crucial test in Kansas

2016For example, the Martin I court says that article 11, § 1 “prohibits favoritism” and thus, “the crucial inquiry is the legislative intent and purpose for enacting” the exemption. 227 Kan. 456 , Syl. ¶ 10, 462.

2016For example, the Martin I court says that article 11, § 1 "prohibits favoritism" and thus, "the crucial inquiry is the legislative intent and purpose for enacting" the exemption. 227 Kan. 456 , Syl. ¶ 10, 462.

1990Additionally, the operation must be intimately connected with the resolution of whatever physical difficulty caused the well to cease production.” Sheffield v. Exxon Corp., 424 So. 2d 1297, 1303 (Ala. 1982). “ ‘[R]e-working operations’ . . . means actual work or operations which have theretofore been done, being done over, and being done in good faith endeavor to cause a well to produce oil and gas or oil or gas in paying quantities as an ordinarily competent operator would do in the same or similar circumstances.” Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 544 , 261 S.W. 2d 311 (1953). “ ‘[R]eworking sh

1990Additionally, the operation must be intimately connected with the resolution of whatever physical difficulty caused the well to cease production.” Sheffield v. Exxon Corp., 424 So. 2d 1297, 1303 (Ala. 1982). “ ‘[R]e-working operations’ . . . means actual work or operations which have theretofore been done, being done over, and being done in good faith endeavor to cause a well to produce oil and gas or oil or gas in paying quantities as an ordinarily competent operator would do in the same or similar circumstances.” Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 544 , 261 S.W. 2d 311 (1953). “ ‘[R]eworking sh

1946In addition to observing the tests hereinbefore considered, the cited opinion quotes, with approval, the following from the case of Whitbeck v. Funk, 140 Ore. 70 , 12 P. 2d 1020 : “ ‘The crucial test for determining what is legislative and what is administrative -is whether the ordinance is one making a new law, or one executing a law already in existence.’/’ In applying such test to the instant case we have no difficulty in concluding that the proposed ordinance only provided for the execution of an ordinance already in existence and, consequently, was administrative in character.

1928It was held in Dixon v. Railway Co., 104 Kan. 404 , 179 Pac. 548 , that “an ordinance which requires the abutting owner to repair sidewalks which become dangerously defective, and authorizes the city to make such repairs at his charge if he fails to do so within ten days of the receipt of an official notice of what has been determined to be necessary, does not render such owner liable to a pedestrian who is injured by reason of a defect in the walk.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) We think the crucial test as to a recovery from the defendant Torsney for his neglect to furnish guards or to comply with any other r

1928It was held in Dixon v. Railway Co., 104 Kan. 404 , 179 Pac. 548 , that “an ordinance which requires the abutting owner to repair sidewalks which become dangerously defective, and authorizes the city to make such repairs at his charge if he fails to do so within ten days of the receipt of an official notice of what has been determined to be necessary, does not render such owner liable to a pedestrian who is injured by reason of a defect in the walk.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) We think the crucial test as to a recovery from the defendant Torsney for his neglect to furnish guards or to comply with any other r

1927In Ogden v. Wilson, 120 Kan. 269, 272 , 243 Pac. 284 , this court quoted approvingly the doctrine stated some years ago by the supreme court of Michigan: “ ‘The crucial principle in. this class of cases is that one who neglect's to look for a car when there is an unobstructed view, just before entering upon the track, and is struck by a car before he can walk directly across, is guilty óf a neglect of duty in not assuring or reassuring himself that there is not a car directly upon him, of which situation the fact that he is struck is conclusive proof.’ (Manos v. Detroit United Railway, 168 Mic

1927In Ogden v. Wilson, 120 Kan. 269, 272 , 243 Pac. 284 , this court quoted approvingly the doctrine stated some years ago by the supreme court of Michigan: “ ‘The crucial principle in. this class of cases is that one who neglect's to look for a car when there is an unobstructed view, just before entering upon the track, and is struck by a car before he can walk directly across, is guilty óf a neglect of duty in not assuring or reassuring himself that there is not a car directly upon him, of which situation the fact that he is struck is conclusive proof.’ (Manos v. Detroit United Railway, 168 Mic

1927In Ogden v. Wilson, 120 Kan. 269, 272 , 243 Pac. 284 , this court quoted approvingly the doctrine stated some years ago by the supreme court of Michigan: “ ‘The crucial principle in. this class of cases is that one who neglect's to look for a car when there is an unobstructed view, just before entering upon the track, and is struck by a car before he can walk directly across, is guilty óf a neglect of duty in not assuring or reassuring himself that there is not a car directly upon him, of which situation the fact that he is struck is conclusive proof.’ (Manos v. Detroit United Railway, 168 Mic

1927In Ogden v. Wilson, 120 Kan. 269, 272 , 243 Pac. 284 , this court quoted approvingly the doctrine stated some years ago by the supreme court of Michigan: “ ‘The crucial principle in. this class of cases is that one who neglect's to look for a car when there is an unobstructed view, just before entering upon the track, and is struck by a car before he can walk directly across, is guilty óf a neglect of duty in not assuring or reassuring himself that there is not a car directly upon him, of which situation the fact that he is struck is conclusive proof.’ (Manos v. Detroit United Railway, 168 Mic