crucial inquiry in Indiana

1982Morris v. State, (1979) Ind., 384 N.E.2d 1022 ; Jameison v. State, (1978) Ind., 377 N.E.2d 404 .” The rationale for having the trial court orally instruct the jury in open court is that once the instructions go to the jury room the trial court judge has no way of knowing how the job of reading the instructions was done or if it was done at all.

1982Morris v. State, (1979) Ind., 384 N.E.2d 1022 ; Jameison v. State, (1978) Ind., 377 N.E.2d 404 ." The rationale for having the trial court orally instruct the jury in open court is that once the instructions go to the jury room the trial court judge has no way of knowing how the job of reading the instructions was done or if it was done at all.

2012Id. at 445-446 .

2012Id. at 445-446 .

1991In Elmore v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 532 , 382 N.E.2d 893 , our supreme court examined Blockburger, and determined "[the crucial inquiry ... requires a determination of whether the offenses are the same for purposes of double jeopardy." 382 N.E.2d, at 895 .

1991In Elmore v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 532 , 382 N.E.2d 893 , our supreme court examined Blockburger, and determined "[the crucial inquiry ... requires a determination of whether the offenses are the same for purposes of double jeopardy." 382 N.E.2d, at 895 .

1990Beeson v. Beeson (1989), Ind. App., 538 N.E.2d 293 .

1990Beeson v. Beeson (1989), Ind.App., 538 N.E.2d 293 .

1982Morris v. State, (1979) Ind., 384 N.E.2d 1022 ; Jameison v. State, (1978) Ind., 377 N.E.2d 404 .” The rationale for having the trial court orally instruct the jury in open court is that once the instructions go to the jury room the trial court judge has no way of knowing how the job of reading the instructions was done or if it was done at all.

1982Morris v. State, (1979) Ind., 384 N.E.2d 1022 ; Jameison v. State, (1978) Ind., 377 N.E.2d 404 ." The rationale for having the trial court orally instruct the jury in open court is that once the instructions go to the jury room the trial court judge has no way of knowing how the job of reading the instructions was done or if it was done at all.

1982This court has stated in Wofford v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 100 that “[although jury instructions are generally not to be sent to the jury room during deliberations this Court has held that it is harmless error to do so if the crucial requirement of first reading the instructions in open court in the presence of the parties and their attorneys was met.

1982This court has stated in Wofford v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 100 that "[a]lthough jury instructions are generally not to be sent to the jury room during deliberations this Court has held that it is harmless error to do so if the crucial requirement of first reading the instructions in open court in the presence of the parties and their attorneys was met.

1975The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background, and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.” Coyote v. United States (1967 C.A. 10th Cir.) 380 F.2d 305, 308 .

1973Dickerson v. State, supra. The crucial test of the Miranda warning was set forth in Coyote v. United States, supra, 380 F. 2d at 308 : “. . .

2020As the Fifth Circuit has observed, the crucial inquiry is whether the provider is “seeking benefits under the terms of the plan, or rights that derive from the independent basis of the contract.” Lone Star OB/GYN Assocs. v. Aetna Health Inc., 579 F.3d 525 , 529 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009).

2015Id. [22] Here, it is undisputed that Johnson’s role in Mudd’s case was limited to receiving reports of Mudd’s alleged misconduct from Community Corrections, preparing notices of violation, and filing the notices with the trial court.

2014Id.

1991Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978), 175 Ind. App. 679 , 373 N.E.2d 923, 926 , transfer denied 271 Ind. 366 , 392 N.E.2d 1168 .

1991Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978), 175 Ind. App. 679 , 373 N.E.2d 923, 926 , transfer denied 271 Ind. 366 , 392 N.E.2d 1168 .

1991Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978), 175 Ind. App. 679 , 373 N.E.2d 923, 926 , transfer denied 271 Ind. 366 , 392 N.E.2d 1168 .

1991Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978), 175 Ind. App. 679 , 373 N.E.2d 923, 926 , transfer denied 271 Ind. 366 , 392 N.E.2d 1168 .

1988States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147 , 96 S.Ct., at 2556 , unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frus trate effective implementation of the Act's processes."' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 , quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jack

1988States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147 , 96 S.Ct., at 2556 , unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frus trate effective implementation of the Act's processes."' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 , quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jack

1988States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147 , 96 S.Ct., at 2556 , unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frus trate effective implementation of the Act's processes."' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 , quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jack

1988States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147 , 96 S.Ct., at 2556 , unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frus trate effective implementation of the Act's processes."' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 , quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jack

1988States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147 , 96 S.Ct., at 2556 , unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frus trate effective implementation of the Act's processes."' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 , quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jack

1988States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147 , 96 S.Ct., at 2556 , unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frus trate effective implementation of the Act's processes."' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 , quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jack

1981According to the Barlow’s Court, a warrant applicant may fulfill the crucial requirement of demonstrating a “reasonable legislative or administrative standard” for inspecting a particular establishment by describing a program based upon “specific neutral criteria.” 436 U.S. at 323 , 98 S.Ct. at 1826 .

