crucial inquiry in Illinois

2000Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619(a)(3)), a defendant may seek dismissal on the ground that ‘there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.’ Our supreme court in Skolnick v. Martin (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 55, 57 , 203 N.E.2d 428, 429 , stated that two actions are for the same cause where ‘relief is requested on substantially the same state of facts.’ Moreover, according to this court, ‘the crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence [citation], not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought material

2000Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-619(a)(3)), a defendant may seek dismissal on the ground that 'there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.' Our supreme court in Skolnick v. Martin (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 55, 57 , 203 N.E. 2d 428, 429 , stated that two actions are for the same cause where 'relief is requested on substantially the same state of facts.' Moreover, according to this court, 'the crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence [citation], not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought materiall

1899Speaking of the effect of acknowledgment and recording of deeds as the equivalent of delivery, we said in Weber v. Christen, 121 Ill. 91 : “We think, however, that the crucial test in all cases is the intent with which the act or acts relied on as the equivalent or substitute for actual delivery were done. * * * It is also true, as a general proposition, where nothing appears to show a contrary intention, that if the owner of an estate makes a conveyance of it and places the deed upon record without the knowledge of the grantee, the title will nevertheless pass, if the latter, on being informe

1898In the Williams-Chamberlain case, supra, where the question was as to whether there had been a gift of an insurance policy, the Supreme Court said: ‘ ‘Undoubtedly the intent is of vital importance, and as was said in- Weber v. Christen, 121 Ill. 91 , in reference to the delivery of a deed, ‘the crucial test ih all cases is the intent with which the act or acts relied on as an “equivalent or substitute for actual delivery were done.” In the same case the court further said: “By all the authorities, to make the gift a valid one, he should, if he retained the policy, have performed such other act

2012"The crucial test to be used in determining whether an accused knowingly and intelligently waived [his or] her rights is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of [his or] her rights." Daniels, 391 Ill.App.3d at 781 , 330 Ill.Dec. 446 , 908 N.E.2d 1104 . ¶ 62 Explaining the basis for his conclusion, the trial court observed that, on the day of the interview, the minor was not on any medication, he was not being treated for any psychosis or psychiatric condition,

2012"The crucial test to be used in determining whether an accused knowingly and intelligently waived [his or] her rights is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of [his or] her rights." Daniels, 391 Ill.App.3d at 781 , 330 Ill.Dec. 446 , 908 N.E.2d 1104 . ¶ 62 Explaining the basis for his conclusion, the trial court observed that, on the day of the interview, the minor was not on any medication, he was not being treated for any psychosis or psychiatric condition,

2017Schroeder Murchie Laya, 319 Ill.

2007Accordingly, “in determining whether a party has waived its contractual right to arbitrate, the crucial inquiry is whether the party has acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate.” Schroeder, 319 Ill.

2002Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 289 .

2002Bartley, 109 Ill.2d at 289 . 93 Ill.Dec. 347 , 486 N.E.2d 880 .

2000Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619(a)(3)), a defendant may seek dismissal on the ground that ‘there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.’ Our supreme court in Skolnick v. Martin (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 55, 57 , 203 N.E.2d 428, 429 , stated that two actions are for the same cause where ‘relief is requested on substantially the same state of facts.’ Moreover, according to this court, ‘the crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence [citation], not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought material

2000Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619(a)(3)), a defendant may seek dismissal on the ground that ‘there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.’ Our supreme court in Skolnick v. Martin (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 55, 57 , 203 N.E.2d 428, 429 , stated that two actions are for the same cause where ‘relief is requested on substantially the same state of facts.’ Moreover, according to this court, ‘the crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence [citation], not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought material

1993App. 3d 441 , 475 N.E.2d 1045 .) “The crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, not whether the legal theories, issues, burden of proof or relief sought materially differ between the two actions ***.” Catalano, 105 Ill.

1988App. 3d 195, 198 , 434 N.E.2d 31, 34 .) The crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof, or relief sought materially differ between the two actions.

2023People v. Fleming, 2014 IL App (1st) 113004, ¶ 36 . ¶ 62 Here, defendant was charged with both murder and aggravated battery of a child for inflicting numerous blunt force injuries on Tate on February 18, 2020.

2021In determining whether a defendant’s acts were part of the same comprehensive transaction, “the most crucial factors to consider include: the proximity of time and location of the various charges, the identity of evidence which would be presented to prove each charge; whether the offenses shared a common method; and whether the same or similar evidence would establish the elements of the offenses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Fleming, 2014 IL App (1st) 113004 , ¶ 36.

