crucial inquiry in Hawaii

2024And the crucial inquiry in its determination is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of ... (the court's) jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id. at 196 , 439 P.3d at 148 (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n of Haw., 63 Haw. 166 , 172 & n.g, 623 P.2d 431 , 438 & n.5 (1981)). 8 Kakalia's opening brief is not in compliance with HRAP Rule 28(b).

2024And the crucial inquiry in its determination is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of ... (the court's) jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id. at 196 , 439 P.3d at 148 (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n of Haw., 63 Haw. 166 , 172 & n.g, 623 P.2d 431 , 438 & n.5 (1981)). 8 Kakalia's opening brief is not in compliance with HRAP Rule 28(b).

2001Regardless of the standing theory, "the crucial inquiry . . . is `whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of . . . [the court's] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.'" Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 281 , 768 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989) (citations omitted).

2001Regardless of the standing theory, "the crucial inquiry . . . is `whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of . . . [the court's] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.'" Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 281 , 768 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989) (citations omitted).

2007Corp., 81 Hawai'i 270, 275 , 916 P.2d 680, 685 (1996). *319 Mottl v. Miyahira, 95 Hawai'i 381, 389 , 23 P.3d 716, 724 (2001) (quoting Akinaka v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawai'i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i 51, 55 , 979 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999)).

2007Corp., 81 Hawai'i 270, 275 , 916 P.2d 680, 685 (1996). *319 Mottl v. Miyahira, 95 Hawai'i 381, 389 , 23 P.3d 716, 724 (2001) (quoting Akinaka v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawai'i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i 51, 55 , 979 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999)).

2019See, e.g. , Mottl , 95 Hawai'i at 389 , 23 P.3d at 724 ("It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf." ( quoting Akinaka , 91 Hawai'i at 55 , 979 P.2d at 1081 )).

2019See, e.g. , Mottl , 95 Hawai'i at 389 , 23 P.3d at 724 ("It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf." ( quoting Akinaka , 91 Hawai'i at 55 , 979 P.2d at 1081 )).

2007The Law of Standing a. general principles of standing “Standing is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit.” Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 67 , 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994) [[Image here]] “It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his or her behalf.” In re Application of Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal D

2007The Law of Standing a. general principles of standing “Standing is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit.” Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 67 , 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994) [[Image here]] “It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his or her behalf.” In re Application of Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal D

2024And the crucial inquiry in its determination is “whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of . . . (the court’s) jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).

2000And the crucial inquiry in its determination is “whether the [party] has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ to warrant his [or her] invocation of ... [the court’s] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his [or her] behalf.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 , 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

2007Instead, we concluded that under our sovereign immunity doctrine, “the crucial inquiry ... is whether the relief sought for a past violation of law is ‘tantamount to an award of damages’ or ivould merely have an ‘ancilla'ry’ effect on the state treasury.” Id. (quoting Paty, 73 Haw. at 609-10 , 837 P.2d at 1266 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 , 106 S.Ct. 2932 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986))) (emphasis added).

2007Instead, we concluded that under our sovereign immunity doctrine, “the crucial inquiry ... is whether the relief sought for a past violation of law is ‘tantamount to an award of damages’ or ivould merely have an ‘ancilla'ry’ effect on the state treasury.” Id. (quoting Paty, 73 Haw. at 609-10 , 837 P.2d at 1266 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 , 106 S.Ct. 2932 , 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986))) (emphasis added).

2019See, e.g. , Mottl , 95 Hawai'i at 389 , 23 P.3d at 724 ("It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf." ( quoting Akinaka , 91 Hawai'i at 55 , 979 P.2d at 1081 )).

2019See, e.g. , Mottl , 95 Hawai'i at 389 , 23 P.3d at 724 ("It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf." ( quoting Akinaka , 91 Hawai'i at 55 , 979 P.2d at 1081 )).

2025Absent a “clear relinquishment” of immunity and consent to be sued, “the sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages. . . . [U]nder our sovereign immunity doctrine, ‘the crucial inquiry . . . is whether the relief sought for a past violation of law is “tantamount to an award of damages” or would merely have an “ancillary” effect on the state treasury.’” Kahoʻohanohano v. State, 114 Hawaiʻi 302, 336, 162 P.3d 696, 730 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawaiʻi 474, 481, 482 n.9, 918 P.2d 1130, 1137, 1138 n.9 (1996)) (emphasis in original omitted).

2025Absent a “clear relinquishment” of immunity and consent to be sued, “the sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages. . . . [U]nder our sovereign immunity doctrine, ‘the crucial inquiry . . . is whether the relief sought for a past violation of law is “tantamount to an award of damages” or would merely have an “ancillary” effect on the state treasury.’” Kahoʻohanohano v. State, 114 Hawaiʻi 302, 336, 162 P.3d 696 , 730 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawaiʻi 474, 481, 482 n.9, 918 P.2d 1130, 1137 , 1138 n.9 (1996)) (emphasis in original omitted).

