crucial inquiry in Texas

2022The crucial inquiry is “whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Id. at 347 .

2015It is ir relevant whether the public servant felt threatened, since the crucial inquiry remains whether the appellant's proven driving conduct posed "an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensitivity." Whiddon,infra. @ *4[quoting, Plivas v. State, 203 S.W.3d 341,347 (Tex.Crim.App.2006)]. 13.

2021Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439 ; State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104 ; Jackson v. State, 77 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2014Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439 ; Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 467 ; Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d at 679 ; Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104 .

2015See Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (stating that assault by threat is a conduct-oriented offense which focuses upon the act of making a threat, regardless of any result that the threat may cause.); Olivas v. State, 203 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (“ ‘[Although the question whether the defendant’s conduct produced fear in the vie-. tim is relevant, the crucial inquiry remains whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.’ ” (quoting Anthony v. United S

2015App. 2006) ("'[Although the question whether the defendant's conduct produced fear in the victim is relevant, the crucial inquiry remains whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.'" (quoting Anthony v. United States, 361 A.2d 202, 206 (D.C. 1976))); see also Montejano v. State, No. 08-12-00235- CR, 2014 WL 4638911 , at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that "the operative question is whether the defendant's conduct would be perceived as o

2023See Franks, 241 S.W.3d at 142 (“Although [officer] parked his vehicle behind appellant’s, nothing in the record suggests that the position of his vehicle blocked hers or prevented appellant from leaving the rest area by simply driving forward.”).9 With respect to whether a reasonable person in Lewis’s shoes would have felt able to terminate the interaction with Deputy Rodriguez in light of the car being inoperable: “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was n

2015Distinguishing consensual encounters from investigative detentions Where the defendant is not in a confined location in which his movement is restricted due to circumstances beyond his control, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 , 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 , 115 L.

2023Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 893 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); see Venture Cotton Co-op. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 232 (Tex. 2014). - 13 - 04-22-00355-CV In determining unconscionability, “the crucial inquiry is whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, a forum where the litigant can effectively vindicate his or her rights.” In re Olshan Found.

2017Venture Cotton Co-op. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 231 (Tex. 2014).

2024The crucial inquiry in determining whether a defendant has threatened another “is whether the [defendant] acted in such a manner as would, under the circumstances, portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Boston v. State, 373 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012), aff’d, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim.

2016The crucial inquiry in determining whether a threat has been made “is whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would, under the circumstances, portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Boston v. State, 373 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tex.App.-Austin 2012), aff'd, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex.Crim.App.2013); see also Dobbins v. State, 228 S.W.3d 761 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism’d).

2025App. 2015) (concluding, where the testifying expert referred to results of DNA tests performed by non-testifying analysts, that the expert’s testimony was nevertheless admissible under the Confrontation Clause because she “performed the crucial analysis determining the DNA match and testified to her own conclusions”); see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 661–62 (2011) 4 (noting that “surrogate [expert] testimony” violated the Confrontation Clause because it “could not convey what [the non-testifying analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned” nor could it “e

2025“While the testifying expert can rely upon information from a non-testifying analyst, the testifying expert cannot act as a surrogate to introduce that information.” Id. (concluding, where the testifying expert referred to results of DNA tests performed by non- testifying analysts, that the expert’s testimony was nevertheless admissible under the Confrontation Clause because she “performed the crucial analysis determining the DNA match and testified to her own conclusions”); see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 661–62 (2011) (noting that “surrogate [expert] testimony” violated the Conf

2022“Imminent” has been defined as meaning “near at hand.” Devine v. State, 786 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim.

2016“So long as the [perpetrator’s] actions are of such nature as' in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with his property against his will, any actual or perceived threat of imminent bodily injury will satisfy this element of the offense.” See Burgess, 448 S.W.3d at 601-02 ; Devine v. State, 786 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

2021Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439 ; State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104 ; Jackson v. State, 77 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2011Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 ; State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104 ; Jackson v. State, 77 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2021But as the court of appeals observed in this case, Freeman had personal knowledge of the tests used, and she conducted the crucial analysis by comparing the DNA profiles and determining that the complainant’s DNA profile matched the DNA from the bloodstain on appellant’s T-shirt.”) (citing Paredes v. State, 439 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), aff’d, 462 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2015)); Paredes, 439 S.W.3d at 526 ; McWilliams v. State, 367 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (distinguished from Bullcoming because witness “was a supervisor, involved with every aspect of the testing process, first by determining which samples should be tested, which tests should be conducted and in what order, then through supervision, then through analysis of the data, and lastly by writing the report.

2015See Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga, 9 S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (identifying the concern as whether experts relied on subjective interpretation or on objective data or interpretation).

2015See Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga, 9 S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (identifying the concern as whether experts relied on subjective interpretation or on objective data or interpretation).

2008App. 2006) (citing Anthony v. United States , 361 A.2d 202, 206 (D.C. 1976)); see also Chapman v. State , 78 Ala. 463, 465 (Ala. 1885).

