crucial test in Maryland

2019In determining whether the person has been seized, the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would “have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). 11 In Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139 (2006), Swift was walking down a public street in a high-crime area when a police officer stopped his marked patrol car, exited the vehicle, and asked Swift for permission to sp

2010As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, “[w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” In determining whether a person has been seized, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53 , 899 A.2d

2019In determining whether the person has been seized, the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would “have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). 11 In Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139 (2006), Swift was walking down a public street in a high-crime area when a police officer stopped his marked patrol car, exited the vehicle, and asked Swift for permission to sp

2010As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, “[w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” In determining whether a person has been seized, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53 , 899 A.2d

2010As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, “[w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” In determining whether a person has been seized, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53 , 899 A.2d

2010As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, “[w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” In determining whether a person has been seized, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53 , 899 A.2d

1993Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465 , 190 A.2d 797 (1963).

1993Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465 , 190 A.2d 797 (1963).

1993He denominated it as the test for “voluntariness in the traditional sense”: “More than a century ago, in Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 153 (1873) this Court said that ‘it is very clear upon all the authorities, that if the confession of the [accused] had been induced by any threat of harm, or promise of worldly advantage held out to him ... it ought to be excluded.’ The crucial test was succinctly put in Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 429 , 209 A.2d 595 (1965): ‘If freely and voluntarily given, it is admissible; if not, it is inadmissible.’ For a statement to be the free and voluntary act of

1993He denominated it as the test for “voluntariness in the traditional sense”: “More than a century ago, in Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 153 (1873) this Court said that ‘it is very clear upon all the authorities, that if the confession of the [accused] had been induced by any threat of harm, or promise of worldly advantage held out to him ... it ought to be excluded.’ The crucial test was succinctly put in Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 429 , 209 A.2d 595 (1965): ‘If freely and voluntarily given, it is admissible; if not, it is inadmissible.’ For a statement to be the free and voluntary act of

2012Id. at 678 , 404 A.2d 1064 . 24 Nevertheless, there is one consistent principle running through Maryland private nuisance case law that may provide guidance: in determining whether a nuisance is permanent or temporary, the crucial inquiry is “not the possibility of abatement but rather its likelihood.” Moy, 46 Md.App. at 371 , 416 A.2d 289 (emphasis added).

2012Id. at 678 , 404 A.2d 1064 . 24 Nevertheless, there is one consistent principle running through Maryland private nuisance case law that may provide guidance: in determining whether a nuisance is permanent or temporary, the crucial inquiry is “not the possibility of abatement but rather its likelihood.” Moy, 46 Md.App. at 371 , 416 A.2d 289 (emphasis added).

2012Id. at 678 , 404 A.2d 1064 . 24 Nevertheless, there is one consistent principle running through Maryland private nuisance case law that may provide guidance: in determining whether a nuisance is permanent or temporary, the crucial inquiry is “not the possibility of abatement but rather its likelihood.” Moy, 46 Md.App. at 371 , 416 A.2d 289 (emphasis added).

2012Id. at 678 , 404 A.2d 1064 . 24 Nevertheless, there is one consistent principle running through Maryland private nuisance case law that may provide guidance: in determining whether a nuisance is permanent or temporary, the crucial inquiry is “not the possibility of abatement but rather its likelihood.” Moy, 46 Md.App. at 371 , 416 A.2d 289 (emphasis added).

2010As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, “[w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” In determining whether a person has been seized, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53 , 899 A.2d

2010As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, "[w]hen the officer, by means of *82 physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a `seizure' has occurred." In determining whether a person has been seized, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would `have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53 , 899 A

2009Moreover, the crucial inquiry in determining “the effect that a factor has, in causing harm, standing alone, when there are multiple causes, is determined, not only by the nature of the particular factor, but also by whether the aggregate of the causes produce an unforeseeable result.” Id. at 582 , 933 A.2d at 575 .

2009Moreover, the crucial inquiry in determining “the effect that a factor has, in causing harm, standing alone, when there are multiple causes, is determined, not only by the nature of the particular factor, but also by whether the aggregate of the causes produce an unforeseeable result.” Id. at 582 , 933 A.2d at 575 .

2007In the administrative law context we have long recognized that some purported standards “ ‘are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 , 91 S.Ct. 814 , 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (quoting S.Rep.

2007In the administrative law context we have long recognized that some purported standards “ ‘are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 , 91 S.Ct. 814 , 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (quoting S.Rep.

2002See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 ; Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132 ; Oken, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 .

2002See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 ; Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132 ; Oken, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 .

2002See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 ; Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132 ; Oken, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 .

2002See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 ; Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132 ; Oken, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 .

2002See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 ; Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132 ; Oken, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 .

2002See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516 ; Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132 ; Oken, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 .

1996Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether ‘the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Act’s processes.’ *296 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148-49 , 96 S.Ct. at 2557 .

1996Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether ‘the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Act’s processes.’ *296 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148-49 , 96 S.Ct. at 2557 .

1984The crucial inquiry in this type of case is whether the police made a good faith effort to accurately describe the premises.” 4 The exception to the general rule was recognized in People of the State of Colorado v. McGill and Reiter, 187 Colo. 85 , 528 P.2d 386 (1974), stating: “The fact that the police learned that the house was being used for multiple occupancy purposes after they gained entrance to the premises does not alter our conclu *430 sion (of constitutionality).

1984The crucial inquiry in this type of case is whether the police made a good faith effort to accurately describe the premises.” 4 The exception to the general rule was recognized in People of the State of Colorado v. McGill and Reiter, 187 Colo. 85 , 528 P.2d 386 (1974), stating: “The fact that the police learned that the house was being used for multiple occupancy purposes after they gained entrance to the premises does not alter our conclu *430 sion (of constitutionality).