2024And the crucial inquiry in its determination is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of ... (the court's) jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id. at 196 , 439 P.3d at 148 (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n of Haw., 63 Haw. 166 , 172 & n.g, 623 P.2d 431 , 438 & n.5 (1981)). 8 Kakalia's opening brief is not in compliance with HRAP Rule 28(b).

2024And the crucial inquiry in its determination is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of ... (the court's) jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id. at 196 , 439 P.3d at 148 (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n of Haw., 63 Haw. 166 , 172 & n.g, 623 P.2d 431 , 438 & n.5 (1981)). 8 Kakalia's opening brief is not in compliance with HRAP Rule 28(b).

2013“The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.” State v. Maluia, 56 Haw. 428, 432 , 539 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1975) (citation omitted).

2013“The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.” State v. Maluia, 56 Haw. 428, 432 , 539 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1975) (citation omitted).

2025Absent a “clear relinquishment” of immunity and consent to be sued, “the sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages. . . . [U]nder our sovereign immunity doctrine, ‘the crucial inquiry . . . is whether the relief sought for a past violation of law is “tantamount to an award of damages” or would merely have an “ancillary” effect on the state treasury.’” Kahoʻohanohano v. State, 114 Hawaiʻi 302, 336, 162 P.3d 696, 730 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawaiʻi 474, 481, 482 n.9, 918 P.2d 1130, 1137, 1138 n.9 (1996)) (emphasis in original omitted).

2025Absent a “clear relinquishment” of immunity and consent to be sued, “the sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages. . . . [U]nder our sovereign immunity doctrine, ‘the crucial inquiry . . . is whether the relief sought for a past violation of law is “tantamount to an award of damages” or would merely have an “ancillary” effect on the state treasury.’” Kahoʻohanohano v. State, 114 Hawaiʻi 302, 336, 162 P.3d 696 , 730 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawaiʻi 474, 481, 482 n.9, 918 P.2d 1130, 1137 , 1138 n.9 (1996)) (emphasis in original omitted).

2025In Superferry II, we explained that awards of attorneys’ fees against the State are subject to the sovereign immunity doctrine: “‘an award of costs and fees to a prevailing 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** party is inherently in the nature of a damage award.’ Accordingly, to properly award attorney’s fees and costs against [the State] in this case, there must be ‘a clear relinquishment’ of the State’s immunity.” 120 Hawaiʻi at 226, 202 P.3d at 1271 (first quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawaiʻi 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501 (1998);

2025In Superferry II, we explained that awards of attorneys’ fees against the State are subject to the sovereign immunity doctrine: “‘an award of costs and fees to a prevailing 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** party is inherently in the nature of a damage award.’ Accordingly, to properly award attorney’s fees and costs against [the State] in this case, there must be ‘a clear relinquishment’ of the State’s immunity.” 120 Hawaiʻi at 226, 202 P.3d at 1271 (first quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawaiʻi 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501 (1998);

2025In Superferry II, we explained that awards of attorneys’ fees against the State are subject to the sovereign immunity doctrine: “‘an award of costs and fees to a prevailing 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** party is inherently in the nature of a damage award.’ Accordingly, to properly award attorney’s fees and costs against [the State] in this case, there must be ‘a clear relinquishment’ of the State’s immunity.” 120 Hawaiʻi at 226, 202 P.3d at 1271 (first quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawaiʻi 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501 (1998);

2025In Superferry II, we explained that awards of attorneys’ fees against the State are subject to the sovereign immunity doctrine: “‘an award of costs and fees to a prevailing 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** party is inherently in the nature of a damage award.’ Accordingly, to properly award attorney’s fees and costs against [the State] in this case, there must be ‘a clear relinquishment’ of the State’s immunity.” 120 Hawaiʻi at 226, 202 P.3d at 1271 (first quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawaiʻi 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501 (1998);

2025In Superferry II, we explained that awards of attorneys’ fees against the State are subject to the sovereign immunity doctrine: “‘an award of costs and fees to a prevailing 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** party is inherently in the nature of a damage award.’ Accordingly, to properly award attorney’s fees and costs against [the State] in this case, there must be ‘a clear relinquishment’ of the State’s immunity.” 120 Hawaiʻi at 226, 202 P.3d at 1271 (first quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawaiʻi 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501 (1998);

2025In Superferry II, we explained that awards of attorneys’ fees against the State are subject to the sovereign immunity doctrine: “‘an award of costs and fees to a prevailing 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** party is inherently in the nature of a damage award.’ Accordingly, to properly award attorney’s fees and costs against [the State] in this case, there must be ‘a clear relinquishment’ of the State’s immunity.” 120 Hawaiʻi at 226, 202 P.3d at 1271 (first quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawaiʻi 37, 51, 951 P.2d 487, 501 (1998);

2013See State v. Edwards, 96 Hawai'i 224, 240 , 30 P.3d 238, 254 (2001) (concluding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived her Miranda rights, despite the fact that officers failed to use reasonable effort to contact her attorney).

