crucial inquiry in Alabama

2015“In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2

2015Specifically, Largin argues that C.J.G. did not unequivocally state that she could not follow the circuit court’s instructions and recommend a sentence of death, regardless of the facts and circumstances presented. “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985);

2015“In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2

2015“In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2

2012(R. 864.) “ ‘[J]urors who give responses that would support a challenge for cause may be rehabilitated by subsequent questioning by the prosecutor or the court.’ Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 855 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘The crucial inquiry is whether the veniremen could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.’ McNabb v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 944 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), quoting other cases.” Brownfield v. State, 44 So.3d 1, 34 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).

2007“The crucial inquiry is whether the veniremen could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” McNabb v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 944 (Ala. Crim.App.2001), quoting other cases.

1999A juror's bias need not be proved with `unmistakable clarity' because `juror bias cannot be reduced to questionanswer sessions which obtain results in the name of a catechism.' Id. " "` Martin v. State, 548 So.2d 488, 490 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 496 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 , 110 S.Ct. 419 , 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989).' " Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 109 (Ala. Cr.App.1995). "`"A trial judge's finding on whether or not a particular juror is biased `is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that's peculiarly within a trial judge's province.' [ Wainwright v.] Witt

1996A juror's bias need not be proved with "unmistakable clarity" because "juror bias cannot be reduced to question-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism." Id. " Martin v. State, 548 So.2d 488, 490 (Ala. Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 496 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 , 110 S.Ct. 419 , 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)." Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995). "`A trial judge's finding on whether or not a particular juror is biased "is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that's peculiarly within a trial judge's province." [ Wainwright v.] Witt ,

2015“In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2

1999"In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d

2012(R. 864.) “ ‘[J]urors who give responses that would support a challenge for cause may be rehabilitated by subsequent questioning by the prosecutor or the court.’ Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 855 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘The crucial inquiry is whether the veniremen could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.’ McNabb v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 944 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), quoting other cases.” Brownfield v. State, 44 So.3d 1, 34 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).

2007Thank you. “[Defense counsel]: Nothing further.” (R. 469-73.) Though J.A. initially stated that she would hold it against Hyde if he chose not to testify, the prosecutor rehabilitated the juror. “ ‘[J]urors who give responses that would support a challenge for cause may be rehabilitated by subsequent questioning by the prosecutor or the court.’ Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 855 (AIa.Crim.App.2000). ‘The crucial inquiry is whether the veniremen could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.’ McNabb v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 944 (Ala.C

1999A juror's bias need not be proved with `unmistakable clarity' because `juror bias cannot be reduced to questionanswer sessions which obtain results in the name of a catechism.' Id. " "` Martin v. State, 548 So.2d 488, 490 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 496 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 , 110 S.Ct. 419 , 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989).' " Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 109 (Ala. Cr.App.1995). "`"A trial judge's finding on whether or not a particular juror is biased `is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that's peculiarly within a trial judge's province.' [ Wainwright v.] Witt

1996A juror's bias need not be proved with "unmistakable clarity" because "juror bias cannot be reduced to question-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism." Id. " Martin v. State, 548 So.2d 488, 490 (Ala. Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 496 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 , 110 S.Ct. 419 , 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)." Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995). "`A trial judge's finding on whether or not a particular juror is biased "is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that's peculiarly within a trial judge's province." [ Wainwright v.] Witt ,

1998See also Brownlee v. State, 545 So.2d 151, 155-56 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 166 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 , 110 S.Ct. 208 , 107 L.Ed.2d 161 (1989). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , [658

1998See also Brownlee v. State, 545 So.2d 151, 155-56 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 166 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 , 110 S.Ct. 208 , 107 L.Ed.2d 161 (1989). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , [658

1998See also Brownlee v. State, 545 So.2d 151, 155-56 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 166 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 , 110 S.Ct. 208 , 107 L.Ed.2d 161 (1989). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , [658

1998See also Brownlee v. State, 545 So.2d 151, 155-56 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 166 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 , 110 S.Ct. 208 , 107 L.Ed.2d 161 (1989). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , [658

1998See also Brownlee v. State, 545 So.2d 151, 155-56 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 166 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 , 110 S.Ct. 208 , 107 L.Ed.2d 161 (1989). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , [658

1998See also Brownlee v. State, 545 So.2d 151, 155-56 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 545 So.2d 166 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 , 110 S.Ct. 208 , 107 L.Ed.2d 161 (1989). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , [658

2015“In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2

2015“In Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 47 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), this Court outlined the guidelines for determining whether a potential juror should be excluded for cause based on his or her feelings concerning capital punishment: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is ‘whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2

2014As the Court in Mu’Min stated: “‘Whether a trial court decides to put questions about the content of publicity to a potential juror or not, it must make the same decision at the end of the questioning: is this juror to be believed when he says he has not formed an opinion about the case?' “500 U.S. at 425, 111 S.Ct. at 1905.

