12 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Spotogreen2 sentences2009See Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318 . 1994Id. | 1 | 2 |
Florida v. Bostickgreen2 sentences2025"Thus, the boundary between consensual encounters and investigatory stops is crucial because it defines where the protection of the Fourth Amendment begins." Jackson , 39 P.3d at 1179 . ¶52 To determine whether an encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' " Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 ( quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569 ( 1988 ) ) . 2025"Thus, the boundary between consensual encounters and investigatory stops is crucial because it defines where the protection of the Fourth Amendment begins." Jackson , 39 P.3d at 1179. 24 ¶52 To determine whether an encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2025"Thus, the boundary between consensual encounters and investigatory stops is crucial because it defines where the protection of the Fourth Amendment begins." Jackson , 39 P.3d at 1179 . ¶52 To determine whether an encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' " Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 ( quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569 ( 1988 ) ) . 2025"Thus, the boundary between consensual encounters and investigatory stops is crucial because it defines where the protection of the Fourth Amendment begins." Jackson , 39 P.3d at 1179. 24 ¶52 To determine whether an encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Chesternutgreen2 sentences2025"Thus, the boundary between consensual encounters and investigatory stops is crucial because it defines where the protection of the Fourth Amendment begins." Jackson , 39 P.3d at 1179 . ¶52 To determine whether an encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' " Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 ( quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569 ( 1988 ) ) . 2025"Thus, the boundary between consensual encounters and investigatory stops is crucial because it defines where the protection of the Fourth Amendment begins." Jackson , 39 P.3d at 1179. 24 ¶52 To determine whether an encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
ALBERT JONES v. UNITED STATESgreen2 sentences2025The test "is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation." Chesternut , 486 U.S. at 573 . ¶53 "The message that a suspect is not free to leave or terminate the inquiry can be conveyed, not necessarily intentionally, in ways less obvious than actual physical force or explicit command." Jones v. United States , 154 A.3d 591, 595 ( D.C. 2017 ) . 2025The test "is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation." Chesternut , 486 U.S. at 573. ¶53 "The message that a suspect is not free to leave or terminate the inquiry can be conveyed, not necessarily intentionally, in ways less obvious than actual physical force or explicit command." Jones v. United States , 154 A.3d 591, 595 (D.C. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Ron Championgreen1 sentence2007People v. Whittiker, supra, - P.3d at -; see Harris v. Champion, supra, 15 F.3d at 1566 ; see also Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160 , 1170 n. 7 (8d Cir.1995) (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence L. Simmons v. Howard L. Beyer and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, W. Cary Edwardsgreen1 sentence2007People v. Whittiker, supra, - P.3d at -; see Harris v. Champion, supra, 15 F.3d at 1566 ; see also Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160 , 1170 n. 7 (8d Cir.1995) (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
Marriage of Korol v. Korolgreen2 sentences1996Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, Commissioner's comment, 9A U.L.A. 628-29 (1987); see also In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.2d 414 , 33 Ill.Dec. 110, 113 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1979) (ruling that in creating presumption favoring present custodian, legislature sought to promote a stability and continuity in child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be lightly overturned); In re Custody of Andre, 234 Mont. 80 , 761 P.2d 809, 811 (1988) (finding stability of custody arrangement to be one of the most crucial factors in a child’s development); Korol v. Korol, 188 Mont. 351 , 613 1996Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, Commissioner's comment, 9A U.L.A. 628-29 (1987); see also In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.2d 414 , 33 Ill.Dec. 110, 113 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1979) (ruling that in creating presumption favoring present custodian, legislature sought to promote a stability and continuity in child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be lightly overturned); In re Custody of Andre, 234 Mont. 80 , 761 P.2d 809, 811 (1988) (finding stability of custody arrangement to be one of the most crucial factors in a child’s development); Korol v. Korol, 188 Mont. 351 , 613 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Custody of Andregreen1 sentence1996Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, Commissioner's comment, 9A U.L.A. 628-29 (1987); see also In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.2d 414 , 33 Ill.Dec. 110, 113 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1979) (ruling that in creating presumption favoring present custodian, legislature sought to promote a stability and continuity in child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be lightly overturned); In re Custody of Andre, 234 Mont. 80 , 761 P.2d 809, 811 (1988) (finding stability of custody arrangement to be one of the most crucial factors in a child’s development); Korol v. Korol, 188 Mont. 351 , 613 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Custody of Harnegreen2 sentences1996Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, Commissioner's comment, 9A U.L.A. 628-29 (1987); see also