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25 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Trianon Park Condominium v. City of Hialeahgreen2 sentences2018Thus, in addition to the five basic principles identified by the Florida Supreme Court in Trianon, which have been listed at the beginning of this analysis, the Court recognized that “there were areas of government activity where orthodox tort liability stops and the act of governing begins, . . . as well as the distinct principle of law . . . which makes not actionable in tort certain judgmental decisions of governmental authorities which are inherent in the act of governing.” Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 918 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 2017Thus, in addition to the five basic principles identified by the Florida Supreme Court in Trianon, which have been listed at the beginning of this analysis, the Court recognized that “there were areas of government activity where orthodox tort liability stops and the act of governing begins, . . . as well as 23 the distinct principle of law . . . which makes not actionable in tort certain judgmental decisions of governmental authorities which are inherent in the act of governing.” Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 918 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Brown v. State, 846 So.2d 1114, 1126 (Fla.2003) (analyzing cumulative error separately and holding that a cumulative error claim fails when the defendant fails to establish any of his claims under Strickland). 2014See, e.g., Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1126 (Fla. 2003) (analyzing cumulative - 59 - error separately and holding that a cumulative error claim fails when the defendant fails to establish any of his claims under Strickland). | 1 | 1 |
Hendricks v. Starkgreen1 sentence2013This doctrine seems to rest ... upon a distinct principle of public policy, that all that justice or equity requires for the relief of a party having such cause to impeach a contract is that he should have but one fair opportunity, after full knowledge of his rights, to decide whether he will affirm and take the benefits of the contract, or disaffirm it and demand the consequent redress.” Id. at 296-97 (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1 |
Zurstrassen v. Stoniergreen1 sentence2013See also Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So.2d 65, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Ratification occurs where a party with full knowledge of all the material facts makes an affirmative showing of his or her express or implied intention to adopt an act or contract entered into without authority. | 1 | 1 |
Hannah v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Cf. Hannah v. State, 814 So.2d 1129, 1130-31 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (treating revocation of probation as a distinct inquiry from modification of conditions of probation). | 1 | 1 |
Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2004See id. at 1253 . | 1 | 1 |
McGann v. Florida Elections Com'ngreen1 sentence2003In McGann v. Florida Elections Comm'n, 803 So.2d 763, 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), the court ruled that the Commission must use a separately numbered paragraph for each violation on which the Commission seeks to impose a fine. | 1 | 1 |
Town of Palm Beach v. Wattsgreen1 sentence1997See Town of Palm Beach v. Watts, 426 So.2d 1312, 1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Rimer v. Safecare Health Corp.green1 sentence1995Rimer v. Safecare Health Corp., 591 So.2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), approved, 620 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Singleton v. Ranzgreen1 sentence1995Carmen has a cause of action for personal injury stemming from the stillborn fetus, as living tissue of her body, McGeehan v. Parke-Davis, 573 So.2d 376, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So.2d 847, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So.2d 1334 (Fla. 1989); while, George and Carmen, as personal representatives of Christian's estate, also have a statutory cause of action for his wrongful death. §§ 768.16-.31, Fla. Stat. (1993). | 1 | 1 |
McGeehan v. Parke-Davisgreen1 sentence1995Carmen has a cause of action for personal injury stemming from the stillborn fetus, as living tissue of her body, McGeehan v. Parke-Davis, 573 So.2d 376, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So.2d 847, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So.2d 1334 (Fla. 1989); while, George and Carmen, as personal representatives of Christian's estate, also have a statutory cause of action for his wrongful death. §§ 768.16-.31, Fla. Stat. (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Duncan v. Pullumgreen1 sentence1987Mendez, 303 So.2d at 4 (quoting Duncan v. Pullum, 198 So.2d 658, 660-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)) (emphasis in original). *322 In Mendez , the supreme court determined that the multi-count complaint contained a separate and distinct claim for fraud and that judicial labor had ended as to that count. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Safecare Health Corp. v. Rimer
green
2 sentences1996A separate and distinct claim is one that involves different elements of damages. 620 So.2d at 164 . 1995Rimer v. Safecare Health Corp., 591 So.2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), approved, 620 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1993). | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Rivello v. Cooper City
green
2 sentences1980This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)." [3] Ch. 74-235, § 1, Laws of Fla. [4] Two commentators have criticized this "anomaly." See Seligman & Beals, The Sovereignty of Florida Municipalities: In-Again, Out-Again, When-Again, 50 Fla. B.J. 338 (1976). 1979This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [2] 342 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [3] 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [4] 353 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [5] § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 768.28(6), Fla. Stat. (1975). [7] § 768.28(12), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] E.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964); K. | 2 | 1979–1980 |
McNayr v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1980This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)." [3] Ch. 74-235, § 1, Laws of Fla. [4] Two commentators have criticized this "anomaly." See Seligman & Beals, The Sovereignty of Florida Municipalities: In-Again, Out-Again, When-Again, 50 Fla. B.J. 338 (1976). 1979This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [2] 342 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [3] 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [4] 353 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [5] § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 768.28(6), Fla. Stat. (1975). [7] § 768.28(12), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] E.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964); K. | 2 | 1979–1980 |
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeo
green
2 sentences2012The Supreme Court’s decision Young-berg announced a distinct standard to be applied in measuring a state’s constitutional duties to mental incompetents, addressing the extent to which the Due Process Clause imposes upon states an affirmative duty to care for, treat, and protect persons in its custody. 457 U.S. at 324 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 . 2012The Supreme Court’s decision Young-berg announced a distinct standard to be applied in measuring a state’s constitutional duties to mental incompetents, addressing the extent to which the Due Process Clause imposes upon states an affirmative duty to care for, treat, and protect persons in its custody. 457 U.S. at 324 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bynum Transport, Inc. v. Snyder
green
1 sentence2003Neither of the two main cases relied on by the majority, Bynum Transport, Inc. v. Snyder, 765 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and Clements v. Walt Disney World Co., 819 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), involve a situation where the carrier would not realize that a new and distinct claim was being made. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Clements v. Walt Disney World Co.
