privilege bar in California

2026GenMark responds that given its limited 10 Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 , 365—which held that the privilege did not bar the pursuit of a statutory remedy by a victim of telephonic eavesdropping that occurred before a judicial proceeding was commenced— and Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202 , 205–206, 209—which deemed the privilege inapplicable to the noncommunicative act of secretly recording telephone conversations—cited by Landlords to suggest that illegal acts are not protected by the privilege are readily distinguishable. 15 role as a subpoenaed party, any proposed torts would be

1992(Kimmel v. Goland, supra, 51 Cal.3d 202 ; Cutter v. Brownbridge (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 841-848 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; and ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 307 .) Applying the privilege to bar plaintiffs’ suit against an expert witness hired to assist them in litigation, under the circumstances alleged, does not further the policies underlying section 47, subdivision (2).

2022(Action, at p. 1241; Kibler, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 202-203.) Moreover, failing to apply the privilege to this claim “would further discourage participation in peer review by allowing disciplined physicians to file harassing lawsuits against hospitals and their peer review committee members rather than seeking judicial review of the committee’s decision by the available means of a petition for administrative mandate.” (Id. at p. 201.) We are also unpersuaded by Bonni’s citation to Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 40 .

2022(Action, at p. 1241; Kibler, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 202-203.) Moreover, failing to apply the privilege to this claim “would further discourage participation in peer review by allowing disciplined physicians to file harassing lawsuits against hospitals and their peer review committee members rather than seeking judicial review of the committee’s decision by the available means of a petition for administrative mandate.” (Id. at p. 201.) We are also unpersuaded by Bonni’s citation to Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 40 .

2022(Action, at p. 1241; Kibler, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 202-203.) Moreover, failing to apply the privilege to this claim “would further discourage participation in peer review by allowing disciplined physicians to file harassing lawsuits against hospitals and their peer review committee members rather than seeking judicial review of the committee’s decision by the available means of a petition for administrative mandate.” (Id. at p. 201.) We are also unpersuaded by Bonni’s citation to Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 40 .

2022(Action, at p. 1241; Kibler, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 202-203.) Moreover, failing to apply the privilege to this claim “would further discourage participation in peer review by allowing disciplined physicians to file harassing lawsuits against hospitals and their peer review committee members rather than seeking judicial review of the committee’s decision by the available means of a petition for administrative mandate.” (Id. at p. 201.) We are also unpersuaded by Bonni’s citation to Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 40 .

2016(Id. at pp. 1473-1474.) Under such circumstances, the appellate court concluded that application of the privilege to bar the breach of contract claim furthered “the policy of allowing access to the courts without fear of harassing derivative actions.” (Id. at pp. 1497-1498.) More recently, in Vivian v. Labrucherie (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 267 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ] (Vivian), the appellate court held that the litigation privilege applied to bar a breach of contract claim where an ex-wife made voluntary statements about her ex-husband to a county sheriffs internal affairs department, in alleged v

2016(Id. at pp. 1473-1474.) Under such circumstances, the appellate court concluded that application of the privilege to bar the breach of contract claim furthered “the policy of allowing access to the courts without fear of harassing derivative actions.” (Id. at pp. 1497-1498.) More recently, in Vivian v. Labrucherie (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 267 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ] (Vivian), the appellate court held that the litigation privilege applied to bar a breach of contract claim where an ex-wife made voluntary statements about her ex-husband to a county sheriffs internal affairs department, in alleged v

2007Disagreeing with Davenport, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 255 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 , the Court of Appeal concluded that a protective order would not sufficiently protect Garcia's interests.

2007Disagreeing with Davenport, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 255 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 , the Court of Appeal concluded that a protective order would not sufficiently protect Garcia's interests.

2007Counsel should give "proper and timely notice" of the privilege claim ( Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1131 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 789 ), and provide the court with the affidavit the defense seeks to file under seal, along with a proposed redacted version.

2007Counsel should give "proper and timely notice" of the privilege claim ( Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1131 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 789 ), and provide the court with the affidavit the defense seeks to file under seal, along with a proposed redacted version.

1967The distinction which has emerged ... is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” (Italics added.) (See also Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 712 ; Evans v. Hendrick, 359 F.2d 776 ; People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223, 234 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ] ; People v. Juarez, 243 Cal.App.2d 475, 478 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 556 ].) True it is that under Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.

