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9 Minnesota opinions name it 3 courts 1889–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Larry E. Brooks, Sr.green1 sentence2016See, e.g., United States v. Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir.2004) (explaining that, as a general rule, if a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment on cross-examination, “the district court must strike the witness’s direct testimony unless the refusal to answer only concerns collateral matters” and determining that the witness’s testimony should have been stricken where her invoca *504 tion of the privilege precluded inquiry into details of her direct testimony that were not collateral); United States v. Brooks, 82 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that the district court's failure to stri | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Earnest Wilmoregreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., United States v. Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir.2004) (explaining that, as a general rule, if a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment on cross-examination, “the district court must strike the witness’s direct testimony unless the refusal to answer only concerns collateral matters” and determining that the witness’s testimony should have been stricken where her invoca *504 tion of the privilege precluded inquiry into details of her direct testimony that were not collateral); United States v. Brooks, 82 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that the district court's failure to stri | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gulleksongreen1 sentence2014To establish the existence of a psychologist-client privilege, the client must establish that “(1) a confidential psychologist-patient relationship existed between defendant and *433 the psychologist, (2) during which the psychologist acquired information of the type contemplated by the privilege statute, (3) while attending the patient, and (4) which was necessary for diagnosis and treatment.” State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn.App.1986) (citing State v. Staat, 291 Minn. 394, 399 , 192 N.W.2d 192, 197 (1971)), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1986). “[T]he absence of one essential fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Staatgreen2 sentences2014To establish the existence of a psychologist-client privilege, the client must establish that “(1) a confidential psychologist-patient relationship existed between defendant and *433 the psychologist, (2) during which the psychologist acquired information of the type contemplated by the privilege statute, (3) while attending the patient, and (4) which was necessary for diagnosis and treatment.” State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn.App.1986) (citing State v. Staat, 291 Minn. 394, 399 , 192 N.W.2d 192, 197 (1971)), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1986). “[T]he absence of one essential fact 2014To establish the existence of a psychologist-client privilege, the client must establish that “(1) a confidential psychologist-patient relationship existed between defendant and *433 the psychologist, (2) during which the psychologist acquired information of the type contemplated by the privilege statute, (3) while attending the patient, and (4) which was necessary for diagnosis and treatment.” State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn.App.1986) (citing State v. Staat, 291 Minn. 394, 399 , 192 N.W.2d 192, 197 (1971)), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1986). “[T]he absence of one essential fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Richardsgreen1 sentence2006See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Burke
green
2 sentences2014Over 100 years later, in State v. Burke, 258 \Vis. 2d 832, 653 N.W.2d 922 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the Polacheck reasoning, finding that legislators had no privilege from criminal arrest and that the privilege exception for "treason, felony and breach of the peace" was intended to mean "all crimes." Burke, 258 Wis. at 841, 653 N.W.2d at 927 . 2014Over 100 years later, in State v. Burke, 258 \Vis. 2d 832, 653 N.W.2d 922 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the Polacheck reasoning, finding that legislators had no privilege from criminal arrest and that the privilege exception for "treason, felony and breach of the peace" was intended to mean "all crimes." Burke, 258 Wis. at 841, 653 N.W.2d at 927 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard
green
2 sentences2013And “[i]f public policy dictates that testimony by a witness is protected by absolute privilege as against a defamation claim, the same policy may be served through application of the privilege to bar all legal claims based on that same testimony.” Id. ‘When absolute privilege applies, the speaker is completely shielded from liability for her statements, even statements that are intentionally false or made with malice.” Id. at 306 . 2013And “[i]f public policy dictates that testimony by a witness is protected by absolute privilege as against a defamation claim, the same policy may be served through application of the privilege to bar all legal claims based on that same testimony.” Id. ‘When absolute privilege applies, the speaker is completely shielded from liability for her statements, even statements that are intentionally false or made with malice.” Id. at 306 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Black
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jenkins v. Jenkins
neutral
1 sentence1908In Jenkins v. Jenkins, 92 Minn, 310, 311, 100 N. W. 7 , it was held that the widow could maintain ejectment for the possession of the land; it not appearing that the administrator had taken possession thereof. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Groll v. Tower
green
1 sentence1889Russell v. Jackson, 15 Jur. 1117; Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175 ; Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249 . | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Blackburn v. Crawfords
green
1 sentence1889Russell v. Jackson, 15 Jur. 1117; Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175 ; Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249 . | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.