green
1 sentence2003Neither of the two main cases relied on by the majority, Bynum Transport, Inc. v. Snyder, 765 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and Clements v. Walt Disney World Co., 819 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), involve a situation where the carrier would not realize that a new and distinct claim was being made. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bombalier v. Lifemark Hosp. of Fla.
green
1 sentence1997We find that although it was the identical tortious acts that caused [the mother's] personal injury and [the son's] death, such acts gave rise to two separate and distinct claims." [c.o.] 661 So.2d at 852-853 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Parker v. State
green
1 sentence1996In the cases relied on by the dissent (Ross v. State, 493 So.2d 1015 (Fla.1986); Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1986); and Parker v. State, 633 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 639 So.2d 980 (Fla.1994)), crimes constituting a distinct violation of the victim’s rights were completed at one location, and a subsequent crime involving another invasion of the victim’s rights was begun and completed at another location. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ross v. State
green
2 sentences1996In the cases relied on by the dissent (Ross v. State, 493 So.2d 1015 (Fla.1986); Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1986); and Parker v. State, 633 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 639 So.2d 980 (Fla.1994)), crimes constituting a distinct violation of the victim’s rights were completed at one location, and a subsequent crime involving another invasion of the victim’s rights was begun and completed at another location. 1996In Ross, supra, and Murray, supra, the victim was robbed in one location, and the sexual battery occurred at another. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Murray v. State
green
2 sentences1996In the cases relied on by the dissent (Ross v. State, 493 So.2d 1015 (Fla.1986); Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1986); and Parker v. State, 633 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 639 So.2d 980 (Fla.1994)), crimes constituting a distinct violation of the victim’s rights were completed at one location, and a subsequent crime involving another invasion of the victim’s rights was begun and completed at another location. 1996In Ross, supra, and Murray, supra, the victim was robbed in one location, and the sexual battery occurred at another. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Cruz v. State
green
1 sentence1992Cruz, 465 So.2d at 520-21 . [9] See supra note 4. [10] It may be true that while `[s]ociety is at war with the criminal classes,' . .. [p]olice must fight this war, not engage in the manufacture of new hostilities. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sarasota Cloth Fabric & Foam, Inc. v. Benes
green
1 sentence1987Sarasota Cloth Fabric & Foam, Inc. v. Benes, 482 So.2d 574 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987Mendez, 303 So.2d at 4 (quoting Duncan v. Pullum, 198 So.2d 658, 660-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)) (emphasis in original). *322 In Mendez , the supreme court determined that the multi-count complaint contained a separate and distinct claim for fraud and that judicial labor had ended as to that count. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div.
green
1 sentence1985NOTES [1] Mental distress unaccompanied by such physical consequences, on the other hand, should still be inadequate to support a claim; nonphysical injuries must accompany and flow from direct trauma before recovery can be claimed for them in a negligence action. [2] In a collateral case issued this day, Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., General Motors Corp., 468 So.2d 903 , we held that Brown's judgment must be vacated because his psychic trauma was not manifested by physical injury and no cause of action lies for psychic trauma alone. [3] Those jurisdictions that do not have the impact rule | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County
green
1 sentence1979This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [2] 342 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [3] 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [4] 353 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [5] § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 768.28(6), Fla. Stat. (1975). [7] § 768.28(12), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] E.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964); K. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Cheney v. Dade County
green
1 sentence1979This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [2] 342 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [3] 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [4] 353 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [5] § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 768.28(6), Fla. Stat. (1975). [7] § 768.28(12), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] E.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964); K. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Charles B. Elgin, Sr., Individually and as Next Friend of John Elgin, a Minor v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence1979This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [2] 342 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [3] 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [4] 353 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [5] § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 768.28(6), Fla. Stat. (1975). [7] § 768.28(12), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] E.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964); K. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach
green
1 sentence1979This distinct principle of law is explored in cases such as McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966), and Rivello v. Cooper City, 322 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [2] 342 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [3] 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [4] 353 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [5] § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 768.28(6), Fla. Stat. (1975). [7] § 768.28(12), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] E.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964); K. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Albritton v. Scott green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Ormond v. State green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Goswick v. State green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Coker v. Dawkins neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Amos v. Mathews green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.