26 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1906–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thigpen v. Ngogreen2 sentences2026P. 9(j); see also Thigpen, 355 N.C. at 202 , 558 S.E.2d at 165 (emphasizing “no other subsection [of Rule 9] contains the mandatory language ‘shall be dismissed[]’” and “[Rule 9(j)] indicates that medical malpractice complaints have a distinct requirement of expert certification with which plaintiffs must comply”). 2026P. 9(j); see also Thigpen, 355 N.C. at 202 , 558 S.E.2d at 165 (emphasizing “no other subsection [of Rule 9] contains the mandatory language ‘shall be dismissed[]’” and “[Rule 9(j)] indicates that medical malpractice complaints have a distinct requirement of expert certification with which plaintiffs must comply”). | 5 | 6 |
Pait v. Southeastern General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2021App. 403, 414 , 724 S.E.2d 618, 627 (2012) (A death benefits claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act is a distinct claim to those beneficiaries upon the death of the injured worker.). 2021App. 403, 414 , 724 S.E.2d 618, 627 (2012) (A death benefits claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act is a distinct claim to those beneficiaries upon the death of the injured worker.). | 2 | 2 |
Maines v. City of Greensborogreen2 sentences2007See Maines v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 130 , 265 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1980) (discussing the two types of claims where plaintiff “first contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face . . . alternative [ly], plaintiff argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied”). 2007See Maines v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 130 , 265 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1980) (discussing the two types of claims where plaintiff “first contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face . . . alternative [ly], plaintiff argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied”). | 2 | 2 |
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Rent-A- Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 , 70–71 (2010); Howell, 2020 NCBC LEXIS 105 , at *20–23 (suggesting that a party must make a distinct challenge to the provision’s delegation clause to avoid its effect). 3 To be clear, as set forth below, the Court makes no determination as to whether the Operating Agreements are binding or valid. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Propergreen2 sentences2024The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held Rule 9(j) imposes “a distinct requirement of expert certification.” Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 30 , 726 S.E.2d 812, 816 (2012) (citation omitted). 2024The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held Rule 9(j) imposes “a distinct requirement of expert certification.” Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 30 , 726 S.E.2d 812, 816 (2012) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
John MacDonald v. Cashcall Incgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Gibbs v. Haynes Invs., LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 22736 , at *12 (4th Cir. July 21, 2020) (“[I]n specifically challenging a delegation clause, a party may rely on the same arguments that it employs to contest the enforceability of other arbitration provisions.” (quoting MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220 , 226–27 (3d Cir. 2018))); see also, e.g., Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., N.A., 835 F.3d 1331 , 1335 n.1 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Because [the plaintiff] directly challenged the delegation clause in her opposition to the motion to compel, there is no waiver and we have jurisdiction to | 1 | 1 |
Jessica Parm v. National Bank of California, N.A.green1 sentence2020See, e.g., Gibbs v. Haynes Invs., LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 22736 , at *12 (4th Cir. July 21, 2020) (“[I]n specifically challenging a delegation clause, a party may rely on the same arguments that it employs to contest the enforceability of other arbitration provisions.” (quoting MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220 , 226–27 (3d Cir. 2018))); see also, e.g., Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., N.A., 835 F.3d 1331 , 1335 n.1 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Because [the plaintiff] directly challenged the delegation clause in her opposition to the motion to compel, there is no waiver and we have jurisdiction to | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stevensongreen2 sentences2017App. 409 , 412, 344 S.E.2d 334 , 335 (1986) ("The 'castle doctrine' is derived from the principle that one's home is one's castle and is based on the theory that if a person is bound to become a fugitive from her own home, there would be no refuge for her anywhere in the world.") While the castle doctrine is a legal theory in the nature of self-defense, it is a separate and distinct analysis from simple self-defense against a threat of serious or deadly force because under the castle doctrine the person is not just defending himself but also defending himself in the place he has the right to b 2017App. 409, 412 , 344 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1986) (“The ‘castle doctrine’ is derived from the principle that one’s home is one’s castle and is based on the theory that if a person is bound to become a fugitive from her own home, there would be no refuge for her anywhere in the world.”) While the castle doctrine is a legal theory in the nature of self-defense, it is a separate and distinct analysis from simple self- defense against a threat of serious or deadly force because under the castle doctrine the person is not just defending himself but also defending himself in the place he has the right to b | 1 | 1 |
Duncan v. Ohio Blow Pipe Co.green2 sentences2006Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he traveling-employee rule recognizes that the conditions faced by employees working ‘on the road,’ away from home and away from their employer’s home office, are sufficiently different from the conditions faced by employees merely going to or from their local place of employment on a daily basis to warrant a distinct rule.”); Duncan v. Ohio Blow Pipe Co., 130 Ohio App. 3d 228, 235 , 719 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (1998) (holding that the fact that the employee had fixed hours and a fixed work location for purposes of the “coming- and-going” rule “does not end the inquiry,” and the 2006Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he traveling-employee rule recognizes that the conditions faced by employees working ‘on the road,’ away from home and away from their employer’s home office, are sufficiently different from the conditions faced by employees merely going to or from their local place of employment on a daily basis to warrant a distinct rule.”); Duncan v. Ohio Blow Pipe Co., 130 Ohio App. 3d 228, 235 , 719 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (1998) (holding that the fact that the employee had fixed hours and a fixed work location for purposes of the “coming- and-going” rule “does not end the inquiry,” and the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Batiste
