privilege hearing in Missouri

2014“The so-called ‘fairness doctrine’ is grounded in the notion that it is unfair to permit a party to make use of privileged information as a sword when it is advantageous for the privilege holder to do so, and then as a shield when the party opponent seeks to use privileged information that might be harmful to the privilege holder.” Dally, 90 S.W.3d at 215-16 .

2014“The so-called ‘fairness doctrine’ is grounded in the notion that it is unfair to permit a party to make use of privileged information as a sword when it is advantageous for the privilege holder to do so, and then as a shield when the party opponent seeks to use privileged information that might be harmful to the privilege holder.” Dally, 90 S.W.3d at 215-16 .

2002Coldwell Banker and Waelter also claim a privilege under the rule set out in Community Title Co. The full statement of that rule is that one “who has a present existing economic interest, such as a prior contract of his own or a financial interest in the affairs of the person persuaded not to enter into a contract, is privileged to interfere with another’s business expectancy to protect one’s own economic interests.” Community Title Co., 796 S.W.2d at 372 .

2000Myers, 997 S.W.2d at 34 ; Rollie, 962 S.W.2d at 415 .

2000Myers, 997 S.W.2d at 34 ; Rollie, 962 S.W.2d at 415 .

1997There the appellate court noted that the reason some form of judicial response is appropriate following the invocation of the privilege is “to eliminate any undue advantage which might flow from the ability to conceal pertinent evidence.” Id. at 567 .

1993Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160 , 12 S.W. 510 , 514 (1889), holds that those who represent the patient after his death could waive the privilege and that the privilege continues indefinitely.

1976Id., 384 U.S. at 764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 916 .

1976Id., 384 U.S. at 764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 916 .

1976Gilbert v. Edwards, supra, in its expression of legislative intent, does not limit the Real Estate Commission’s power to suspend or revoke a broker’s license to cases of fraud and incompetency; and such powers can be exercised only upon notice and hearing which were duly accorded in this case.

1972Counsel for plaintiff was entitled to argue the value of his client’s case — a privilege that defense counsel also exercised by telling the jury in his closing argument that “I think a fair verdict in this case would be probably $750.00 to $1,000.00 above his out of pocket expense * As this court held in Lynch v. Rosenthal, Mo.App., 396 S.W.2d 272 , ruling the identical question considered in this case, “Counsel was merely exercising the privilege of an advocate to indulge in the natural art of persuasion.” In any event, considering that the verdict returned was in the lesser sum of $10,000.00

1942The annulment of such decree and the Entrance of another depriving her of custody without proper notice would be a denial of due process, and said decree would not be a judgment at all, and its efficacy in affecting the right of custody may be determined by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Ex Parte Jack v. Jack, 295 Mo. 128 , 243 S. W. 314 ; Tomlinson v. French Institute, 232 Mo. App. 597 , 109 S. W. (2d) 73 .] A distinction is clearly draivn between judgments which are lawfully rendered, with competent jurisdiction, and judgments which are the result of an excess of jurisdiction.

1942The annulment of such decree and the Entrance of another depriving her of custody without proper notice would be a denial of due process, and said decree would not be a judgment at all, and its efficacy in affecting the right of custody may be determined by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Ex Parte Jack v. Jack, 295 Mo. 128 , 243 S. W. 314 ; Tomlinson v. French Institute, 232 Mo. App. 597 , 109 S. W. (2d) 73 .] A distinction is clearly draivn between judgments which are lawfully rendered, with competent jurisdiction, and judgments which are the result of an excess of jurisdiction.

1942The annulment of such decree and the Entrance of another depriving her of custody without proper notice would be a denial of due process, and said decree would not be a judgment at all, and its efficacy in affecting the right of custody may be determined by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Ex Parte Jack v. Jack, 295 Mo. 128 , 243 S. W. 314 ; Tomlinson v. French Institute, 232 Mo. App. 597 , 109 S. W. (2d) 73 .] A distinction is clearly draivn between judgments which are lawfully rendered, with competent jurisdiction, and judgments which are the result of an excess of jurisdiction.

1942The annulment of such decree and the Entrance of another depriving her of custody without proper notice would be a denial of due process, and said decree would not be a judgment at all, and its efficacy in affecting the right of custody may be determined by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Ex Parte Jack v. Jack, 295 Mo. 128 , 243 S. W. 314 ; Tomlinson v. French Institute, 232 Mo. App. 597 , 109 S. W. (2d) 73 .] A distinction is clearly draivn between judgments which are lawfully rendered, with competent jurisdiction, and judgments which are the result of an excess of jurisdiction.

1916But the privilege under this rule is limited to retorts or answers which are necessary to the defense or fairly arise out of the charges made, and hence if the defamatory matter published by defendant is not a proper reply to the matter published by plaintiff which provoked its publication, it will be actionable irrespective of the question of malice.” [25 Cyc. 391, 392.] See, also, Fish v. St Louis County Printing & Publishing Co., 102 Mo. App. 6 , 74 S. W. 641 .

1916But the privilege under this rule is limited to retorts or answers which are necessary to the defense or fairly arise out of the charges made, and hence if the defamatory matter published by defendant is not a proper reply to the matter published by plaintiff which provoked its publication, it will be actionable irrespective of the question of malice.” [25 Cyc. 391, 392.] See, also, Fish v. St Louis County Printing & Publishing Co., 102 Mo. App. 6 , 74 S. W. 641 .