1967The distinction which has emerged ... is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” (Italics added.) (See also Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 712 ; Evans v. Hendrick, 359 F.2d 776 ; People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223, 234 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ] ; People v. Juarez, 243 Cal.App.2d 475, 478 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 556 ].) True it is that under Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.

2026GenMark responds that given its limited 10 Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 , 365—which held that the privilege did not bar the pursuit of a statutory remedy by a victim of telephonic eavesdropping that occurred before a judicial proceeding was commenced— and Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202 , 205–206, 209—which deemed the privilege inapplicable to the noncommunicative act of secretly recording telephone conversations—cited by Landlords to suggest that illegal acts are not protected by the privilege are readily distinguishable. 15 role as a subpoenaed party, any proposed torts would be

2026Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 478 .) “[M]any cases have held that the official proceeding privilege applies to a communication intended to prompt an administrative agency charged with enforcing the law to investigate or remedy a wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362 .) The “privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 .) “The EDD has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate an employee’s claim for un

2026Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 478 .) “[M]any cases have held that the official proceeding privilege applies to a communication intended to prompt an administrative agency charged with enforcing the law to investigate or remedy a wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362 .) The “privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 .) “The EDD has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate an employee’s claim for un

2026Proc., § 425.16.) It agreed the complaint arose from protected activities, i.e., “communicative acts and prosecutorial or administrative decisions carried out by City [and County] employees in the course of their duties, including initiating or assisting in criminal proceedings, reporting violations of court orders, and enforcing civil restraining orders.” It concluded “[t]hese acts are intimately connected with and in furtherance of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings” and that appellant had not “demonstrated a legal theory that is not negated by a privilege or immunity.” “We review de nov

2026Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 478 .) “[M]any cases have held that the official proceeding privilege applies to a communication intended to prompt an administrative agency charged with enforcing the law to investigate or remedy a wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362 .) The “privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 .) “The EDD has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate an employee’s claim for un

2026Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 478 .) “[M]any cases have held that the official proceeding privilege applies to a communication intended to prompt an administrative agency charged with enforcing the law to investigate or remedy a wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362 .) The “privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 .) “The EDD has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate an employee’s claim for un

2024While “a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him does not supersede a witness’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 521 ; Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 993 ), such a major intrusion into defense rights calls for some degree of certainty that the privilege claim is valid.

2024While “a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him does not supersede a witness’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 521 ; Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 993 ), such a major intrusion into defense rights calls for some degree of certainty that the privilege claim is valid.

2024While “a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him does not supersede a witness’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 521 ; Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 993 ), such a major intrusion into defense rights calls for some degree of certainty that the privilege claim is valid.

2023(Id. at p. 761.) The court distinguished between a suspect’s communications (which are protected by the Fifth Amendment), and actions such as “compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture,” which are not protected by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. ( Schmerber, supra, at p. 764 , fn. omitted.) The court held: “The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against co

2022(Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 216 .) “‘[T]he policy underlying the privilege is to assure utmost freedom of 13 communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility it is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.’ In order for such investigation to be effective, ‘there must be an open channel of communication by which citizens can call his attention to suspected wrongdoing.’” (Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745, 753-754 .) That channel would “quickly close” if it could lead to a risk of tort liability.

2020Thus, the ‘salutary policy reasons for an absolute [litigation] privilege supersede individual litigants’ interests in recovering damages for injurious publications made during the course of judicial proceedings.’ ” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1064 .) “[A]pplication of the litigation privilege gives the recipient of a subpoena duces tecum freedom to respond to that subpoena without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” (Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 .) Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s application of this privilege to bar Nelson’s tort claim

2020(Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 914‒915 [“ ‘when allegations of misconduct properly put an individual’s intent at issue in a civil action, statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding may be used for evidentiary purposes in determining whether the disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, [or] administrative adjudication, … in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. [¶] … [¶] (c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants

2020Thus, the ‘salutary policy reasons for an absolute [litigation] privilege supersede individual litigants’ interests in recovering damages for injurious publications made during the course of judicial proceedings.’ ” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1064 .) “[A]pplication of the litigation privilege gives the recipient of a subpoena duces tecum freedom to respond to that subpoena without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” (Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 .) Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s application of this privilege to bar Nelson’s tort claim