distinct hearing in Georgia

2020When the parties disagree about the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, OCGA § 17-14-7 (b) calls for a restitution hearing: “If the parties have not agreed on the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, the ordering authority shall set a date for a hearing to determine restitution. . . .” But a defendant can “waive[] any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” Ezebuiro v. State, 308 Ga. App. 282, 285 (2) (b) ( 707 SE2d 182 ) (2011).

2020When the parties disagree about the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, OCGA § 17-14-7 (b) calls for a restitution hearing: “If the parties have not agreed on the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, the ordering authority shall set a date for a hearing to determine restitution. . . .” But a defendant can “waive[] any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” Ezebuiro v. State, 308 Ga. App. 282, 285 (2) (b) ( 707 SE2d 182 ) (2011).

2014Although Graf cites Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289 ( 739 SE2d 129 ) (2013), for the proposition that a trial court errs when it fails to hold a separate restitution hearing, Graf does not assert or show that she asked for such a hearing, and has thus “waived any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” Wilson v. State, 317 Ga. App. 171, 180 (2) (b) ( 730 SE2d 500 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2014Although Graf cites Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289 ( 739 SE2d 129 ) (2013), for the proposition that a trial court errs when it fails to hold a separate restitution hearing, Graf does not assert or show that she asked for such a hearing, and has thus “waived any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” Wilson v. State, 317 Ga. App. 171, 180 (2) (b) ( 730 SE2d 500 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2020But a defendant can “waive any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, __ Ga. App. __ (2) (842 SE2d 521, 524-525 (2)) (2020); see also Futch v. State, 314 Ga. App. 294, 297-298 (3) (a) (723 SE2d 714) (2012); Ezebuiro v. State, 308 Ga. App. 282, 285-286 (2) (a) (707 SE2d 182) (2011).

2020But a defendant can “waive any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, __ Ga. App. __ (2) (842 SE2d 521, 524-525 (2)) (2020); see also Futch v. State, 314 Ga. App. 294, 297-298 (3) (a) (723 SE2d 714) (2012); Ezebuiro v. State, 308 Ga. App. 282, 285-286 (2) (a) (707 SE2d 182) (2011).

2020In State v. Wilkerson, 348 Ga. App. 190 (820 SE2d 60) (2018) (“Wilkerson I”), this Court vacated the trial court’s grant of a new trial to Jason Edwin Wilkerson on the general grounds, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly conflating the standard for the general grounds and the distinct standard by which the legal sufficiency of the evidence is assessed.

2020In State v. Wilkerson, 348 Ga. App. 190 (820 SE2d 60) (2018) (“Wilkerson I”), this Court vacated the trial court’s grant of a new trial to Jason Edwin Wilkerson on the general grounds, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly conflating the standard for the general grounds and the distinct standard by which the legal sufficiency of the evidence is assessed.

2015See also Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79, 80-81 ( 344 SE2d 411 ) (1986) (explaining that the doctrine of virtual adoption does not fit the situation where an illegitimate child is attempting to inherit from his natural father and establishing the similar but distinct doctrine of virtual or equitable legitimation).

2015See also Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79, 80-81 ( 344 SE2d 411 ) (1986) (explaining that the doctrine of virtual adoption does not fit the situation where an illegitimate child is attempting to inherit from his natural father and establishing the similar but distinct doctrine of virtual or equitable legitimation).

1992See Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 ( 297 SE2d 270 ) (1982); White v. Hubbard, 203 Ga. App. 255, 256 ( 416 SE2d 568 ) (1992) (although an action by a wife for loss of consortium brought in the same suit with her husband's action for personal injuries is a derivative claim precluding inconsistent verdicts by the same jury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim for relief).

1992See Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 ( 297 SE2d 270 ) (1982); White v. Hubbard, 203 Ga. App. 255, 256 ( 416 SE2d 568 ) (1992) (although an action by a wife for loss of consortium brought in the same suit with her husband's action for personal injuries is a derivative claim precluding inconsistent verdicts by the same jury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim for relief).

2025Kearney pulled this principle — that a plaintiff must show that his or “her injury was the direct result of a predicate act targeted toward [him]” — from an opinion that was physical precedent only: Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 166 (1).

2023As discussed above, however Titshaw’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract were not viable and thus, Titshaw would not be entitled to attorney fees. 3 Due to the nature of his brief, it is unclear if Titshaw challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on his disgorgement claim, however we agree with the trial court that Titshaw has not shown that disgorgement can be maintained as a separate and distinct claim. 4 Because we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Geer on Titshaw’s breach of contract claim, we need not address any of Titshaw’s arg

2023As discussed above, however Titshaw’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract were not viable and thus, Titshaw would not be entitled to attorney fees. 3 Due to the nature of his brief, it is unclear if Titshaw challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on his disgorgement claim, however we agree with the trial court that Titshaw has not shown that disgorgement can be maintained as a separate and distinct claim. 4 Because we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Geer on Titshaw’s breach of contract claim, we need not address any of Titshaw’s arg

2023As discussed above, however Titshaw’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract were not viable and thus, Titshaw would not be entitled to attorney fees. 3 Due to the nature of his brief, it is unclear if Titshaw challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on his disgorgement claim, however we agree with the trial court that Titshaw has not shown that disgorgement can be maintained as a separate and distinct claim. 4 Because we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Geer on Titshaw’s breach of contract claim, we need not address any of Titshaw’s arg

2023As discussed above, however Titshaw’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract were not viable and thus, Titshaw would not be entitled to attorney fees. 3 Due to the nature of his brief, it is unclear if Titshaw challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on his disgorgement claim, however we agree with the trial court that Titshaw has not shown that disgorgement can be maintained as a separate and distinct claim. 4 Because we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Geer on Titshaw’s breach of contract claim, we need not address any of Titshaw’s arg

2018See Coates v. State , 342 Ga. App. 148 , 151-152, 802 S.E.2d 65 (2017) (holding that a statute prohibiting a felony first offender from possessing "any firearm," when read in conjunction with the sentencing provision's later use of "a firearm," "expresses an unambiguous ... intent to make each firearm a unit of prosecution").

