12 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1889–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Costello v. Ocean County Observergreen2 sentences2007These types of situations do not support a contention that the media is justified in using the privilege as a defense because it is functioning as "the eyes and ears of the public." Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594 , 643 A.2d 1012, 1020 (1994). 2007These types of situations do not support a contention that the media is justified in using the privilege as a defense because it is functioning as “the eyes and ears of the public.” Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 643 A.2d 1012, 1020 (N.J. 1994). | 2 | 2 |
Hayes v. Newspapers of New Hampshire, Inc.green2 sentences2007In Hayes , we held that the fair report privilege applies to "[t]he publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public. . . ." Hayes, 141 N.H. at 466 , 685 A.2d 1237 (quotation omitted and emphases added). 2007In Hayes , we held that the fair report privilege applies to “[t]he publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public ....” Hayes, 141 N.H. at 466 (quotation omitted and emphases added). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences1987The court must necessarily make the final determination of whether a truthful and complete response might be incriminating . . . and in most cases the court will be unable to give reasoned consideration to the privilege claim until the witness’ refusal to answer a particular question is viewed in the light of all of the circumstances of the particular case.” 112 N.H. at 447 , 298 A.2d at 756 . 1987The court must necessarily make the final determination of whether a truthful and complete response might be incriminating . . . and in most cases the court will be unable to give reasoned consideration to the privilege claim until the witness’ refusal to answer a particular question is viewed in the light of all of the circumstances of the particular case.” 112 N.H. at 447 , 298 A.2d at 756 . | 1 | 2 |
Janvrin v. Scammongreen2 sentences1987(Citations omitted.) This is a point which need not be labored further except to observe that Justice Kenison traced his analysis to both an early decision of this court, Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N.H. 280 (1894), as well as a more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 1972The court must necessarily make the final determination of whether a truthful and complete response might be incriminating (3 Wharton, Criminal Evidences. 723, at 21 (12th ed. 1955)), in order to protect against abuse of the privilege (Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N.H. 280, 290 (1854)), and in most cases the court will be unable to give reasoned consideration to the privilege claim until the witness’ refusal to answer a particular question is viewed in the light of all of the circumstances of the particular case. | 1 | 2 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen1 sentence2004“The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'Connellgreen2 sentences1999Id. at 447 , 298 A.2d at 756 (citations omitted); see State v. O’Connell, 131 N.H. 92, 94 , 550 A.2d 747, 749 (1988). 1999Id. at 447 , 298 A.2d at 756 (citations omitted); see State v. O’Connell, 131 N.H. 92, 94 , 550 A.2d 747, 749 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kupchun
green
2 sentences2011We have found that "the privileges in question are not absolute and must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential." Kupchun, 117 N.H. at 415 , 373 A.2d 1325 . 2011We have found that "the privileges in question are not absolute and must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential." Kupchun, 117 N.H. at 415 , 373 A.2d 1325 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
2 sentences1987(Citations omitted.) This is a point which need not be labored further except to observe that Justice Kenison traced his analysis to both an early decision of this court, Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N.H. 280 (1894), as well as a more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 1972Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 12 L. | 2 | 1972–1987 |
Gardner v. Broderick
green
2 sentences2018The Court acknowledged that the privilege against self-incrimination "may be waived in appropriate circumstances if the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made" and that "[a]nswers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying." Id . at 276 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 . 2018However, the Court distinguished the case before it in which the police officer was discharged from office "not for failure to answer relevant questions about his official duties, but for refusal to waive a constitutional right," thereby "relinquish[ing] the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id . at 278 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Melvin
green
1 sentence2013Melvin, 132 N.H. at 309-10 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Richards
green
1 sentence2001Therefore, when a witness asserts his or her Fifth Amendment rights, the trial court must determine “whether a truthful and complete response might be incriminating and in most cases the court will be unable to give reasoned consideration to the privilege claim until the witness’ refusal to answer a particular question is viewed in the light of all of the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. (quotation and ellipsis omitted). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Walker v. Sauvinet
green
1 sentence1889This requirement of the constitution is met if the trial is liad according to the settled course of judicial proceedings.” Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 92 . | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.