crucial defense (Montana) · Go Syfert
← Montana issues

crucial defense in Montana

9 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1899–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Jackson v. William Dingwall Companygreen
mont · 1965 · cited in 2 Montana opinions naming this issue, 1968–1982
2 sentences

1982See Jackson v. William Dingwall Co., 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 .” The facts in Knowlton do not support res ipsa loquitur.

1982See Jackson v. William Dingwall Co., 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 .” The facts in Knowlton do not support res ipsa loquitur.

22
State v. W. Cunninghamgreen
mont · 2018 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See State v. Cunningham , 2018 MT 56 , ¶¶ 24, 26, 390 Mont. 408 , 414 P.3d 289 (explaining that jurors may attribute significant weight to expert medical testimony).

2019See State v. Cunningham , 2018 MT 56 , ¶¶ 24, 26, 390 Mont. 408 , 414 P.3d 289 (explaining that jurors may attribute significant weight to expert medical testimony).

11
State v. Howellgreen
mont · 1992 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See State v. Howell, 254 Mont. 438, 446 , 839 P.2d 87, 92 (1992) (upholding a district court’s discretion in excluding evidence of past sexual history of a child molestation victim). ¶14 Secondly, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973), and cases from several of our sister states, Patterson argues the District Court’s ruling violated his right to a fair trial under *190 the Due Process Clause because he was prevented from presenting a crucial defense.

2012See State v. Howell, 254 Mont. 438, 446 , 839 P.2d 87, 92 (1992) (upholding a district court’s discretion in excluding evidence of past sexual history of a child molestation victim). ¶14 Secondly, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973), and cases from several of our sister states, Patterson argues the District Court’s ruling violated his right to a fair trial under *190 the Due Process Clause because he was prevented from presenting a crucial defense.

11
Chambers v. Mississippigreen
scotus · 1973 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See State v. Howell, 254 Mont. 438, 446 , 839 P.2d 87, 92 (1992) (upholding a district court’s discretion in excluding evidence of past sexual history of a child molestation victim). ¶14 Secondly, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973), and cases from several of our sister states, Patterson argues the District Court’s ruling violated his right to a fair trial under *190 the Due Process Clause because he was prevented from presenting a crucial defense.

2012See State v. Howell, 254 Mont. 438, 446 , 839 P.2d 87, 92 (1992) (upholding a district court’s discretion in excluding evidence of past sexual history of a child molestation victim). ¶14 Secondly, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973), and cases from several of our sister states, Patterson argues the District Court’s ruling violated his right to a fair trial under *190 the Due Process Clause because he was prevented from presenting a crucial defense.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Kougl green
mont · 2004
1 sentence

2019State v. Kougl , 2004 MT 243 , ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶15 In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

12019–2019
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2019State v. Kougl , 2004 MT 243 , ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶15 In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2019State v. Kougl , 2004 MT 243 , ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶15 In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

12019–2019
State v. Kougl green
mont · 2004
2 sentences

2019State v. Kougl , 2004 MT 243 , ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶15 In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2019State v. Kougl , 2004 MT 243 , ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶15 In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

12019–2019
John D. Williamson, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross v. Gordon G. Tucker, Defendants-Appellees-Cross green
ca5 · 1981
1 sentence

2012The Eleventh Circuit has found “the crucial inquiry is the *331 amount of control that the investors retain under their written agreements.” Albanese, 823 F.2d at 410 (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423-24 .).

12012–2012
Albanese v. Florida National Bank Of Orlando green
ca11 · 1987
1 sentence

2012The Eleventh Circuit has found “the crucial inquiry is the *331 amount of control that the investors retain under their written agreements.” Albanese, 823 F.2d at 410 (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423-24 .).

12012–2012
United States v. Rohn Martin Ishmael and Debra K. Ishmael green
ca5 · 1995
1 sentence

1997According to the Ishmael court, the crucial inquiry is whether the technology revealed any “intimate details.” Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 .

