privilege immunity in New Jersey

17 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animalsred scotus · 2001 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020 2 sentences 2020The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. [Saucier v. Katz 533 U.S. 194 , 200-01 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).] "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from personal liability for civil rights violations when the officers are acting under color of law in the performance of official duties." Morillo, 222 N.J. at 107 . 2019The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. [Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 200-01 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted).] Thus, the court should decide a request for qualified immunity at the earliest possible time "so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive." Id. at 200; accord Morillo, 222 N.J. at 119 .	1	2
Eric Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff'sgreen nj · 2015 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020 2 sentences 2020The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. [Saucier v. Katz 533 U.S. 194 , 200-01 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).] "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from personal liability for civil rights violations when the officers are acting under color of law in the performance of official duties." Morillo, 222 N.J. at 107 . 2019The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. [Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 200-01 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted).] Thus, the court should decide a request for qualified immunity at the earliest possible time "so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive." Id. at 200; accord Morillo, 222 N.J. at 119 .	1	2
Bainhauer v. Manoukiangreen njsuperctappdiv · 1987 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 1 sentence 1987See Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J.	1	1
Gilbert v. Californiagreen scotus · 1967 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987See Gilbert v. California, 388 US. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 1987See Gilbert v. California, 388 US. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).	1	1
Gissen v. Tackmangreen njd · 1975 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977 1 sentence 1977See Gissen v. Tackman, 401 F. Supp. 305 (D.N.J. 1975).	1	1
Leers v. Greengreen nj · 1957 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965 1 sentence 1965The essentials of qualified privilege regarding matters of public concern in this State, allowing "fair comment" to be undeterred by civil or criminal liability, are fully discussed in Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 254-255 (1957).	1	1
Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuegreen ca3 · 1940 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1960–1960 2 sentences 1960Ed. 1107 ; Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 Cir. 113 F. 2d 555 ; 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. § 2312.” 144 F. 2d, at pages 782-783 In Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 113 F. 2d 555, 556 (3 Cir. 1940), the court, after referring to the privilege as a rule of balance which suppresses some 'truth "so that the general process of administering truth may be furthered,” noted that the authorities were almost unanimous in excluding the identity of the client from the protection of the privilege; and while it questioned some of the reasoning it nevertheless agreed that this resul 1960Ed. 1107 ; Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 Cir. 113 F. 2d 555 ; 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. § 2312.” 144 F. 2d, at pages 782-783 In Mauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 113 F. 2d 555, 556 (3 Cir. 1940), the court, after referring to the privilege as a rule of balance which suppresses some 'truth "so that the general process of administering truth may be furthered,” noted that the authorities were almost unanimous in excluding the identity of the client from the protection of the privilege; and while it questioned some of the reasoning it nevertheless agreed that this resul	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc. green nj · 1955 2 sentences 1996Id. at 373-74 , 149 A. 2d 193 . `[T]he court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired'; it would seem that `the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection'; if the defendant is moved `chiefly' by `motives of ill will, or to accomplish a distinct objective which may be legitimate in itself but is not within the privilege,' ... he is given no immunity. [ Id. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 (quoting Prosser on Torts 601, 627-28 (2d ed.)).] At common law, the privilege 1996Id. at 373-74 , 149 A. 2d 193 . `[T]he court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired'; it would seem that `the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection'; if the defendant is moved `chiefly' by `motives of ill will, or to accomplish a distinct objective which may be legitimate in itself but is not within the privilege,' ... he is given no immunity. [ Id. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 (quoting Prosser on Torts 601, 627-28 (2d ed.)).] At common law, the privilege	5	1965–2001
Peterson v. Ballard green njsuperctappdiv · 1996 2 sentences 2001Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.Super. 575, 582 , 679 A.2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A.2d 761 (1996) (citing Rainier’s Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558 , 117 A.2d 889 ). 2001Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.Super. 575, 582 , 679 A.2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A.2d 761 (1996) (citing Rainier’s Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558 , 117 A.2d 889 ).	2	2001–2001
Peterson v. Ballard green nj · 1996 2 sentences 2001Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.Super. 575, 582 , 679 A.2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A.2d 761 (1996) (citing Rainier’s Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558 , 117 A.2d 889 ). 2001Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.Super. 575, 582 , 679 A. 2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A. 2d 761 (1996) (citing Rainier's Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558 , 117 A. 2d 889 ).	2	2001–2001
GLOBE MOTOR CAR COMPANY v. First Fidelity Bank, NA green nj · 1996 2 sentences 2001Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.Super. 575, 582 , 679 A.2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A.2d 761 (1996) (citing Rainier’s Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558 , 117 A.2d 889 ). 2001Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J.Super. 575, 582 , 679 A. 2d 657 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 260 , 686 A. 2d 761 (1996) (citing Rainier's Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558 , 117 A. 2d 889 ).	2	2001–2001
Gardner v. Broderick green scotus · 1968 2 sentences 1970But in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 1082 (1968), the Court said that "Answers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruit in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying," citing both Counselman and Murphy ( 392 U.S. at 276 , 88 S.Ct. at 1915 , 20 L.Ed. 2d at 1085 ). 1970But in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 1082 (1968), the Court said that "Answers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruit in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying," citing both Counselman and Murphy ( 392 U.S. at 276 , 88 S.Ct. at 1915 , 20 L.Ed. 2d at 1085 ).	2	1970–1970
Costello v. Ocean County Observer green nj · 1994 2 sentences 2002Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 606 , 643 A. 2d 1012 . 2002Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 606 , 643 A. 2d 1012 .	1	2002–2002
Branzburg v. Hayes green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 2000In the wake of the United States Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1972), most of the federal circuit courts have recognized the existence of a qualified privilege for newspersons based on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2000In the wake of the United States Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1972), most of the federal circuit courts have recognized the existence of a qualified privilege for newspersons based on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.	1	2000–2000
Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co. green nj · 1990 2 sentences 1996Id. at 373-74 , 149 A. 2d 193 . `[T]he court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired'; it would seem that `the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection'; if the defendant is moved `chiefly' by `motives of ill will, or to accomplish a distinct objective which may be legitimate in itself but is not within the privilege,' ... he is given no immunity. [ Id. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 (quoting Prosser on Torts 601, 627-28 (2d ed.)).] At common law, the privilege 1996Id. at 373-74 , 149 A. 2d 193 . `[T]he court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired'; it would seem that `the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection'; if the defendant is moved `chiefly' by `motives of ill will, or to accomplish a distinct objective which may be legitimate in itself but is not within the privilege,' ... he is given no immunity. [ Id. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 (quoting Prosser on Torts 601, 627-28 (2d ed.)).] At common law, the privilege	1	1996–1996
Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co. green nj · 1959 2 sentences 1996Id. at 373-74 , 149 A. 2d 193 . `[T]he court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired'; it would seem that `the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection'; if the defendant is moved `chiefly' by `motives of ill will, or to accomplish a distinct objective which may be legitimate in itself but is not within the privilege,' ... he is given no immunity. [ Id. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 (quoting Prosser on Torts 601, 627-28 (2d ed.)).] At common law, the privilege 1996Id. at 373-74 , 149 A. 2d 193 . `[T]he court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired'; it would seem that `the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection'; if the defendant is moved `chiefly' by `motives of ill will, or to accomplish a distinct objective which may be legitimate in itself but is not within the privilege,' ... he is given no immunity. [ Id. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 (quoting Prosser on Torts 601, 627-28 (2d ed.)).] At common law, the privilege	1	1996–1996
Harlow v. Fitzgerald green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 1989The case law is abundantly clear that courts have continuously refused to look beyond a lawful 346 purpose even if there is a suspicion that a somewhat less lofty one lurks in the background. [ Id. at 425 , 373 A. 2d 1045 ] More recently, New Jersey courts have adopted the "objective reasonableness" standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982), in defining the good faith immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. 1989The case law is abundantly clear that courts have continuously refused to look beyond a lawful 346 purpose even if there is a suspicion that a somewhat less lofty one lurks in the background. [ Id. at 425 , 373 A. 2d 1045 ] More recently, New Jersey courts have adopted the "objective reasonableness" standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982), in defining the good faith immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3.	1	1989–1989
Expo, Inc. v. City of Passaic green njsuperctappdiv · 1977 2 sentences 1989The case law is abundantly clear that courts have continuously refused to look beyond a lawful 346 purpose even if there is a suspicion that a somewhat less lofty one lurks in the background. [ Id. at 425 , 373 A. 2d 1045 ] More recently, New Jersey courts have adopted the "objective reasonableness" standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982), in defining the good faith immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. 1989The case law is abundantly clear that courts have continuously refused to look beyond a lawful 346 purpose even if there is a suspicion that a somewhat less lofty one lurks in the background. [ Id. at 425 , 373 A. 2d 1045 ] More recently, New Jersey courts have adopted the "objective reasonableness" standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982), in defining the good faith immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3.	1	1989–1989
Schmerber v. California green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1987See Gilbert v. California, 388 US. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 1987See Gilbert v. California, 388 US. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).	1	1987–1987
Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Industrial Ass'n green njsuperctappdiv · 1961 1 sentence 1977In Rainier, supra, the privilege was held to bar an action for tortious interference with business relations, the court stating: If the policy, which in defamation actions affords an absolute privilege or immunity to statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is really to mean anything then we must not permit its circumvention by affording an almost equally unrestricted action under a different label. [ 19 N.J. at 564 ] Similar reasoning was held to bar such a claim in Middlesex Concrete, etc. v. Carteret Industrial Ass'n, supra, 68 N.J.	1	1977–1977
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham green scotus · 1977 1 sentence 1977This term the United States Supreme Court expressed the test governing applicability of the privilege as “whether the testimony might later subject the witness to criminal prosecution,” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, - U. S. -, -, 97 S. Ct. 2132, 2136 , 53 L.	1	1977–1977