1981According to the Barlow’s Court, a warrant applicant may fulfill the crucial requirement of demonstrating a “reasonable legislative or administrative standard” for inspecting a particular establishment by describing a program based upon “specific neutral criteria.” 436 U.S. at 323 , 98 S.Ct. at 1826 .

1981Acceptance of the foregoing definitions is consistent with the existing case law on the subject of “fondling.” In Almaguer v. State, (1951) 155 Tex.Cr.R. 531 , 237 S.W.2d 631 , a rape conviction was reversed on the theory that the forcible element inherent in rape necessarily abrogates any “caressing” element present in “fondling.” The court in Almaguer focused on the elements of force and threats as the crucial factors foreclosing the possibility of “fondling” and specifically conceded that one person could “fondle” another by making use of appendages other than hands.

1981Acceptance of the foregoing definitions is consistent with the existing case law on the subject of “fondling.” In Almaguer v. State, (1951) 155 Tex.Cr.R. 531 , 237 S.W.2d 631 , a rape conviction was reversed on the theory that the forcible element inherent in rape necessarily abrogates any “caressing” element present in “fondling.” The court in Almaguer focused on the elements of force and threats as the crucial factors foreclosing the possibility of “fondling” and specifically conceded that one person could “fondle” another by making use of appendages other than hands.

1981Accord, Gay v. State, (1877) 2 Tex.App. 127 (defining “fondle”); See also, Lason v. State, (1943) 152 Fla. 440 , 12 So.2d 305 ; People v. Garcia, (1971) 3 Ill.App.3d 365 , 279 N.E.2d 741 .

1981Accord, Gay v. State, (1877) 2 Tex.App. 127 (defining “fondle”); See also, Lason v. State, (1943) 152 Fla. 440 , 12 So.2d 305 ; People v. Garcia, (1971) 3 Ill.App.3d 365 , 279 N.E.2d 741 .

1978The United States Supreme Court, as the final arbiter in matters of constitutional interpretation, has devel oped a test for determining when offenses are the same under the Double Jeopardy Clause: “The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, (1932) 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 75 L.Ed. 306 , 309; See also G

1978The United States Supreme Court, as the final arbiter in matters of constitutional interpretation, has devel oped a test for determining when offenses are the same under the Double Jeopardy Clause: “The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, (1932) 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 75 L.Ed. 306 , 309; See also G

1977The court then stated, at 337 N.E.2d at 836 : “As our survey of Indiana law regarding communication with the jury indicates, the crucial requirement is that the instructions first be read in open court in the presence and with the consent of the parties and their attorneys.

1938Lamick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 71 , 147 N. E. 139 ; Famsley v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 722 , 149 N. E. 436; Nahas v State (1927), 199 Ind. 117 , 155 N. E. 259 . *513 *512 In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s plea of guilty was not entered by him' *513 freely and understandingly.

1938Lamick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 71 , 147 N. E. 139 ; Famsley v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 722 , 149 N. E. 436; Nahas v State (1927), 199 Ind. 117 , 155 N. E. 259 . *513 *512 In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s plea of guilty was not entered by him' *513 freely and understandingly.

1938After quoting from the case of Rhodes v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 183 , 156 N. E. 389 , the court said (p. 113): “It is evident from the foregoing that the crucial test of the trial court’s action in accepting a plea of guilty is whether the defendant entered his plea of guilty ‘freely and understanding^.’ If the acts which constitute the alleged offense are such that the defendant can readily understand whether he has committed them, and if he understands that his plea of guilty amounts- to an acknowledgment that he has committed the acts in question, and if he also understands the legal conseq

1938After quoting from the case of Rhodes v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 183 , 156 N. E. 389 , the court said (p. 113): “It is evident from the foregoing that the crucial test of the trial court’s action in accepting a plea of guilty is whether the defendant entered his plea of guilty ‘freely and understanding^.’ If the acts which constitute the alleged offense are such that the defendant can readily understand whether he has committed them, and if he understands that his plea of guilty amounts- to an acknowledgment that he has committed the acts in question, and if he also understands the legal conseq

1938Lamick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 71 , 147 N. E. 139 ; Famsley v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 722 , 149 N. E. 436; Nahas v State (1927), 199 Ind. 117 , 155 N. E. 259 . *513 *512 In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s plea of guilty was not entered by him' *513 freely and understandingly.

1938Lamick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 71 , 147 N. E. 139 ; Famsley v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 722 , 149 N. E. 436; Nahas v State (1927), 199 Ind. 117 , 155 N. E. 259 . *513 *512 In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s plea of guilty was not entered by him' *513 freely and understandingly.

1938Lamick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 71 , 147 N. E. 139 ; Famsley v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 722 , 149 N. E. 436; Nahas v State (1927), 199 Ind. 117 , 155 N. E. 259 . *513 *512 In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s plea of guilty was not entered by him' *513 freely and understandingly.

1938Lamick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 71 , 147 N. E. 139 ; Famsley v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 722 , 149 N. E. 436; Nahas v State (1927), 199 Ind. 117 , 155 N. E. 259 . *513 *512 In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s plea of guilty was not entered by him' *513 freely and understandingly.