distinct claim in Arizona

2014The superior court concluded that because the arbitration agreements pui-port-ed to bind “heirs,” Aspeitia’s children — who were not parties to the agreements — were required to arbitrate their wrongful-death claim. ¶ 25 A wrongful-death claim is “an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by named statutory benefieiaries[; i]t is not derived from nor is it a continuation of claims which formerly existed in a decedent.” Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 549-50 , 514 P.2d 470, 470-71 (1973).

2014The superior court concluded that because the arbitration agreements pui-port-ed to bind “heirs,” Aspeitia’s children — who were not parties to the agreements — were required to arbitrate their wrongful-death claim. ¶ 25 A wrongful-death claim is “an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by named statutory benefieiaries[; i]t is not derived from nor is it a continuation of claims which formerly existed in a decedent.” Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 549-50 , 514 P.2d 470, 470-71 (1973).

2021The wrongful death statute, A.R.S. § 12-612, is “an original and distinct claim for damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries and is not derivative or a continuation of a claim existing in the decedent.” See Barragan v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz. App. 402, 404 (1970) (a wrongful death action “is for the wrong to the beneficiaries, confined to their loss because of the death”).

1988In distinguishing wrongful death actions from survival actions, which carry on the claim that the decedent would have had for his injuries, Division Two of this court stated in Barragan v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz.App. 402, 404-405 , 470 P.2d 722, 724-725 (1970) (citation omitted): A wrongful death action is an original and distinct claim for damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries and is not derivative of or a continuation of a claim existing in the decedent.

2025See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1986) (voluntariness of constitutional waiver a distinct inquiry from whether waiver is knowing and intelligent and involves consideration of any coercive pressures exerted by state); see also Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, ¶ 14 (“[W]hile we agree that it is a defendant’s responsibility to ensure the availability of civilian clothing at trial, we reject the idea that every failure in this regard can sensibly be characterized as ‘voluntary.’”). 13 STATE v. VALLEJO Opinion of the Court ¶44 The majority observes that we may consider information presen

2022Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (inquiry regarding adequacy of waiver of constitutional right “has two distinct dimensions”: first, assessment of voluntariness; second, assessment of knowledge and intelligence); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010) (same, quoting Burbine); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1987) (waiver only valid if both voluntariness and intelligence, separately described, are demonstrated).

2025See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1986) (voluntariness of constitutional waiver a distinct inquiry from whether waiver is knowing and intelligent and involves consideration of any coercive pressures exerted by state); see also Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, ¶ 14 (“[W]hile we agree that it is a defendant’s responsibility to ensure the availability of civilian clothing at trial, we reject the idea that every failure in this regard can sensibly be characterized as ‘voluntary.’”). 13 STATE v. VALLEJO Opinion of the Court ¶44 The majority observes that we may consider information presen

2025See Sainz, 186 Ariz. at 473-74 .

2022Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (inquiry regarding adequacy of waiver of constitutional right “has two distinct dimensions”: first, assessment of voluntariness; second, assessment of knowledge and intelligence); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010) (same, quoting Burbine); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1987) (waiver only valid if both voluntariness and intelligence, separately described, are demonstrated).

2022Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (inquiry regarding adequacy of waiver of constitutional right “has two distinct dimensions”: first, assessment of voluntariness; second, assessment of knowledge and intelligence); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010) (same, quoting Burbine); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1987) (waiver only valid if both voluntariness and intelligence, separately described, are demonstrated).

2017While the quoted text is written in the conjunctive, in support of the rule, Henderson cites State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 , 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984), which suggests that each element consti tutes a distinct error that, standing alone, may amount to fundamental error.

2017While the quoted text is written in the conjunctive, in support of the rule, Henderson cites State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 , 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984), which suggests that each element consti tutes a distinct error that, standing alone, may amount to fundamental error.

2017Hunter , in turn, references State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 138 , 685 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1984), which lists only the first two elements in the disjunctive. .

2017Hunter , in turn, references State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 138 , 685 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1984), which lists only the first two elements in the disjunctive. .

