privilege exception in Virginia

2009However, “the privilege is an exception to the general duty to disclose, is an obstacle to investigation of the truth, and should be strictly construed.” Id. (citations omitted).

1998White’s and Riecker’s confidential communications with counsel on matters related to administration of the estate and trust are privileged, and Wyland has not made an adequate showing to cause application of the crime-fraud exception to the privilege or of the exception articulated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S. Ct. 1191 , 28 L.

1998White’s and Riecker’s confidential communications with counsel on matters related to administration of the estate and trust are privileged, and Wyland has not made an adequate showing to cause application of the crime-fraud exception to the privilege or of the exception articulated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S. Ct. 1191 , 28 L.

1998White’s and Riecker’s confidential communications with counsel on matters related to administration of the estate and trust are privileged, and Wyland has not made an adequate showing to cause application of the crime-fraud exception to the privilege or of the exception articulated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S. Ct. 1191 , 28 L.

1998White’s and Riecker’s confidential communications with counsel on matters related to administration of the estate and trust are privileged, and Wyland has not made an adequate showing to cause application of the crime-fraud exception to the privilege or of the exception articulated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S. Ct. 1191 , 28 L.

1968The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” See also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 ; Owens v. Common wealth, 186 Va. 689, 702 , 43 S.E.2d 895, 901 ; Annotation, 28 A.L.R.2d 1115 , 1136-38. [4] Defendant next asserts that “The discretion given Virginia jurors to decide whether a man convicted of murder shall live or die is arbitrary and u

1968The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” See also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 ; Owens v. Common wealth, 186 Va. 689, 702 , 43 S.E.2d 895, 901 ; Annotation, 28 A.L.R.2d 1115 , 1136-38. [4] Defendant next asserts that “The discretion given Virginia jurors to decide whether a man convicted of murder shall live or die is arbitrary and u

1968The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” See also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 ; Owens v. Common wealth, 186 Va. 689, 702 , 43 S.E.2d 895, 901 ; Annotation, 28 A.L.R.2d 1115 , 1136-38. [4] Defendant next asserts that “The discretion given Virginia jurors to decide whether a man convicted of murder shall live or die is arbitrary and u

1968The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” See also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 ; Owens v. Common wealth, 186 Va. 689, 702 , 43 S.E.2d 895, 901 ; Annotation, 28 A.L.R.2d 1115 , 1136-38. [4] Defendant next asserts that “The discretion given Virginia jurors to decide whether a man convicted of murder shall live or die is arbitrary and u

1952As we pointed out in Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 , 62 S. Ct. 1159 , 86 L. ed. 1559, 1563, our holding does not mean that a guilty defendant must go free.

1952As we pointed out in Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 , 62 S. Ct. 1159 , 86 L. ed. 1559, 1563, our holding does not mean that a guilty defendant must go free.

1952The defendant based his motion to quash the original indictments upon the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Patton v. Mississippi (1947), 332 U. S. 463 , 68 S. Ct. 184 , 92 L. ed. 76, 1 A.L.R. (2d) 1286, wherein the court held that the defendant having “filed a timely motion to quash the indictment” on the ground that Negroes, being available and competent to serve on juries, systematic denial of the privilege was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. *220 However, the unanimous opinion of the court further held: “Indictments

1952The defendant based his motion to quash the original indictments upon the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Patton v. Mississippi (1947), 332 U. S. 463 , 68 S. Ct. 184 , 92 L. ed. 76, 1 A.L.R. (2d) 1286, wherein the court held that the defendant having “filed a timely motion to quash the indictment” on the ground that Negroes, being available and competent to serve on juries, systematic denial of the privilege was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. *220 However, the unanimous opinion of the court further held: “Indictments

1926In Bradford v. Board of Education, 18 Cal. App. 19 , 121 Pac. 929 , the court in passing upon the constitutionality of the statute which prohibited a pupil enrolled in any elementary school of the State from joining any secret fraternity, upon pain of dismissal, said: “Finally, we are unable to perceive that the statute is, as claimed by appellant, repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, because it deprives a citizen of a right to attend a public school of the State.

1926In Bradford v. Board of Education, 18 Cal. App. 19 , 121 Pac. 929 , the court in passing upon the constitutionality of the statute which prohibited a pupil enrolled in any elementary school of the State from joining any secret fraternity, upon pain of dismissal, said: “Finally, we are unable to perceive that the statute is, as claimed by appellant, repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, because it deprives a citizen of a right to attend a public school of the State.