privilege claim in Texas

2026See In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to conduct an adequate in camera inspection of documents when such review is critical to evaluation of a privilege claim.”).

2026See In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to conduct an adequate in camera inspection of documents when such review is critical to evaluation of a privilege claim.”).

2010See Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye , 893 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding).

2010See Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye, 893 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding).

2023Affidavits supporting a privilege claim must strike a delicate balance between providing enough information to establish the existence of a privileged communication while preserving confidentiality. 12 The dissent criticizes Sharphorn’s affidavit because it “was prepared in connection with other litigation.” Id. at 22 n.60.

2016DuPont de Nemours, 136 S.W.3d at 223 (“The trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to conduct an in camera inspection when such review is critical- to the. evaluation of a privilege claim.”).

2024See R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 841 (“[T]he offensive use doctrine is independent from and unrelated to the privilege exception . . . stated in Rules 509(d)(4) and 510(d)(5).”). 6 Here, E.B. designated her psychologist and pediatrician, Drs.

2009Id. (citing Republic Ins. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1993)). “[T]he offensive use doctrine is independent from and unrelated to the privilege exception for patient-litigants stated in Rules 509(d)(4) and 510(d)(5).” R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 841 .

2018Evid. 513 (prohibiting the court or counsel from commenting upon a privilege claim); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 614–15 (1965) (“What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.

2018Evid. 513 (prohibiting the court or counsel from commenting upon a privilege claim); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 614–15 (1965) (“What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.

2017First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex. 1992) (recognizing that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, orig, proceeding) ("Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged [trader the attorney-client privilege], the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim”); Coats v. Ruiz, 198 S.W.3d 863, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, n

2016First Ct.App., 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex.1992) (recognizing that the crime — fraud exception to the attorney — client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2013, orig. proceeding) (“Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged, the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim.”); In re Small, 346 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (same); Coats v. Ruiz, 198

2017Co., 128 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig, proceeding) (same). .

2016Co., 128 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (same).

2017First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex. 1992) (recognizing that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, orig, proceeding) ("Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged [trader the attorney-client privilege], the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim”); Coats v. Ruiz, 198 S.W.3d 863, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, n

2016First Ct.App., 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex.1992) (recognizing that the crime — fraud exception to the attorney — client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2013, orig. proceeding) (“Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged, the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim.”); In re Small, 346 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (same); Coats v. Ruiz, 198

2017First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex. 1992) (recognizing that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, orig, proceeding) ("Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged [trader the attorney-client privilege], the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim”); Coats v. Ruiz, 198 S.W.3d 863, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, n

2016First Ct.App., 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex.1992) (recognizing that the crime — fraud exception to the attorney — client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2013, orig. proceeding) (“Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged, the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim.”); In re Small, 346 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (same); Coats v. Ruiz, 198

2015As courts have recognized, the “level of intimidation against a local legislator arising from the threat of a criminal proceeding is at least as great as the threat from a civil suit,” so “the privilege or immunity enjoyed by local legislators should be extended to criminal proceedings.” State v. Holton, 997 A.2d 828, 845, 856 (Md.

2015As courts have recognized, the “level of intimidation against a local legislator arising 14 from the threat of a criminal proceeding is at least as great as the threat from a civil suit,” so “the privilege or immunity enjoyed by local legislators should be extended to criminal proceedings.” State v. Holton, 997 A.2d 828, 845, 856 (Md.

2023In Weisel Enterprises, for example, despite its passing reference to “affidavits and live testimony,” the only putative support for the privilege claim was a “summary listing of documents under the heading ‘Attorney-Client/Attorney Work-Product’,” which, the Court stressed, “was merely an unverified, global allegation that the list of documents was 13 protected by one or both privileges.” Id. (emphasis added).

2015DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (trial court abuses discretion in refusing to conduct in camera inspection when such review is critical to evaluation of a privilege claim); Weisel Enters., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that trial judge who denies discovery in absence of evidence substantiating claim of privilege abuses discretion, that when claim for protection is based on attorney-client or work product privilege, documents themselves may be only evidence substantiating claim of privilege, that listi

2016First Ct.App., 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex.1992) (recognizing that the crime — fraud exception to the attorney — client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2013, orig. proceeding) (“Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged, the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim.”); In re Small, 346 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (same); Coats v. Ruiz, 198

2013In re Small, 346 S.W.3d at 662-63 .

2009Id. (citing Republic Ins. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1993)). “[T]he offensive use doctrine is independent from and unrelated to the privilege exception for patient-litigants stated in Rules 509(d)(4) and 510(d)(5).” R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 841 .

1994See Republic, 856 S.W.2d at 161 n. 5.

2006Once the party asserting the privilege comes forward with proof of the privilege claim, the requesting party must “point out to the court which specific documents or groups of documents it believes require an in camera inspection.” In re Maher, 143 S.W.3d 907, 913 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, orig. proceeding).

2005DuPont, 136 S.W.3d at 226-27 ; In re Maher, 143 S.W.3d at 913 .

1993State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 673-74 (Tex.1991); Loftin, 776 S.W.2d at 148 ; Thibodeaux v. Spring Woods Bank, 757 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Shell Western E & P, Inc., 751 S.W.2d at 196 .

1991Lowry, 802 S.W.2d at 671 ; Jordan, 701 S.W.2d at 648-49 ; Tex. R.Civ.P. 166b(4).

2024See Mireskandari v. Casey, 636 S.W.3d 727 , 739 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, pet. denied) (stating judicial-proceedings privilege did not apply because the essence of the plaintiff’s claim “was not damages but declaratory relief”); Deuell, 508 S.W.3d at 690 (noting judicial-proceedings privilege applies to other torts “when the essence of a claim is damages that flow from communications made in the course of a judicial proceeding” and the “party seeks damages that flow from alleged reputational harm, regardless of the type of claim alleged”).

2023See Salazar, 928 S.W.2d at 172 (“It is an abuse of discretion to deny discovery when no proof of the privilege is provided.”).

2023See, e.g., Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 763 ; In re Edge Capital Grp., Inc., 161 S.W.3d at 768 ; Burton, 749 S.W.2d at 508 .

2016See Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 799 .

2016See id.

2015DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (trial court abuses discretion in refusing to conduct in camera inspection when such review is critical to evaluation of a privilege claim); Weisel Enters., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that trial judge who denies discovery in absence of evidence substantiating claim of privilege abuses discretion, that when claim for protection is based on attorney-client or work product privilege, documents themselves may be only evidence substantiating claim of privilege, that listi

2014See Jarvis, 431 S.W.3d at 135 (summarizing patient-litigant exception to physician-patient privilege as applying where: “(1) the records are relevant to the condition at issue in the litigation, and (2) the condition contained in the records is relied upon as ‘part’ of a party’s claim or defense”).