2016See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 88 , 181 P.3d 219, 242 (App.2008) (appellate court will not address issues or arguments waived by failure to adequately develop them in briefs). .

2016See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 88 , 181 P.3d 219, 242 (App.2008) (appellate court will not address issues or arguments waived by failure to adequately develop them in briefs). .

2014Section 12-611 thus “confers an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by named statutory beneficiaries[; i]t is not derived from nor is it a continuation of claims which formerly existed in a decedent.” Huebner, 109 Ariz. at 549-50 , 514 P.2d at 470-71 ; see also Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Ariz., Inc., 148 Ariz. 548, 550 , 715 P.2d 1236,1238 (App.1985). ¶ 25 Several jurisdictions also have addressed the scope of arbitration clauses in this context, and nearly all distinguish between derivative and independent claims in this manner.

2014Section 12-611 thus “confers an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by named statutory beneficiaries[; i]t is not derived from nor is it a continuation of claims which formerly existed in a decedent.” Huebner, 109 Ariz. at 549-50 , 514 P.2d at 470-71 ; see also Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Ariz., Inc., 148 Ariz. 548, 550 , 715 P.2d 1236,1238 (App.1985). ¶ 25 Several jurisdictions also have addressed the scope of arbitration clauses in this context, and nearly all distinguish between derivative and independent claims in this manner.

2014See Ruiz v. Podolsky, 50 Cal.4th 838 , 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 , 237 P.3d 584 , 591 n. 2 (2010).

2014See Ruiz v. Podolsky, 50 Cal.4th 838 , 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 , 237 P.3d 584 , 591 n. 2 (2010).

2002That court has also observed that simply because “children are not named plaintiffs but are merely beneficiaries does not preclude them from being ‘parties’ to the litigation.” Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 580-81 , 684 P.2d 151, 152-53 (1984). ¶ 19 We do not believe that further analysis is required in order to conclude that Arizona’s wrongful death statutes endow a minor with his own cause of action.

2002That court has also observed that simply because “children are not named plaintiffs but are merely beneficiaries does not preclude them from being ‘parties’ to the litigation.” Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 580-81 , 684 P.2d 151, 152-53 (1984). ¶ 19 We do not believe that further analysis is required in order to conclude that Arizona’s wrongful death statutes endow a minor with his own cause of action.

2001See State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 460 , 868 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App.1993); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539 , 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App.1996); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998). ¶ 31 We do not believe, however, that this avenue of admission obviates the need to screen such evidence pursuant to the framework established in Rule 404(c).

2001See State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 460 , 868 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App.1993); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539 , 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App.1996); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998). ¶ 31 We do not believe, however, that this avenue of admission obviates the need to screen such evidence pursuant to the framework established in Rule 404(c).

2001See State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 460 , 868 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App.1993); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539 , 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App.1996); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998). ¶ 31 We do not believe, however, that this avenue of admission obviates the need to screen such evidence pursuant to the framework established in Rule 404(c).

2001See State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 460 , 868 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App.1993); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539 , 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App.1996); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998). ¶ 31 We do not believe, however, that this avenue of admission obviates the need to screen such evidence pursuant to the framework established in Rule 404(c).

2001See State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 460 , 868 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App.1993); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539 , 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App.1996); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998). ¶ 31 We do not believe, however, that this avenue of admission obviates the need to screen such evidence pursuant to the framework established in Rule 404(c).

2001See State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 460 , 868 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App.1993); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539 , 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App.1996); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998). ¶ 31 We do not believe, however, that this avenue of admission obviates the need to screen such evidence pursuant to the framework established in Rule 404(c).

2001State v. Garner, 116 Ariz. 443, 447 , 569 P.2d 1341, 1345 (1977). ¶ 30 In the years since Gamer, our courts have continued to recognize evidence of a defendant’s lewd disposition toward a particular victim as a distinct exception to the general rule excluding character evidence.

2001State v. Garner, 116 Ariz. 443, 447 , 569 P.2d 1341, 1345 (1977). ¶ 30 In the years since Gamer, our courts have continued to recognize evidence of a defendant’s lewd disposition toward a particular victim as a distinct exception to the general rule excluding character evidence.