distinct claim in New York

2025It is a separate and distinct claim not grounded in the underlying cause" ( Matter of Miller , 47 Misc 3d 409, 411 [Sur Ct, Queens County 2015] [internal citation omitted]). "'Recoupment' is a deduction from a money claim based on cross demands arising out of the same transaction which is allowed to compensate one another and leave the balance only to be recovered; it 'only permits a transaction which is made the subject of the suit to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole'" ( id. [internal ellipses omitted], quo

2025It is a separate and distinct claim not grounded in the underlying cause" ( Matter of Miller , 47 Misc 3d 409, 411 [Sur Ct, Queens County 2015] [internal citation omitted]). "'Recoupment' is a deduction from a money claim based on cross demands arising out of the same transaction which is allowed to compensate one another and leave the balance only to be recovered; it 'only permits a transaction which is made the subject of the suit to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole'" ( id. [internal ellipses omitted], quo

2019This is consistent with our general view that, aside from the limited mortgage moratorium exception triggered by explicit legislation,4 the recoverability of post-maturity interest payments is tethered to a claim for principal rather than “a debt capable of a distinct claim” (see Cutter v City of New York, 92 NY 166, 170 [1883]; Bailey v Buchanan, 115 NY 297, 302 [1889] [“(T)he amount of the bond with the interest thereon” constitutes “but one debt”]; cf. 4 Indeed, New York courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring distinct actions to recover a limited set of unpaid interest payments once a cl

1942(Cutter v. Mayor, 92 N. Y. 166, 170, 171 .) “ It is settled law that interest recoverable only by way of damages for the wrongful detention of a debt is but an incident to the principal debt, and cannot be the basis of an independent claim.” (Moers v. Norshe Handelsbank, 191 App. Div. 114, 116 [First Dept. 1920].) In such case the damages arise in an action based on default in payment of the principal debt, the payment of which is legally enforcible when the alleged default occurred.

2025It is a separate and distinct claim not grounded in the underlying cause" ( Matter of Miller , 47 Misc 3d 409, 411 [Sur Ct, Queens County 2015] [internal citation omitted]). "'Recoupment' is a deduction from a money claim based on cross demands arising out of the same transaction which is allowed to compensate one another and leave the balance only to be recovered; it 'only permits a transaction which is made the subject of the suit to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole'" ( id. [internal ellipses omitted], quo

2025It is a separate and distinct claim not grounded in the underlying cause" ( Matter of Miller , 47 Misc 3d 409, 411 [Sur Ct, Queens County 2015] [internal citation omitted]). "'Recoupment' is a deduction from a money claim based on cross demands arising out of the same transaction which is allowed to compensate one another and leave the balance only to be recovered; it 'only permits a transaction which is made the subject of the suit to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole'" ( id. [internal ellipses omitted], quo

2021Our decision herein, however, does not concern the death benefits claim, which is not before us and "is a separate and distinct claim from a claim for disability benefits for the underlying injury" ( Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co. , 284 AD2d 672, 675 [2001]; see Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept. , 85 NY2d 747, 751 [1995]; Matter of Brannigan v Town of Oyster Bay , 141 AD2d 942, 943 [1988]; see generally Workers' Compensation Law §§ 15 [4]; 16, 33).

2001The workers’ compensation carrier is correct that a claim for death benefits is a separate and distinct claim from a claim for disability benefits for the underlying injury to which the death is causally-related (see, Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept., 85 NY2d 747, 751, 753 ; Matter of Brannigan v Town of Oyster Bay, 141 AD2d 942 ; see also, Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 15, 16).

2024Ice, snow, water, grease and any other foreign substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed, sanded or covered to provide safe footing.” In Rizzuto the Court explained that this section: “unequivocally directs employers not to ‘suffer or permit any employee’ to use a slippery floor or walkway, and also imposes an affirmative duty on employers to provide safe footing by requiring that any ‘foreign substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed to provide safe footing.’ As such, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) mandates a distinct standard of conduct, rather than a general reitera

2024While we have held that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) “mandates a distinct standard of conduct” (Rizzuto, 91 NY2d at 351 ) and satisfies Ross, that conclusion flows from reading the second -4- -5- No. 11 sentence of the regulation to inform the meaning of the first.

2021Our decision herein, however, does not concern the death benefits claim, which is not before us and "is a separate and distinct claim from a claim for disability benefits for the underlying injury" ( Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co. , 284 AD2d 672, 675 [2001]; see Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept. , 85 NY2d 747, 751 [1995]; Matter of Brannigan v Town of Oyster Bay , 141 AD2d 942, 943 [1988]; see generally Workers' Compensation Law §§ 15 [4]; 16, 33).

2001The workers’ compensation carrier is correct that a claim for death benefits is a separate and distinct claim from a claim for disability benefits for the underlying injury to which the death is causally-related (see, Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept., 85 NY2d 747, 751, 753 ; Matter of Brannigan v Town of Oyster Bay, 141 AD2d 942 ; see also, Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 15, 16).

1985However, as the Appellate Division, Third Department, held in Matter of County of Broome v Cuomo case (supra), an award of legal fees and attendant expenses is not, as petitioners argue, incidental to the article 78 relief sought and constitutes a separate and distinct claim for money damages that must be brought in the Court of Claims (see, Matter of Dubner v Ambach, 74 AD2d 949, 951 , affd 52 NY2d 910 ).

1984In our view, such relief was not merely incidental to the CPLR article 78 relief sought, but rather, constituted a separate and distinct claim for monetary damages that must be brought in the Court of Claims (see Matter of Dubner v Ambach, 74 AD2d 949, 951 [Mahoney, P. J., concurring], affd 52 NY2d 910 ).