In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.2d 414 , 33 Ill.Dec. 110, 113 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1979) (ruling that in creating presumption favoring present custodian, legislature sought to promote a stability and continuity in child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be lightly overturned); In re Custody of Andre, 234 Mont. 80 , 761 P.2d 809, 811 (1988) (finding stability of custody arrangement to be one of the most crucial factors in a child’s development); Korol v. Korol, 188 Mont. 351 , 613 1996Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, Commissioner's comment, 9A U.L.A. 628-29 (1987); see also In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.2d 414 , 33 Ill.Dec. 110, 113 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1979) (ruling that in creating presumption favoring present custodian, legislature sought to promote a stability and continuity in child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be lightly overturned); In re Custody of Andre, 234 Mont. 80 , 761 P.2d 809, 811 (1988) (finding stability of custody arrangement to be one of the most crucial factors in a child’s development); Korol v. Korol, 188 Mont. 351 , 613 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalgreen2 sentences1988See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872 , 102 S.Ct. at 3449 . 1988See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872 , 102 S.Ct. at 3449 . | 1 | 1 |
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences1983In determining whether the interest from the loans to Northwest Industries constitutes business income, the crucial inquiry is the “frequency and regularity of the activity,” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Colorado, 198 Colo. 413, 417 , 601 P.2d 628, 631 (1979), bearing in mind that the income must be related to the business being conducted within the state to ensure that extra-territorial value is not being taxed. 1983In determining whether the interest from the loans to Northwest Industries constitutes business income, the crucial inquiry is the “frequency and regularity of the activity,” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Colorado, 198 Colo. 413, 417 , 601 P.2d 628, 631 (1979), bearing in mind that the income must be related to the business being conducted within the state to ensure that extra-territorial value is not being taxed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Webb v. City of Black Hawk
green
2 sentences2016This material impediment standard is broad enough to encompass all of the situations in which we have recognized that conflict can arise, including where “the home-rule city’s ordinance authorizes what state statute forbids, or forbids what state statute authorizes.” Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 2013 CO 9, ¶ 43 , 295 P.3d 480, 492 ; see also maj. op. ¶ 41. 2016This material impediment standard is broad enough to encompass all of the situations in which we have recognized that conflict can arise, including where “the home-rule city’s ordinance authorizes what state statute forbids, or forbids what state statute authorizes.” Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 2013 CO 9, ¶ 43 , 295 P.3d 480, 492 ; see also maj. op. ¶ 41. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
In Re 2015–2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury
green
1 sentence2016This material impediment standard is broad enough to encompass all of the situations in which we have recognized that conflict can arise, including where "the home-rule city's ordinance authorizes what state statute forbids, or forbids what state statute authorizes." Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 2018 CO 9, ¶ 43 , 295 P.3d 480, 492 ; see also maj. op. ¶ 41. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. McGlotten
green
1 sentence2009Id.; McGlotten, 166 P.3d at 185 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Whittiker
green
1 sentence2007People v. Whittiker, supra, - P.3d at -; see Harris v. Champion, supra, 15 F.3d at 1566 ; see also Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160 , 1170 n. 7 (8d Cir.1995) (collecting cases). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Rice v. Wood
green
1 sentence2005The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court committed prejudicial error because the instruction omitted "a critical factor" for the jury's consideration-'"the crucial requirement of the creation and continued existence of a debt." Rice v. Wood, supra, 346 S.E.2d at 211-12 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Federal Election Commission v. Harvey Furgatch
green
2 sentences2001Furgatch, supra, 807 F.2d at 868 . 2001Furgatch, supra, 807 F.2d at 868 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Andre v. Dobson
neutral
1 sentence1996Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, Commissioner's comment, 9A U.L.A. 628-29 (1987); see also In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.2d 414 , 33 Ill.Dec. 110, 113 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1979) (ruling that in creating presumption favoring present custodian, legislature sought to promote a stability and continuity in child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be lightly overturned); In re Custody of Andre, 234 Mont. 80 , 761 P.2d 809, 811 (1988) (finding stability of custody arrangement to be one of the most crucial factors in a child’s development); Korol v. Korol, 188 Mont. 351 , 613 | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences1983We find the Supreme Court of Oregon’s analysis in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 329 , 527 P.2d 729 (1974), persuasive on the issue of the taxability of the interest. 1983We find the Supreme Court of Oregon’s analysis in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 329 , 527 P.2d 729 (1974), persuasive on the issue of the taxability of the interest. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.