10 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Salazar v. Stategreen1 sentence2002In Ross v. State, 886 P.2d 378 (Alaska App.1992), this Court listed the factors that a trial judge should consider when deciding whether to grant a mid-trial request for a continuance to obtain the testimony of an absent witness: (1) whether the [absent witness's] testimony is material to the case; (2) whether the testimony can be elicited from another source; (3) whether the testimony is cumulative; (4) [the] probability of securing the absent witness in a reasonable time; (5) whether the requesting party was diligent and acted in good faith; (6) the inconvenience to the court and/or others; | 1 | 1 |
Mead v. Stategreen1 sentence1972Compare Mead v. State, 445 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. *287 855, 90 S.Ct. 117 , 24 L.Ed.2d 104 (1969), where in rejecting appellant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, we said: But the state’s evidence against appellant was of an overwhelming nature pointing to appellant’s guilt, and we do not perceive anything that counsel might have done differently so that it could be said that his failure to do so resulted in appellant being deprived of a crucial defense, (footnote omitted) 12 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brannen v. State
green
2 sentences2005Id., § 274, Yol. 2, p. 217. 2005Id., § 274, Vol. 2, p. 217. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lambert v. Ryozik
green
1 sentence2002In Ross v. State, 886 P.2d 378 (Alaska App.1992), this Court listed the factors that a trial judge should consider when deciding whether to grant a mid-trial request for a continuance to obtain the testimony of an absent witness: (1) whether the [absent witness's] testimony is material to the case; (2) whether the testimony can be elicited from another source; (3) whether the testimony is cumulative; (4) [the] probability of securing the absent witness in a reasonable time; (5) whether the requesting party was diligent and acted in good faith; (6) the inconvenience to the court and/or others; | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Fickes v. Petrolane-Alaska Gas Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Id. 6 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Farmer v. State
green
1 sentence1992Under Farmer , the crucial inquiry is whether the composite term actually imposed “is warranted under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1302 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Neal v. State
green
1 sentence1989Id. at 22 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence1986We stated: Thus, in determining whether Brown was a first aggressor, the crucial inquiry is not whether he was armed when he went to meet with Miller; rather, it is whether his assault occurred “in the course of a dispute provoked by the defendant at a time when he [knew] or ought reasonably' to [have known] that the encounter [would] result in mortal combat.” This is an inquiry that must be resolved in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial. [Citation omitted.] Id. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Millett
green
2 sentences1985Thus, in determining whether Brown was a first aggressor, the crucial inquiry is not whether he was armed when he went to meet with Miller; rather, it is whether his assault occurred “in the course of a dispute provoked by the defendant at a time when he [knew] or ought reasonably to [have known] that the encounter [would] result in mortal combat.” State v. Millett, 273 A.2d at 510 . 1985Thus, in determining whether Brown was a first aggressor, the crucial inquiry is not whether he was armed when he went to meet with Miller; rather, it is whether his assault occurred "in the course of a dispute provoked by the defendant at a time when he [knew] or ought reasonably to [have known] that the encounter [would] result in mortal combat." State v. Millett, 273 A.2d at 510 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Castillo
green
2 sentences1982The court concluded "the crucial inquiry is whether at the time the crime was committed, the act was recognized as a felony in Washington." (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted), 596 P.2d at 314 . 1982The court concluded “the crucial inquiry is whether at the time the crime was committed, the act was recognized as a felony in Washington.” (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted), 596 P.2d at 314 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck
green
1 sentence1979Whether a manufacturer’s “reasonable care and skill” as an expert in designing a product and its duty to “keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries . . . and of techniques and devices used by practical men in his trade” are to be considered in a strict products liability action for design defect was settled in our recent decision in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979). 5 In the Beck case, we expressly rejected the approach taken by some legal commentators of reinserting negligence terminology into the jury’s inquiry into the “diverse factors relat | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences1979Whether a manufacturer’s “reasonable care and skill” as an expert in designing a product and its duty to “keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries . . . and of techniques and devices used by practical men in his trade” are to be considered in a strict products liability action for design defect was settled in our recent decision in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979). 5 In the Beck case, we expressly rejected the approach taken by some legal commentators of reinserting negligence terminology into the jury’s inquiry into the “diverse factors relat 1979Whether a manufacturer’s “reasonable care and skill” as an expert in designing a product and its duty to “keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries . . . and of techniques and devices used by practical men in his trade” are to be considered in a strict products liability action for design defect was settled in our recent decision in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska, 1979). 5 In the Beck case, we expressly rejected the approach taken by some legal commentators of reinserting negligence terminology into the jury’s inquiry into the “diverse factors relat | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.