2013See State v. Edwards, 96 Hawai'i 224, 240 , 30 P.3d 238, 254 (2001) (concluding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived her Miranda rights, despite the fact that officers failed to use reasonable effort to contact her attorney).

2011Nakazawa v. Baptiste, 115 Hawai'i 15, 26 , 165 P.3d 916, 927 (2007) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981)).

2011Nakazawa v. Baptiste, 115 Hawai'i 15, 26 , 165 P.3d 916, 927 (2007) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981)).

2008Id. at 70-71 , 704 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

2008Id. at 70-71 , 704 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

2008The court, after citing the relevant provisions of the Virginia Insurance Code, 6 noted that “[w]hether the issue is framed as ‘while using’ or ‘arose out of the use of,’ the crucial inquiry is: Was there a causal relationship between the incident and the employment of the insured vehicle as a vehicle.” Id. at 466 (citation omitted).

2008The court, after citing the relevant provisions of the Virginia Insurance Code, [6] noted that "[w]hether the issue is framed as `while using' or `arose out of the use of,' the crucial inquiry is: Was there a causal relationship between the incident and the employment of the insured vehicle as a vehicle." Id. at 466 (citation omitted).

2007Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 388 , 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1982) (stating "the crucial inquiry in its determination [of standing] is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his[, her, or its] invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his[, her, or its] behalf" (quoting Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 172 , 623 P.2d at 438 ) *930 (internal quotation marks and brackets and emphasis in original omitted)).

2007Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 388 , 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1982) (stating "the crucial inquiry in its determination [of standing] is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his[, her, or its] invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his[, her, or its] behalf" (quoting Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 172 , 623 P.2d at 438 ) *930 (internal quotation marks and brackets and emphasis in original omitted)).

2007Problematic, however, is the fact that the County Council is specifically named as a defendant in this case; consequently, the above construction leads to the conclusion that the County is, in essence, suing itself. [15] Accordingly, because a plaintiff must be adversarial to a defendant to create an actual case or controversy sufficient for a court to invoke jurisdiction, State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 274 , 686 P.2d 1379, 1385 (1984), an "actual controversy" does not exist between the plaintiff-County (acting on behalf of the County Council) and the defendant-County Council.

2007Problematic, however, is the fact that the County Council is specifically named as a defendant in this case; consequently, the above construction leads to the conclusion that the County is, in essence, suing itself. [15] Accordingly, because a plaintiff must be adversarial to a defendant to create an actual case or controversy sufficient for a court to invoke jurisdiction, State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 274 , 686 P.2d 1379, 1385 (1984), an "actual controversy" does not exist between the plaintiff-County (acting on behalf of the County Council) and the defendant-County Council.

2000Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., 85 Hawai'i 286, 295 , 944 P.2d 83, 92 (App.1997) (quoting Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 281-82 , 768 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989) (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981))) (some brackets added and some in original) (ellipsis points in original).

2000Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., 85 Hawai'i 286, 295 , 944 P.2d 83, 92 (App.1997) (quoting Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 281-82 , 768 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989) (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981))) (some brackets added and some in original) (ellipsis points in original).

1996Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 80 Hawai'i 54, 66 , 905 P.2d 29, 41 (1995) (citation, quotation marks, brackets, ellipses points, and emphasis omitted).

1996Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 80 Hawai'i 54, 66 , 905 P.2d 29, 41 (1995) (citation, quotation marks, brackets, ellipses points, and emphasis omitted).

1993Corp., 74 Haw. 365, 390-91 , 846 P.2d 882, 893 (1993) (citations omitted).

1993Corp., 74 Haw. 365, 390-91 , 846 P.2d 882, 893 (1993) (citations omitted).

1990Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. at 282 , 768 P.2d at 1298 (quoting *851 Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981)); City & County of Honolulu v. Ariyoshi, 67 Haw. 412, 418 , 689 P.2d 757, 762 (1984).

1990Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. at 282 , 768 P.2d at 1298 (quoting *851 Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981)); City & County of Honolulu v. Ariyoshi, 67 Haw. 412, 418 , 689 P.2d 757, 762 (1984).