crucial inquiry (Florida) · Go Syfert
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crucial inquiry in Florida

30 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Willie Salt Coyote v. United Statesgreen
ca10 · 1967 · cited in 3 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2010–2015
2 sentences

2015“The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.” Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.1967).

2010"The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights." Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.1967).

33
Buttner v. Buttnergreen
fladistctapp · 1986 · cited in 5 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1986–2026
2 sentences

2026The crucial inquiry for what is considered a marital asset “should be whether the property was legally and beneficially acquired by both or either of the parties during the marriage.” Id. at 1266–67.

2007The crucial inquiry is "whether the property was legally and beneficially acquired by either or both of the parties during the marriage." Id. at 1286 (citing Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)).

25
Angora Enterprises, Inc. v. Colegreen
fla · 1983 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1990–1991
2 sentences

1991In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

1990In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

22
Jenkins v. Stategreen
fladistctapp · 1975 · cited in 5 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1976–1993
2 sentences

1993In closing argument the prosecutor referred to the fact that the wife and friend were not called by the defense, and the supreme court affirmed, quoting with approval from Jenkins v. State, 317 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975): Alibi was the crucial defense in this case.

1984In so holding, we quoted from Judge Mills' opinion in Jenkins v. State, 317 So.2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975): Alibi was the crucial defense in this case.

15
Strickland v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1985–1993
2 sentences

1993We held in State v. Stirrup, 469 So.2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), that the crucial test in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel's errors had an effect on the judgment of conviction (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

1993We held in State v. Stirrup, 469 So.2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), that the crucial test in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel's errors had an effect on the judgment of conviction (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

12
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darnell PARKS, Defendant-Appellantgreen
ca9 · 1996 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013See id. at 667-68 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (distinguishing willful and non-willful payment of fines or restitution during probation as basis for incarceration) (citations omitted); United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir.1996) (“[I]f the defendant was making a reasonable, good faith attempt to pay the fine or restitution, it would be fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

11
Bearden v. Georgiagreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013See id. at 667-68 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (distinguishing willful and non-willful payment of fines or restitution during probation as basis for incarceration) (citations omitted); United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir.1996) (“[I]f the defendant was making a reasonable, good faith attempt to pay the fine or restitution, it would be fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

11
Martinez v. Stategreen
fla · 2008 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Where a jury is not instructed on the law of a crucial defense, a “defendant is deprived of a fair trial if the error divests the defendant of his or her ‘sole, or ... primary, defense strategy’ and that defense is supported by evidence adduced at trial that could not be characterized as ‘weak.’ ” McCoy, 56 So.3d at 40 (quoting Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449, 455-57 (Fla.2008)).

11
India v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1967 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
1 sentence

2010See Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 , 88 S.Ct. 489 , 19 L.Ed.2d 484 (1967).

11
City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillantgreen
fla · 1982 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987The crucial inquiry for a circuit court considering a petition for certiorari review of administrative action is “whether procedural due process is accorded, whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence.” City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982).

11
Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metro. Dade Countygreen
fla · 1981 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987See Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981, 987 (Fla. 1981); Barg, 302 So.2d at 742 .

11
United States of America Ex Rel. James Raymond Moore v. People of the State of Illinoisgreen
ca7 · 1978 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980Moore v. State of Illinois, 577 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir.1978): Whether the victim was unable or simply unwilling to make a positive identification from the photographs is not crystal clear from the record... . [I]t may well be that her inability or unwillingness to make a positive identification was due either to the quality of the photographs or to her expressed desire to see the suspects in person so that she would be sure she was pointing her finger at the right man.

11
Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc.green
ill · 1960 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (20)

CaseCitedYears
Bowen v. Bowen green
fladistctapp · 1989
2 sentences

2007The crucial inquiry is "whether the property was legally and beneficially acquired by either or both of the parties during the marriage." Id. at 1286 (citing Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)).

1989To determine whether property is separate or marital for purposes of equitable distribution, the crucial inquiry "is whether the property was legally and beneficially acquired by either or both of the parties during the marriage." Bowen v. Bowen, 543 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (citing Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 494 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1986)) *961 (orange grove, for which husband purchased option to buy prior to marriage, which he exercised after the marriage, was found to be marital property even though the husband's separate funds were use

21989–2007
Florida v. Bostick green
scotus · 1991
2 sentences

2001Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

2001Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

22001–2001
Ass'n of Golden Glades Condo. Club, Inc. v. SECURITY MGMT. CORP. green
fla · 1990
2 sentences

1991The recent case of Association of Golden Glades Condominium Club, Inc. v. Security Management Corp., 557 So.2d 1350 (Fla.1990) clarifies the enforceability of section 718.401(8)(a) and its subsequent changes. 1 It demonstrates that the crucial inquiry in a case where an attempt is being made to void the escalation clause in a recreation lease is whether the lessor agreed to be bound by changes in the Condominium Act, chapter 718.

1990The recent case of Association of Golden Glades Condominium Club, Inc. v. Security Management Cory., 557 So.2d 1350 (Fla.1990) clarifies the enforceability of section 718.401(8)(a) and its subsequent changes. 1 It demonstrates that the crucial inquiry in a ease where an attempt is being made to void the escalation clause in a recreation lease is whether the lessor agreed to be bound by changes in the Condominium Act, chapter 718.