neutral
2 sentences2022Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017) (holding that defendant’s actions, without more, did not violate N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(b)(3a) when those actions violated the explicit language of “a wholly separate” regular condition of probation which did not allow probation revocation and activation of a suspended sentence); State v. Batiste, No. COA16-1186, 2017 WL 3863538 (N.C. 2022Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017) (holding that defendant’s actions, without more, did not violate N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(b)(3a) when those actions violated the explicit language of “a wholly separate” regular condition of probation which did not allow probation revocation and activation of a suspended sentence); State v. Batiste, No. COA16-1186, 2017 WL 3863538 (N.C. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Booker
neutral
2 sentences2022App. 111 (2018) (reasoning that the State’s allegations and supporting evidence were very similar to those rejected in Williams because defendant’s actions only amounted to a violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3) and did not rise to the distinct violation of absconding supervision); State v. Booker, No. COA 16-1142, 2017 WL 3863881 (N.C. 2022App. 111 (2018) (reasoning that the State’s allegations and supporting evidence were very similar to those rejected in Williams because defendant’s actions only amounted to a violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3) and did not rise to the distinct violation of absconding supervision); State v. Booker, No. COA 16-1142, 2017 WL 3863881 (N.C. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Redmond Ex Rel. Nichols
green
2 sentences2021Stat. § 97-24 (a), a dependent is not required to file a separate and distinct claim within the two-year statutory period, so long as an initial claim satisfies the limitation period. ¶ 20 “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction[,] and the courts must give [the statute] its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.” Matter of Redmond by & through Nichols, 369 N.C. 490, 495 , 797 S.E.2d 275 , 279 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted; alt 2021Stat. § 97-24 (a), a dependent is not required to file a separate and distinct claim within the two-year statutory period, so long as an initial claim satisfies the limitation period. ¶ 20 “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction[,] and the courts must give [the statute] its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.” Matter of Redmond by & through Nichols, 369 N.C. 490, 495 , 797 S.E.2d 275 , 279 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted; alt | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Purcell v. Friday Staffing
green
2 sentences2021“When, however, a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.” Purcell v. Friday Staffing, 235 N.C. 2021“When, however, a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.” Purcell v. Friday Staffing, 235 N.C. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Matter of White
green
2 sentences2007White, 81 N.C.App. at 85 , 344 S.E.2d at 38 . 2007White, 81 N.C.App. at 85 , 344 S.E.2d at 38 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Phillips v. a Triangle Women's Health Clinic, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026“When ruling on [a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(j)], a court must consider the facts relevant to Rule 9(j) and apply the law to them.” Phillips v. A Triangle Women’s Health Clinic, Inc., 155 N.C. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2016MARTIN Opinion of the Court Jackson, 220 N.C. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bank v. Cooper, Paroff, Cooper & Cook
green
1 sentence2012Cir.) (“Presumably, the ‘reasonable to believe’ standard requires less than probable cause, because otherwise Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely duplicate the ‘automobile exception,’ which the Court [in Gant] specifically identified as a distinct exception to the warrant requirement.”), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 93 , 178 L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
DeSantiago v. McCollum
green
1 sentence2012Cir.) (“Presumably, the ‘reasonable to believe’ standard requires less than probable cause, because otherwise Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely duplicate the ‘automobile exception,’ which the Court [in Gant] specifically identified as a distinct exception to the warrant requirement.”), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 93 , 178 L. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wray v. . Woolen Mills
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 783-84 , 172 S.E. at 488 . 2012Id. at 783-84 , 172 S.E. at 488 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ebeling v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1950However, the decided weight of authority supports the view that in cases of factual similarity with the one under review the power of the Legislature, when it so intends, to make punishable as a distinct violation of statute law each offense denounced by the statute, although occurring in the same transaction, must be given effect. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 9, and authorities assembled in notes 39, 40, and 42; 15 A. J., Criminal Law, sec. 389; Ebelling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 , 59 L. 1950However, the decided weight of authority supports the view that in cases of factual similarity with the one under review the power of the Legislature, when it so intends, to make punishable as a distinct violation of statute law each offense denounced by the statute, although occurring in the same transaction, must be given effect. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 9, and authorities assembled in notes 39, 40, and 42; 15 A. J., Criminal Law, sec. 389; Ebelling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 , 59 L. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Florida v. Mellon
green
1 sentence1950Ed. 1151 ; Ruark v. U. S., 17 Fed. 2d 570 (C.C.A. 8); 51 A.L.R. 87 ; Albrecht v. U. S., 273 U.S. 1 , 71 L. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Albrecht v. United States
green
1 sentence1950Ed. 1151 ; Ruark v. U. S., 17 Fed. 2d 570 (C.C.A. 8); 51 A.L.R. 87 ; Albrecht v. U. S., 273 U.S. 1 , 71 L. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Manufacturing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1914Dorsett v. Manufacturing Co., 131 N. C., 254 ; Eplee v. R. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Nagel v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1906Such act may have been the immediate intervening cause, but the unlawful employment, continuing, was in combination with the intervening act a proximate cause of the injury.” The principle" was applied in Nagel v. Railway, 75 Mo., 653 : “The defendant owned or had control of a turntable located in a portion of the town where children were in the habit of playing. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.