2008App. 2006) (citing Anthony v. United States, 361 A.2d 202, 206 (D.C. 1976)); see also Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 465 (Ala. 1885).

2025“While the testifying expert can rely upon information from a non-testifying analyst, the testifying expert cannot act as a surrogate to introduce that information.” Id. (concluding, where the testifying expert referred to results of DNA tests performed by non- testifying analysts, that the expert’s testimony was nevertheless admissible under the Confrontation Clause because she “performed the crucial analysis determining the DNA match and testified to her own conclusions”); see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 661–62 (2011) (noting that “surrogate [expert] testimony” violated the Conf

2021But as the court of appeals observed in this case, Freeman had personal knowledge of the tests used, and she conducted the crucial analysis by comparing the DNA profiles and determining that the complainant’s DNA profile matched the DNA from the bloodstain on appellant’s T-shirt.”) (citing Paredes v. State, 439 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), aff’d, 462 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. Crim.

2024When a court “appl[ies] the unconscionability standard, the crucial inquiry is whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, a forum where the litigant can effectively vindicate his or her rights.” Olshan, 328 S.W.3d at 894 .

2023Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 893 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); see Venture Cotton Co-op. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 232 (Tex. 2014). - 13 - 04-22-00355-CV In determining unconscionability, “the crucial inquiry is whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, a forum where the litigant can effectively vindicate his or her rights.” In re Olshan Found.

1986Newspapers Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 , 591 (Tex. 1964).

1986Newspapers Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 591 (Tex. 1964).

2019And she was testifying as “more than a surrogate” because she actually performed “the crucial analysis” and merely relied on another analyst’s “computer-generated data in reaching her conclusion rather than another analyst’s report.” Id. (emphasis added) (explaining “not a case in which the State attempted to bring in a testimonial lab report through a surrogate [witness]”); see also Garret v. State, 518 S.W. 3d 546 , 554–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017) (testifying analyst performed analysis and comparison of criminal defendant’s DNA profile and DNA profile obtained from scene; all tes

2019Id. at 518 . “[W]hen the underlying lab analysis is not referred to or admitted into evidence, a testifying expert who independently analyzes raw DNA data may offer his own opinion concerning the comparison of –8– the DNA profiles; if subject to cross-examination, then the admission of that opinion does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” Dugar v. State, No. 01-16-00908-CR, 2018 WL 2106893 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 8, 2018 , pet. ref’d) (citing Garrett v. State, 518 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d)).

2015Ed. 2d 389 (1991) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 , 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1977 , 100 L.

2010See United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (holding that the respondent was not seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment when law enforcement agents "approached her in a public place, asked if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions."); see also Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality op.) ("law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the

2004The plaintiff in Gross was prescribed a drug, Tegretol, and the claim specifically arose out of the use of the drug. 3 S.W.3d at 520 .

2004The plaintiff in Gross was prescribed a drug, Tegretol, and the claim specifically arose out of the use of the drug. 3 S.W.3d at 520 .

1982The crucial test is whether the taxpayer acted under duress.. . [Id. at 746-47], The Court then contrasted two contemporaneous prior cases, Corsicana Cotton Mills v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 352 , 71 S.W.2d 247 *230 (1934), and Austin National Bank v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 272 , 71 S.W.2d 242 (1934), the former resulting in a finding of no duress and the latter resulting in a finding of duress.

1982The crucial test is whether the taxpayer acted under duress.. . [Id. at 746-47], The Court then contrasted two contemporaneous prior cases, Corsicana Cotton Mills v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 352 , 71 S.W.2d 247 *230 (1934), and Austin National Bank v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 272 , 71 S.W.2d 242 (1934), the former resulting in a finding of no duress and the latter resulting in a finding of duress.

2025“While the testifying expert can rely upon information from a non-testifying analyst, the testifying expert cannot act as a surrogate to introduce that information.” Id. (concluding, where the testifying expert referred to results of DNA tests performed by non- testifying analysts, that the expert’s testimony was nevertheless admissible under the Confrontation Clause because she “performed the crucial analysis determining the DNA match and testified to her own conclusions”); see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 , 661–62 (2011) (noting that “surrogate [expert] testimony” violated the Conf

2021App. 2015)); Paredes, 439 S.W.3d at 526 ; McWilliams v. State, 367 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (distinguished from Bullcoming because witness “was a supervisor, involved with every aspect of the testing process, first by determining which samples should be tested, which tests should be conducted and in what order, then through supervision, then through analysis of the data, and lastly by writing the report.

2020Another court held that the crucial inquiry is whether the “defendant’s actions disguised the evidentiary value of the article.” Anderson v. State, 123 P.3d 1110, 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).

2016The crucial inquiry in determining whether a threat has been made “is whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would, under the circumstances, portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Boston v. State, 373 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tex.App.-Austin 2012), aff'd, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex.Crim.App.2013); see also Dobbins v. State, 228 S.W.3d 761 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism’d).