Where else courts name it

CA 60 (1902–2026) TX 56 (1960–2026) NY 47 (1889–2025) WA 36 (1920–2025) PA 31 (1891–2025) OH 31 (1964–2024) FL 30 (1931–2025) LA 28 (1850–2021) OR 26 (1896–2024) IN 26 (1885–2017) IL 24 (1904–2026) MI 20 (1886–2026) MD 18 (1911–2024) NJ 17 (1960–2020) KY 15 (1929–2025) AZ 14 (1976–2026) VA 14 (1926–2023) CT 13 (1937–2011) NH 12 (1889–2018) MO 11 (1916–2014) WV 11 (1947–2022) WI 11 (1899–2026) IA 11 (1969–2024) CO 10 (1970–2026) AK 10 (1964–2017) MS 10 (1984–2023) NM 9 (1956–2015) MN 9 (1889–2016) OK 9 (1913–2019) GA 9 (1940–2025) ME 8 (1913–2014) MA 8 (1977–2018) AR 8 (1923–2003) AL 8 (1909–2018) DE 7 (1963–2020) RI 6 (1905–2017) KS 6 (1969–2017) NC 6 (1921–2019) DC 5 (1984–2025) TN 5 (1936–2019) UT 4 (1943–2020) HI 3 (1979–2014) NV 3 (1997–2020) ND 3 (1980–1994) SD 2 (1984–2001) NE 2 (1991–2007) VT 2 (1988–2002) ID 2 (1978–2014) MT 2 (1931–1969)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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