crucial factors in Massachusetts

2015The court must “focus on the nature of challenged conduct and on the purpose and effect of that conduct as the crucial factors in making a G.L.c. 93A fairness determination.” Massachusetts Employers Insurance Exchange v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 42-43 (1995).

2008Exch. v. ProPac-Mass., Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 42-43 (1995) (“[W]e focus on the nature of the challenged conduct and on the purpose and effect of that conduct as the crucial factors in making a G.L.c. 93A fairness determination”) .

2007Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 629 (1978), the Supreme Judicial Court listed the crucial factors as: (1) how long the trial lasted; (2) the difficulty of the legal and factual issues involved; and (3) the degree of competency demonstrated by the attorney.

1997Id. at 629 . ‘The crucial factors in making such a determination are (1) how long the trial lasted, (2) the difficulty of the legal and factual issues involved, and (3) the degree of competence demonstrated by the attorney.” Id.

2017Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 439 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980).

2017Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 439 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980).

2017Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 439 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980).

2017Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 439 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980).

2006Lindsay v. Bd. of Appeals of Milton, 362 Mass. 126, 131 (1972) (holding undersized lot held in common ownership with adjoining lot did not retain a separate identity because deed conveyed the two lots as one lot and the property had been jointly assessed as one lot).

2006Lindsay v. Bd. of Appeals of Milton, 362 Mass. 126, 131 (1972) (holding undersized lot held in common ownership with adjoining lot did not retain a separate identity because deed conveyed the two lots as one lot and the property had been jointly assessed as one lot).

2025As to Juror 37’s “no” answers to Questions 40 and 41 on the Case Specific Questionnaire, “the crucial inquiry is whether the juror’s answer[s] w[ere] honest; that is, whether the juror was aware that the answer[s] w[ere] false.” Amirault, 399 Mass. at 626 (emphasis added).

2023Amirault, supra at 626 .

2014See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business’ ”).

2014The reasonable person standard, which “is objective and ‘presupposes an innocent person,’ ” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002), quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasis in original), does not require a court wholly to disregard the reality of interactions on the street.

2014The reasonable person standard, which “is objective and ‘presupposes an innocent person,’ ” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002), quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasis in original), does not require a court wholly to disregard the reality of interactions on the street.

2007The Supreme Judicial Court lengthened this list of factors to include “the nature of the case and the issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and abilily of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in similar cases.” Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-89 (1979).

2006Where legal malpractice is at issue, to recover under 93A Lingis must prove more than a finding of “mere negligence.” 3 Davaris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 274, 278 (2004), citing with approval, Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 151 (1996), for the additional proposition that “negligent representation by an attorney did not violate G.L.c. 93A, where the attorney ‘did not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ ” Thus, the question before the Court is whether Lingis proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Waisbren committed unfair and deceptive acts that involv

2006Where legal malpractice is at issue, to recover under 93A Lingis must prove more than a finding of “mere negligence.” 3 Davaris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 274, 278 (2004), citing with approval, Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 151 (1996), for the additional proposition that “negligent representation by an attorney did not violate G.L.c. 93A, where the attorney ‘did not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ ” Thus, the question before the Court is whether Lingis proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Waisbren committed unfair and deceptive acts that involv

2006Lily Transportion Corp. v. Royal Institutional Services, Inc., et al., 64 Mass.App.Ct. 179, 187 (2005).

2006In deciding whether a certain practice is “unfair” under G.L. 93A, “the nature of [the] challenged conduct and the purpose and effect of that condúct [are] the crucial factors ...” Massachusetts Employers Insurance Exchange v. Propac-Mass., Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 42-43 (1995). “[C]onduct in disregard ‘of known contractual arrangements’ and intended to secure benefits for the breaching party constitutes an unfair act or practice for c. 93A purposes.” Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Associates, et al., 411 Mass. 451, 474 (1991). 2 The Appeals Court has recently identified the element of “active” m

2003Cantell v. Hill Holliday Connors, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 550, 556 (2002), citing Duclersaint v. Federal Natl.

1999However, and as earlier noted, Borofsky’s Case, supra, makes clear that the crucial test for determining whether vacation pay falls within the meaning of “earnings” is whether the pay received by Bradley from his employer while on vacation “bear[s] a close analogy to wages.” See Gunderson’s Case, 423 Mass. 642, 644 (1996); Louis’s Case, 424 Mass. 136, 140 (1997).

1999However, and as earlier noted, Borofsky’s Case, supra, makes clear that the crucial test for determining whether vacation pay falls within the meaning of “earnings” is whether the pay received by Bradley from his employer while on vacation “bear[s] a close analogy to wages.” See Gunderson’s Case, 423 Mass. 642, 644 (1996); Louis’s Case, 424 Mass. 136, 140 (1997).

1993See United States v. Myers, supra at 1049.

1989In applying the legislative-executive test, we have noted that the crucial inquiry is “whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law' already in existence.” Moore v. School Comm. of Newton, supra at 447, quoting 5 E.

1980If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.” See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determine whether [the Commission’s decision] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental”).

1978See Hayden v. Hayden, 326 Mass. 587 (1950).

1978When that questionable exercise of discretion is coupled with the facts that (1) the evidence presented at the hearing on damages plainly did not warrant a judgment in the amount rendered, and (2) the uncontradicted representations (see Farley v. Sprague, 374 Mass. 419, 423-425 [1978]) made by the defendant in support of his motion to vacate judgment strongly suggest that that judgment will operate with harshness totally disproportionate to the wrong, if any, suffered by the plaintiff, we think that the denial of the motion to vacate judgment should not be permitted to stand.

1975Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authy. 304 Mass. 288, 292-293 (1939).