1996As the Court in Mu'Min [v. Virginia , 500 U.S. 415 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991),] stated: " 'Whether a trial court decides to put questions about the content of publicity to a potential juror or not, it must make the same decision at the end of the questioning: is this juror to be believed when he says he has not formed an opinion about the case?' " 500 U.S. at 425 , 111 S.Ct. at 1905 ." 632 So.2d at 17 .

2015See Grelier v. Grelier, 44 So.3d 1092, 1096-98 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (discussing the various valuation methods); Ex parte Hartley, 50 So.3d 1102, 1106 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (“[W]e hold that because the crucial inquiry to be undertaken by a trial court in a divorce action is to determine the fair value of the "parties’ assets rather than to adhere in all cases to their ‘fair market value,’ ” discovery concerning fair value is within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), Ala. R.

2015A juror’s bias need not be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity’ because ‘juror bias cannot be reduced to question and answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.’ M” ’ ” Dallas v. State, 711 So.2d 1101, 1107 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). “[T]here are occasions where a juror’s claim of freedom from prejudice and impartiality cannot be accepted and should not be believed.

2015See Grelier v. Grelier, 44 So.3d 1092, 1096-98 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (discussing the various valuation methods); Ex parte Hartley, 50 So.3d 1102, 1106 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (“[W]e hold that because the crucial inquiry to be undertaken by a trial court in a divorce action is to determine the fair value of the "parties’ assets rather than to adhere in all cases to their ‘fair market value,’ ” discovery concerning fair value is within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), Ala. R.

2014See Hamm, 52 So. 3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 559 (Ala. 2000), for the proposition that "among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is 'whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets'"), and Luna, 631 So. 2d at 919 ("[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until afte

2014See Hamm, 52 So.3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 559 (Ala.2000), for the proposition that “among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is ‘whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets’ ”), and Luna, 631 So.2d at 919 (“[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until after h

2014See Hamm, 52 So. 3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 559 (Ala. 2000), for the proposition that "among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is 'whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets'"), and Luna, 631 So. 2d at 919 ("[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until afte

2014See Hamm, 52 So.3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 559 (Ala.2000), for the proposition that “among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is ‘whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets’ ”), and Luna, 631 So.2d at 919 (“[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until after h

2014See Hamm, 52 So. 3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 559 (Ala. 2000), for the proposition that "among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is 'whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets'"), and Luna, 631 So. 2d at 919 ("[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until afte

2014See Hamm, 52 So.3d at 498 (citing Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553, 559 (Ala.2000), for the proposition that “among the questions of fact essential to a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is ‘whether a debtor who is engaged in bankruptcy proceedings knew or should have known about claims or causes of action that should be disclosed as assets’ ”), and Luna, 631 So.2d at 919 (“[The plaintiff] further contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should not be applied to him because, he says, he was unaware of his claims against [the defendant] until after h

2012(R. 864.) “ ‘[J]urors who give responses that would support a challenge for cause may be rehabilitated by subsequent questioning by the prosecutor or the court.’ Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 855 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘The crucial inquiry is whether the veniremen could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.’ McNabb v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 944 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), quoting other cases.” Brownfield v. State, 44 So.3d 1, 34 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).

1998See also Jenkins v. State, 627 So.2d 1034, 1043 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)." Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171 , 117 S.Ct. 1438 , 137 L.Ed.2d 545 (1997) (emphasis added). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray

1998See also Jenkins v. State, 627 So.2d 1034, 1043 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)." Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171 , 117 S.Ct. 1438 , 137 L.Ed.2d 545 (1997) (emphasis added). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray

1998See also Jenkins v. State, 627 So.2d 1034, 1043 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)." Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171 , 117 S.Ct. 1438 , 137 L.Ed.2d 545 (1997) (emphasis added). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray

1998See also Jenkins v. State, 627 So.2d 1034, 1043 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)." Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171 , 117 S.Ct. 1438 , 137 L.Ed.2d 545 (1997) (emphasis added). "`"The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 [424], 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Gray

1994Accord, Bracewell v. State, 506 So.2d 354, 358 (Ala.Cr.App.1986)." Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474, 484-85 (Ala. Cr.App.1990), affirmed, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 886 , 112 S.Ct. 242 , 116 L.Ed.2d 197 (1991). *47 "The proper standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is `whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."` Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2