E.2d 485 , trans. den. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Neff v. Masters
neutral
1 sentence1948Immunity and privilege are synonymous terms; and mean a right conferred peculiar to some individual or body; a favor granted; a special privilege; in short, an affirmative act of selection of special subjects of favors, not enjoyed by citizens in general.” Hammer v. State (1909), 173 Ind. 199, 202 , 89 N. E. 846 (and cases there cited). *292 *291 The Constitution and laws of the United States do not guarantee to any one a right to visit or frequent *292 a gambling house nor can any one under such Constitution and laws claim that right as a privilege, or that he shall be immune from regulation | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Hammer v. State
green
1 sentence1948Immunity and privilege are synonymous terms; and mean a right conferred peculiar to some individual or body; a favor granted; a special privilege; in short, an affirmative act of selection of special subjects of favors, not enjoyed by citizens in general.” Hammer v. State (1909), 173 Ind. 199, 202 , 89 N. E. 846 (and cases there cited). *292 *291 The Constitution and laws of the United States do not guarantee to any one a right to visit or frequent *292 a gambling house nor can any one under such Constitution and laws claim that right as a privilege, or that he shall be immune from regulation | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Heavenridge v. Nelson
neutral
1 sentence1946As quoted with approval in Heavenridge v. Nelson (1877), 56 Ind. 90, 94 , decided before § 6-2335 supra, was enacted: “This privilege of waiver is a purely personal right, and its exercise rests in her personal discretion alone. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Pinkerton v. Sargent
neutral
1 sentence1936The case seems to have been decided upon authority of Pinkerton, Admt. v. Sargent, Exr. (1869), 102 Mass. 568, 570 , another case in which there seems to have been no order of court authorizing the guardian to ■ elect, where it is said that: “This privilege of waiver is a purely personal right, and its exercise rests in her personal discretion alone. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
State v. Richcreek
green
1 sentence1909State v. Richcreek (1906), 167 Ind. 217 , 5 L. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Hudelson v. State
green
1 sentence1885The judgment in the case of Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426 (48 Am. | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.