11997–1997
City of Whitefish v. O'SHAUGHNESSY green
mont · 1985
2 sentences

1986Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 231 ; City of Whitefish v. O’Shaughnessy (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 433 ,] 704 P.2d 1021, 1026 , 42 St.Rep. 928 , 932.

1986Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 231 ; City of Whitefish v. O’Shaughnessy (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 433 ,] 704 P.2d 1021, 1026 , 42 St.Rep. 928 , 932.

11986–1986
Grayned v. City of Rockford green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1986Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 231 ; City of Whitefish v. O’Shaughnessy (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 433 ,] 704 P.2d 1021, 1026 , 42 St.Rep. 928 , 932.

1986Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 231 ; City of Whitefish v. O’Shaughnessy (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 433 ,] 704 P.2d 1021, 1026 , 42 St.Rep. 928 , 932.

11986–1986
Knowlton v. Sandaker green
mont · 1968
2 sentences

1982In such a case the appellant has filed to establish that there was a greater likelihood that respondents' negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and has thus failed to satisfy a crucial requirement for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. ” 150 Mont. at 447-448 , 436 P.2d at 103 .

1982In such a case the appellant has filed to establish that there was a greater likelihood that respondents' negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and has thus failed to satisfy a crucial requirement for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. ” 150 Mont. at 447-448 , 436 P.2d at 103 .

11982–1982
Fitzgerald v. Clark green
mont · 1895
2 sentences

1899The full benefit of his discovery is what Section 2322, supra, preserves to the miner; and to meet the geologic conditions which exist in the tendency of veins to depart from a perpendicular as they go downward, that the object of the statute might be carried out, Secton 2322, Revised Statutes U. S., authorizes a miner to follow the vein on its dip to an indefinite length, wherever it goes, — provided, of course, he has the apex, and provided, further, he does not cross the vertical planes of the end lines. ‘ ‘The intent of the statute, ’ ’ said Justice De Witt in Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont.

1899The full benefit of his discovery is what Section 2322, supra, preserves to the miner; and to meet the geologic conditions which exist in the tendency of veins to depart from a perpendicular as they go downward, that the object of the statute might be carried out, Secton 2322, Revised Statutes U. S., authorizes a miner to follow the vein on its dip to an indefinite length, wherever it goes, — provided, of course, he has the apex, and provided, further, he does not cross the vertical planes of the end lines. ‘ ‘The intent of the statute, ’ ’ said Justice De Witt in Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont.

11899–1899

Where else courts name it

CA 247 (1906–2026) PA 115 (1920–2026) IL 110 (1895–2026) OH 110 (1899–2025) TX 85 (1964–2025) LA 85 (1968–2026) MI 65 (1908–2025) NY 65 (1889–2025) NC 54 (1904–2026) HI 43 (1955–2025) AL 42 (1921–2015) TN 39 (1910–2020) MA 37 (1975–2025) DC 34 (1982–2026) GA 34 (1907–2023) WA 32 (1970–2021) FL 30 (1974–2026) NJ 28 (1960–2025) IN 27 (1938–2023) MD 22 (1951–2019) AZ 14 (1966–2021) MO 13 (1890–2002) IA 13 (1922–2023) OR 12 (1931–2020) CO 12 (1983–2025) VA 10 (1918–2022) AK 10 (1972–2005) MN 10 (1973–2026) NE 9 (1941–2000) MT 9 (1899–2019) AR 8 (1939–2026) WI 8 (1963–2021) NM 7 (1985–2021) KS 7 (1926–2016) SC 7 (1941–2010) MS 6 (1991–2024) VT 6 (1991–2022) CT 6 (1997–2014) UT 5 (1939–2017) KY 5 (2005–2024) SD 5 (1956–2019) WY 4 (1981–2012) NV 4 (1975–2025) ID 4 (1928–2007) ME 4 (1901–2024) OK 4 (1964–2003) NH 3 (2000–2019) RI 2 (1991–2009) DE 2 (2016–2020) ND 2 (1901–1939)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check