2018See Coates v. State , 342 Ga. App. 148 , 151-152, 802 S.E.2d 65 (2017) (holding that a statute prohibiting a felony first offender from possessing "any firearm," when read in conjunction with the sentencing provision's later use of "a firearm," "expresses an unambiguous ... intent to make each firearm a unit of prosecution").

2016See Duke Galish LLC v. SouthCrest Bank, 314 Ga.App. 801 , 803, 726 S.E.2d 54 (2012) (leaving open the question of whether a failure to comply with OCGA § 44-14-162(b) rendered the sale void or voidable).

2016See Duke Galish LLC v. SouthCrest Bank, 314 Ga.App. 801 , 803, 726 S.E.2d 54 (2012) (leaving open the question of whether a failure to comply with OCGA § 44-14-162(b) rendered the sale void or voidable).

2014See Reyes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 496, 498 (2) ( 745 SE2d 738 ) (2013) (as the instruction was not a separate and distinct defense, the trial court did not err in failing to give the charge). 4.

2014See Reyes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 496, 498 (2) ( 745 SE2d 738 ) (2013) (as the instruction was not a separate and distinct defense, the trial court did not err in failing to give the charge). 4.

2013See Brown, 293 Ga. at 798-799 .

2013We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari, posing the question: “Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct legal analysis in assessing whether the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than field officers, for a legitimate primary purpose?” As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervi

2013We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari, posing the question: “Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct legal analysis in assessing whether the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than field officers, for a legitimate primary purpose?” As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervi

2013We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari, posing the question: “Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct legal analysis in assessing whether the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than field officers, for a legitimate primary purpose?” As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervi

2013We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari, posing the question: “Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct legal analysis in assessing whether the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than field officers, for a legitimate primary purpose?” As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervi

2011See Morrow, 272 Ga. at 692, n. 1 (noting the form of the jury’s sentencing verdict).

2011See Grant v. State, 289 Ga. *286 App. 230, 236 (5) ( 656 SE2d 873 ) (2008) (appellate courts cannot consider questions not presented to or ruled upon by the trial court); Hames v. State, 280 Ga. App. 708, 708 (1) ( 634 SE2d 836 ) (2006) (failure to object to trial court’s conduct of proceedings below waives appellate review of the issue).

2011See Grant v. State, 289 Ga. *286 App. 230, 236 (5) ( 656 SE2d 873 ) (2008) (appellate courts cannot consider questions not presented to or ruled upon by the trial court); Hames v. State, 280 Ga. App. 708, 708 (1) ( 634 SE2d 836 ) (2006) (failure to object to trial court’s conduct of proceedings below waives appellate review of the issue).

2011See Grant v. State, 289 Ga. *286 App. 230, 236 (5) ( 656 SE2d 873 ) (2008) (appellate courts cannot consider questions not presented to or ruled upon by the trial court); Hames v. State, 280 Ga. App. 708, 708 (1) ( 634 SE2d 836 ) (2006) (failure to object to trial court’s conduct of proceedings below waives appellate review of the issue).

1992See Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 ( 297 SE2d 270 ) (1982); White v. Hubbard, 203 Ga. App. 255, 256 ( 416 SE2d 568 ) (1992) (although an action by a wife for loss of consortium brought in the same suit with her husband's action for personal injuries is a derivative claim precluding inconsistent verdicts by the same jury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim for relief).

1992See Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 ( 297 SE2d 270 ) (1982); White v. Hubbard, 203 Ga. App. 255, 256 ( 416 SE2d 568 ) (1992) (although an action by a wife for loss of consortium brought in the same suit with her husband's action for personal injuries is a derivative claim precluding inconsistent verdicts by the same jury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim for relief).

1985Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 ( 297 SE2d 270 ) (1982); Deese v. Parks, 157 Ga. App. 116, 118 ( 276 SE2d 269 ) (1981).

1985Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 ( 297 SE2d 270 ) (1982); Deese v. Parks, 157 Ga. App. 116, 118 ( 276 SE2d 269 ) (1981).

1953Railroad Co. v. Brown, 138 Ga. 328, 332 (6) ( 75 S. E. 330 ): “The failure of the court to charge the jury specifically what their finding should be in case they should determine from the evidence that the injury complained of resulted from an accident does not afford a ground for a new trial, in the absence of a written request to charge upon that subject.” In the instant case, there was no request to charge on the subject, and the court did charge that there could be no recovery if the defendant was not negligent.

1953Railroad Co. v. Brown, 138 Ga. 328, 332 (6) ( 75 S. E. 330 ): “The failure of the court to charge the jury specifically what their finding should be in case they should determine from the evidence that the injury complained of resulted from an accident does not afford a ground for a new trial, in the absence of a written request to charge upon that subject.” In the instant case, there was no request to charge on the subject, and the court did charge that there could be no recovery if the defendant was not negligent.