crucial test in Nebraska

1945This is an executive or administrative act.” (Italics supplied.) In Read v. City of Scottsbluff, supra, this court adopted and approved a rule stated in Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580 , 3 Pac. 2d 778 that, “The crucial test, for determining that which is legislative and that which is administrative, is whether the' ordinance was one making a law or one executing a law already in existence; * * * .” Measured by this test the resolution involved could not be legislative in character, otherwise it would improperly delegate the legislative powers of the legislature to the city council of the city of

1945This is an executive or administrative act.” (Italics supplied.) In Read v. City of Scottsbluff, supra, this court adopted and approved a rule stated in Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580 , 3 Pac. 2d 778 that, “The crucial test, for determining that which is legislative and that which is administrative, is whether the' ordinance was one making a law or one executing a law already in existence; * * * .” Measured by this test the resolution involved could not be legislative in character, otherwise it would improperly delegate the legislative powers of the legislature to the city council of the city of

1998The Court reasoned that “ ‘[f]or a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.’ ” 427 U.S. at 144 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 , 74 S. Ct. 161 , 98 L.

1998The Court reasoned that “ ‘[f]or a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.’ ” 427 U.S. at 144 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 , 74 S. Ct. 161 , 98 L.

1998The Court reasoned that “ ‘[f]or a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.’ ” 427 U.S. at 144 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 , 74 S. Ct. 161 , 98 L.

1998In resolving this issue, we find guidance from the Supreme Court’s holding in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 , 103 S. Ct. 3172 , 77 L.

1998In resolving this issue, we find guidance from the Supreme Court’s holding in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 , 103 S. Ct. 3172 , 77 L.

1997Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).

1985Lenstrom v. Thone , 209 Neb. 783 , 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981), involved the issue of the constitutionality of a statutory scheme establishing a scholarship award program providing financial assistance to eligible undergraduate state residents to receive educational services in public and private postsecondary educational institutions in the state.

1985Lenstrom v. Thone , 209 Neb. 783 , 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981), involved the issue of the constitutionality of a statutory scheme establishing a scholarship award program providing financial assistance to eligible undergraduate state residents to receive educational services in public and private postsecondary educational institutions in the state.

1982In Robertson & Associates (Ala.), Inc. v. Boswell, 361 So. 2d 1070 (Ala. 1978), the Alabama Supreme Court restated the test on the basis of whether the manufacturer used the material with the intent and purpose of making it an ingredient or component part of the finished product or whether its presence in the finished product was merely incidental to its primary function.

1960Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638 , 17 N. W. 2d 683 , that: “The crucial test for determining that which is legislative and that which is executive or administrative is whether the resolution or ordinance of a city council is one making a law or one executing a law already in existence.” The vacation ordinance here involved was in effect simply executive or administrative in character, that is, it was one executing applicable and controlling laws already in existence, which could be done, but only in the form and manner authorized by such laws.

1960Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638 , 17 N. W. 2d 683 , that: “The crucial test for determining that which is legislative and that which is executive or administrative is whether the resolution or ordinance of a city council is one making a law or one executing a law already in existence.” The vacation ordinance here involved was in effect simply executive or administrative in character, that is, it was one executing applicable and controlling laws already in existence, which could be done, but only in the form and manner authorized by such laws.

1945A like situation but from a different approach was presented in Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582 , 290 N. W. 451 , wherein it was said: “The contention is advanced that the legislation delegates legislative powers to the city council of the city of Omaha' and to the Housing Authority of the city of Omaha, contrary to section 1, art.

1945A like situation but from a different approach was presented in Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582 , 290 N. W. 451 , wherein it was said: “The contention is advanced that the legislation delegates legislative powers to the city council of the city of Omaha' and to the Housing Authority of the city of Omaha, contrary to section 1, art.

1941It is said in that case: “The crucial test, for determining that which is legislative and that which is administrative, is whether the ordinance was one making a law or one executing a law already in existence.” “Notwithstanding the broad language of these and other statutes, the courts have uniformly recognized the distinction between acts that were legislative and those that were administrative, and have said that the initiative and referendum applied only to the former.” Murphy v. Gilman, 204 Ia. 58 , 214 N. W. 679 .

1941It is said in that case: “The crucial test, for determining that which is legislative and that which is administrative, is whether the ordinance was one making a law or one executing a law already in existence.” “Notwithstanding the broad language of these and other statutes, the courts have uniformly recognized the distinction between acts that were legislative and those that were administrative, and have said that the initiative and referendum applied only to the former.” Murphy v. Gilman, 204 Ia. 58 , 214 N. W. 679 .