1942(Cutter v. Mayor, 92 N. Y. 166, 170, 171 .) “ It is settled law that interest recoverable only by way of damages for the wrongful detention of a debt is but an incident to the principal debt, and cannot be the basis of an independent claim.” (Moers v. Norshe Handelsbank, 191 App. Div. 114, 116 [First Dept. 1920].) In such case the damages arise in an action based on default in payment of the principal debt, the payment of which is legally enforcible when the alleged default occurred.

1941(Cutter v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 92 N. Y. 166 ; Moers v. Norske Handelsbank, 191 App. Div. 114 .)

2026The issue of undue influence thus involves a distinct inquiry from that of capacity, and a "decedent's testamentary capacity at the time the [will or trust] was executed does not affect" an independent determination that a beneficiary exercised undue influence over the decedent ( Matter of Wang , 179 AD3d 418, 419 [1st Dept 2020]; see Matter of Johnson , 6 AD3d 859, 860-861 [3d Dept 2004]; Matter of Donovan , 47 AD2d 923, 924 [2d Dept 1975]).

2026The issue of undue influence thus involves a distinct inquiry from that of capacity, and a "decedent's testamentary capacity at the time the [will or trust] was executed does not affect" an independent determination that a beneficiary exercised undue influence over the decedent ( Matter of Wang , 179 AD3d 418, 419 [1st Dept 2020]; see Matter of Johnson , 6 AD3d 859, 860-861 [3d Dept 2004]; Matter of Donovan , 47 AD2d 923, 924 [2d Dept 1975]).

2026The issue of undue influence thus involves a distinct inquiry from that of capacity, and a "decedent's testamentary capacity at the time the [will or trust] was executed does not affect" an independent determination that a beneficiary exercised undue influence over the decedent ( Matter of Wang , 179 AD3d 418, 419 [1st Dept 2020]; see Matter of Johnson , 6 AD3d 859, 860-861 [3d Dept 2004]; Matter of Donovan , 47 AD2d 923, 924 [2d Dept 1975]).

2024To allow plaintiff to recover for property damage repairs under the indemnification provision would render the damages provision meaningless ( see generally Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. , 30 NY3d 572, 581 [2017]; Teliman Holding Corp. v VCW Assoc. , 211 AD3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2022]).

2024To allow plaintiff to recover for property damage repairs under the indemnification provision would render the damages provision meaningless ( see generally Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. , 30 NY3d 572, 581 [2017]; Teliman Holding Corp. v VCW Assoc. , 211 AD3d 499 , 500 [1st Dept 2022]).

2022County Court then advised defendant of his right to appeal and emphasized that a waiver of the right to appeal was a separate and distinct requirement of the plea agreement, explaining the consequences of the waiver and distinguishing it from the trial-related rights defendant would be automatically forfeiting by his guilty plea ( see People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Hemingway , 192 AD3d 1266, 1266 [2021], lvs denied 37 NY3d 956 , 960 [2021]).

2022County Court then advised defendant of his right to appeal and emphasized that a waiver of the right to appeal was a separate and distinct requirement of the plea agreement, explaining the consequences of the waiver and distinguishing it from the trial-related rights defendant would be automatically forfeiting by his guilty plea ( see People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Hemingway , 192 AD3d 1266, 1266 [2021], lvs denied 37 NY3d 956 , 960 [2021]).

2021Here, plaintiff's claim that defendants are liable under Labor Law § 241 (6) is based on the alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), which, in pertinent part, directs that workers not be permitted to use "a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface which is in a slippery condition" and requires that substances such as snow and ice be "removed . . . or covered to provide safe footing." It is undisputed that "12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) mandates a distinct standard of conduct, rather than a general reiteration of common-law principles, and [thus] is precisely the

2021Our decision herein, however, does not concern the death benefits claim, which is not before us and "is a separate and distinct claim from a claim for disability benefits for the underlying injury" ( Matter of Mace v Owl Wire & Cable Co. , 284 AD2d 672, 675 [2001]; see Matter of Zechmann v Canisteo Volunteer Fire Dept. , 85 NY2d 747, 751 [1995]; Matter of Brannigan v Town of Oyster Bay , 141 AD2d 942, 943 [1988]; see generally Workers' Compensation Law §§ 15 [4]; 16, 33).

2019Bank v Tuttle, 290 NY 497, 503-504 [1943]; see e.g.

2019This is consistent with our general view that, aside from the limited mortgage moratorium exception triggered by explicit legislation,4 the recoverability of post-maturity interest payments is tethered to a claim for principal rather than “a debt capable of a distinct claim” (see Cutter v City of New York, 92 NY 166, 170 [1883]; Bailey v Buchanan, 115 NY 297, 302 [1889] [“(T)he amount of the bond with the interest thereon” constitutes “but one debt”]; cf. 4 Indeed, New York courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring distinct actions to recover a limited set of unpaid interest payments once a cl

2018New York recognizes a distinct claim for professional malpractice and allows parties to pursue simultaneously a professional malpractice claim and a breach of contract claim ( see *463 Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh , 78 N.Y.2d 700 , 579 N.Y.S.2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1014 [1992] ; Sears, Roebuck v. Enco Assoc. , 43 N.Y.2d 389 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 , 372 N.E.2d 555 [1977] ; see also Robins v. Finestone , 308 N.Y. 543 , 127 N.E.2d 330 [1955] ).

2018New York recognizes a distinct claim for professional malpractice and allows parties to pursue simultaneously a professional malpractice claim and a breach of contract claim ( see *463 Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh , 78 N.Y.2d 700 , 579 N.Y.S.2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1014 [1992] ; Sears, Roebuck v. Enco Assoc. , 43 N.Y.2d 389 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 , 372 N.E.2d 555 [1977] ; see also Robins v. Finestone , 308 N.Y. 543 , 127 N.E.2d 330 [1955] ).