2014Accordingly, the crucial inquiry in this case is not whether the language of the policy covers Terpinas, but whether the common law innocent insured doctrine permits the policy to remain in place as to Terpinas. 3 3 Defendants rely on Great American Insurance Co. v. Christy, 53 A.3d 538 (N.H. 2012), a case from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in arguing that the innocent insured clause protects Terpinas in this matter.

2013Accordingly, the crucial inquiry in this case is not whether the language of the policy covers Terpinas, but whether the common law innocent insured doctrine permits the policy to remain in place as to Terpinas.3 3 Defendants rely on Great American Insurance Co. v. Christy, 53 A.3d 538 (N.H. 2012), a case from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in arguing that the innocent insured clause protects Terpinas in this matter.

2014If the private benefits are purely incidental to the public purposes of the act, then [the public-purpose provision] is not violated.” Id. at 355 . 1 The City comptroller argues that yet another public benefit the concession agreement confers is evidenced by the affidavit of John S. Strong, Ph.D., a professor of finance and economics at the Mason School of Business, College of William and Mary.

2014If the private benefits are purely incidental to the public purposes of the act, then [the public-purpose provision] is not violated." Id. at 355 . ¶ 54 Plaintiffs here argue that the private benefits to CPM were not "purely incidental" to the public purposes served and, thus, under City of O'Fallon, plaintiffs stated a cause of action for 1 The City comptroller argues that yet another public benefit the concession agreement confers is evidenced by the affidavit of John S. Strong, Ph.D., a professor of finance and economics at the Mason School of Business, College of William and Mary.

2013“The crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought materially differs between the two actions.” Id.

2002Village of Mapleton, 313 Ill.

2010Although many vehicles in our society are co-owned, such co-ownership merely makes it equally reasonable to believe that either one owner or the other may in fact be driving a car." Lloyd, 227 Ill.

2010Although many vehicles in our society are co-owned, such co-ownership merely makes it equally reasonable to believe that either one owner or the other may in fact be driving a car.” Lloyd, 227 Ill.

2004Carpetland U.S.A. , 201 Ill. 2d at 394 .

2004Carpetland U.S.A., 201 Ill. 2d at 394 .

1995While an accused may always "`subjectively deny that he understood the precautionary warning[,] * * * [w]hen the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, * * * it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.'" ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 55 , 143 Ill.Dec. 239 , 554 N.E.2d 174 , quoting Coyote v. United States (10th Cir.1967), 380 F.2d 305, 308 .) Our appellate court has held that the crucial test to be used in determining *920 whether an accused knowingly and intelligently waive

1995While an accused may always " 'subjectively deny that he understood the precautionary warning!,] *** [w]hen the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, *** it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.’ ” (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 55 , quoting Coyote v. United States (10th Cir. 1967), 380 F.2d 305, 308 .) Our appellate court has held that the crucial test to be used in determining whether an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his rights is whether the words in the c

1995While an accused may always "`subjectively deny that he understood the precautionary warning[,] * * * [w]hen the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, * * * it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.'" ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 55 , 143 Ill.Dec. 239 , 554 N.E.2d 174 , quoting Coyote v. United States (10th Cir.1967), 380 F.2d 305, 308 .) Our appellate court has held that the crucial test to be used in determining *920 whether an accused knowingly and intelligently waive

1995While an accused may always " 'subjectively deny that he understood the precautionary warning!,] *** [w]hen the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, *** it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.’ ” (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 55 , quoting Coyote v. United States (10th Cir. 1967), 380 F.2d 305, 308 .) Our appellate court has held that the crucial test to be used in determining whether an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his rights is whether the words in the c

1995In re Willis (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 347, 358 , 44 Ill.Dec. 760 , 411 N.E.2d 1126 .

1995In re Willis (1980), 89 Ill.

1989People v. Baker (1973), 9 Ill.

1984People v. Baker (1973), 9 Ill.

1987(People v. Green (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 444 , 386 N.E.2d 272 ; People v. Better (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514 , 386 N.E.2d 857 ; People v. Rehbein (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 435 , 386 N.E.2d 39 .) In Rehbein the defendant was charged with giving a woman a ride in his car, then driving to an isolated area and sexually assaulting her.

1987(People v. Green (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 444 , 386 N.E.2d 272 ; People v. Better (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514 , 386 N.E.2d 857 ; People v. Rehbein (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 435 , 386 N.E.2d 39 .) In Rehbein the defendant was charged with giving a woman a ride in his car, then driving to an isolated area and sexually assaulting her.