21990–1991
American Trucking Assns. v. United States green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1991In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

1990In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

21990–1991
Paul v. Haley green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1991In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

1990In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

21990–1991
O'Bannon v. Azar green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1991In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

1990In Angora Enters., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 , 104 S.Ct. 1710 , 80 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984), the supreme court held that where the declaration of condominium expressly incorporated the Condominium Act and any amendments, such language encompassed the amendment declaring escalation clauses in recreation or land leases void and unenforceable.

21990–1991
McCoy v. State green
fladistctapp · 2010
1 sentence

2013Where a jury is not instructed on the law of a crucial defense, a “defendant is deprived of a fair trial if the error divests the defendant of his or her ‘sole, or ... primary, defense strategy’ and that defense is supported by evidence adduced at trial that could not be characterized as ‘weak.’ ” McCoy, 56 So.3d at 40 (quoting Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449, 455-57 (Fla.2008)).

12013–2013
Chamberland v. State green
fladistctapp · 1983
1 sentence

2010The crucial inquiry in determining the existence of a proper factual basis to support this instruction is whether possession is personal and “involve[s] a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused.” Chamberland, 429 So.2d at 843 .

12010–2010
State v. Stirrup green
fladistctapp · 1985
1 sentence

1993We held in State v. Stirrup, 469 So.2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), that the crucial test in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel's errors had an effect on the judgment of conviction (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

11993–1993
Crapps v. Crapps green
fladistctapp · 1987
1 sentence

1989Likewise, in Crapps v. Crapps, 501 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev. den., 511 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1987), the court found that timber acreage owned by the husband prior to his marriage or acquired by gift during the marriage was subject to equitable distribution as he had devoted considerable time during the marriage to cultivating the property.

11989–1989
Sarasota County v. Barg green
fla · 1974
1 sentence

1987See Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981, 987 (Fla. 1981); Barg, 302 So.2d at 742 .

11987–1987
United States v. Agurs green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

1984We find that the information, even if factually substantiated and not already known to the defense at the time of trial, fails the crucial test of "materiality" as expressed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

1984We find that the information, even if factually substantiated and not already known to the defense at the time of trial, fails the crucial test of "materiality" as expressed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

11984–1984
Askew v. Cross Key Waterways green
fla · 1978
1 sentence

1983Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1978); Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1976).

11983–1983
Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County green
fla · 1977
1 sentence

1983Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1978); Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1976).

11983–1983
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn. green
scotus · 1978
2 sentences

1983Matter of RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 , 98 S.Ct. 1912 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

1983Matter of RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 , 98 S.Ct. 1912 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

11983–1983
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1983Matter of RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 , 98 S.Ct. 1912 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

1983Matter of RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 , 98 S.Ct. 1912 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

11983–1983
In Re RMJ green
scotus · 1982
2 sentences

1983Matter of RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 , 98 S.Ct. 1912 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

1983Matter of RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 , 102 S.Ct. 929 , 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 , 98 S.Ct. 1912 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

11983–1983
Kirby v. Illinois green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1980And, as with the introduction of such a photograph, he contends that the crucial inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes is whether that evidence has become available only as a result of official misconduct. [The majority rejects this contention, supra, in the opinion of Mr. Justice White at 445 U.S. at 477 , 100 S.Ct. at 1253 .] [5] Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). [6] U.S. ex rel.

1980And, as with the introduction of such a photograph, he contends that the crucial inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes is whether that evidence has become available only as a result of official misconduct. [The majority rejects this contention, supra, in the opinion of Mr. Justice White at 445 U.S. at 477 , 100 S.Ct. at 1253 .] [5] Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). [6] U.S. ex rel.

11980–1980
United States v. Crews green
scotus · 1980
11980–1980
Thompson v. State green
fladistctapp · 1971
11974–1974

Statutes the citing opinions construe

FL § 921.141 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 247 (1906–2026) PA 115 (1920–2026) IL 110 (1895–2026) OH 110 (1899–2025) TX 85 (1964–2025) LA 85 (1968–2026) MI 65 (1908–2025) NY 65 (1889–2025) NC 54 (1904–2026) HI 43 (1955–2025) AL 42 (1921–2015) TN 39 (1910–2020) MA 37 (1975–2025) DC 34 (1982–2026) GA 34 (1907–2023) WA 32 (1970–2021) FL 30 (1974–2026) NJ 28 (1960–2025) IN 27 (1938–2023) MD 22 (1951–2019) AZ 14 (1966–2021) MO 13 (1890–2002) IA 13 (1922–2023) OR 12 (1931–2020) CO 12 (1983–2025) VA 10 (1918–2022) AK 10 (1972–2005) MN 10 (1973–2026) NE 9 (1941–2000) MT 9 (1899–2019) AR 8 (1939–2026) WI 8 (1963–2021) NM 7 (1985–2021) KS 7 (1926–2016) SC 7 (1941–2010) MS 6 (1991–2024) VT 6 (1991–2022) CT 6 (1997–2014) UT 5 (1939–2017) KY 5 (2005–2024) SD 5 (1956–2019) WY 4 (1981–2012) NV 4 (1975–2025) ID 4 (1928–2007) ME 4 (1901–2024) OK 4 (1964–2003) NH 3 (2000–2019) RI 2 (1991–2009) DE 2 (2016–2020) ND 2 (1901–1939)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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