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12 Virginia opinions name it 5 courts 1882–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Osborne v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co 2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Lester Giles Pantergreen1 sentence2025Indeed, “[n]ecessity provides no defense to a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon if the felon takes possession of the firearm before the threat becomes imminent or retains possession longer than required after the danger has passed.” Id. (citing United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (“We emphasize that our holding protects a § 1202 defendant only for possession during the time he is endangered.”)). 25 In Virginia, duress is a similar but distinct defense from necessity. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Schreiber, Michael Franks, Brent Gilpin, and Susan Scainetti, John Biancogreen1 sentence2018See, e.g. , Schreiber , 191 F.3d at 105, 109 (remanding for a finding on the merits where the trial court disqualified at the threshold a timely filed disclosure without an evaluation of the truthfulness or completeness). | 1 | 1 |
Supervalu, Inc. v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2011(Dem. 1-2.) The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that, “in order to recover on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must.. . show that (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the resulting emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” SuperValu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 369 (2008); accord Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342 , 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Womack v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2011(Dem. 1-2.) The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that, “in order to recover on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must.. . show that (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the resulting emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” SuperValu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 369 (2008); accord Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342 , 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974). 2011(Dem. 1-2.) The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that, “in order to recover on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must.. . show that (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the resulting emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” SuperValu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 369 (2008); accord Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342 , 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Juannitto H. Edwards, etc v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co 2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co 2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co | 1 | 1 |
Menefee v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co 2003Code § 8.01-398 (emphasis added). 4 "Such communications include 'all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 470, 474 , 457 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 692 , 204 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1974); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912 , 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). 4 The Commonwealth's attorney's sua sponte invocation of "immunity" confused the spousal immunity privilege with "the separate and distinct rule of evidence governing co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Andrew Gilbert Schmuhl v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 302 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Townsend v. Com.
green
2 sentences2012Despite this general rule, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is a separate and distinct rule that “has effectively established per se disqualification [of a juror] by [other] limited categories.” Townsend, 270 Va. at 331 , 619 S.E.2d at 74 . 2012Despite this general rule, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is a separate and distinct rule that “has effectively established per se disqualification [of a juror] by [other] limited categories.” Townsend, 270 Va. at 331 , 619 S.E.2d at 74 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
cluster 551298
green
1 sentence1994Id. at 447 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co.
green
2 sentences1977After examining the basic purposes underlying the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and noting that Section 2-715 of the Code provides that "(2) consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," the court in Gardiner concludes as follows: In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Con 1977After examining the basic purposes underlying the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and noting that Section 2-715 of the Code provides that "(2) consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," the court in Gardiner concludes as follows: In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Con | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.
green
2 sentences1977After examining the basic purposes underlying the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and noting that Section 2-715 of the Code provides that "(2) consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," the court in Gardiner concludes as follows: In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Con 1977After examining the basic purposes underlying the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and noting that Section 2-715 of the Code provides that "(2) consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," the court in Gardiner concludes as follows: In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Con | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Loch Et Ux. v. Confair Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1977After examining the basic purposes underlying the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and noting that Section 2-715 of the Code provides that "(2) consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," the court in Gardiner concludes as follows: In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Con 1977After examining the basic purposes underlying the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and noting that Section 2-715 of the Code provides that "(2) consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," the court in Gardiner concludes as follows: In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Con | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Moseley ex rel. County of Monroe v. Tift
green
1 sentence1917Moseley, Governor, &c. v. Tift, 4 Fla. 402 . | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Rodd v. Heartt
green
1 sentence1905If, notwithstanding the unmistakable policy of this State in the interest of human life and safety, we were disposed to follow that case rather than the line of authorities of which Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 , 21 L. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood
green
1 sentence1905If, notwithstanding the unmistakable policy of this State in the interest of human life and safety, we were disposed to follow that case rather than the line of authorities of which Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 , 21 L. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Umbarger v. Watts
green
1 sentence1882The court is of opinion that the claim of the appellants, Hilleary, Willson & Johnson, not being of an amount sufficient to give this court jurisdiction—the same with interest at the date of the final decree, not amounting to $500— and being a separate and distinct claim from that of Miss Tebbs, cannot be helped by her uniting with them in the appeal—as to them the appeal must be dismissed as improvidently allowed (Umbarger v. Watts, 25 Gratt. 167 ; Gage v. Crockett, 27 Gratt. 735 )—but that Miss Tebbs’ right of appeal is not affected by such dismission, and the court will now proceed to consi | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.