distinct requirement in Kentucky

2025Id.

2025Id. at 485 .

1937Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Anderson, 206 Ky. 600 , 268 S. W. 311 .

1937Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Anderson, 206 Ky. 600 , 268 S. W. 311 .

1932The rule was also recognized in Bingham v. Continental Casualty Co., 219 Ky. 501 , 293 S. W. 968, 970 , in these words: “Where a policy contains a general clause containing a promise to pay and also a separate and distinct clause which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something which would otherwise be included in it, a party relying on the general clause may, in pleading, set out that clause only, and it then devolves on the insurer to plead and prove the facts bringing the case within the exempting clause.” But in that case the plaintiff had by her pleading affirmatively al

1932The rule was also recognized in Bingham v. Continental Casualty Co., 219 Ky. 501 , 293 S. W. 968, 970 , in these words: “Where a policy contains a general clause containing a promise to pay and also a separate and distinct clause which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something which would otherwise be included in it, a party relying on the general clause may, in pleading, set out that clause only, and it then devolves on the insurer to plead and prove the facts bringing the case within the exempting clause.” But in that case the plaintiff had by her pleading affirmatively al

1931Each letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act.’ It is not, as in the case of In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274 , 30 L.

1931Ed. 658 , 7 S. Ct. 556 , a continuous offense, but it consists of a single isolated act, and is repeated as often as the act is repeated.

1931Each letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act.’ It is not, as in the case of In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274 , 30 L.

1915The rule of pleading applicable to such a case is stated as follows: “If the contract sued on ‘contain in it, first, a general clause, and afterwards a separate and distinct clause which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something that would otherwise be included in it, a party, relying upon the general clause, in pleading, may set out that clause only, without noticing the separate and distinct clause which operates as an exception; but, if' the exception itself be incorporated in the general clause, then the party relying on it must, in pleading, state it together with the e

1909In the early case of Taylor v. Howser, 12 Bush, 465 , the contention was made that the section of the Code under consideration was divisible into two parts, each stating a distinct rule of practice; the first part providing that in no action for an injury to the person or reputation could a new trial be granted on account of the smallness of the damages, the second that a new trial might be granted in actions not involving an injury to the person or reputation if the damages did not equal the pecuniary loss sustained.

1909But the court rejected this construction of the section, and held that whether the action be for an injury to the .person or reputation or rested on other grounds a new trial might be granted if the amount awarded did not equal the actual pecuniary injury sustained; and this construction was followed in Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367 , 5 S. W. 867 , 9 R. 602 .

1909But the court rejected this construction of the section, and held that whether the action be for an injury to the .person or reputation or rested on other grounds a new trial might be granted if the amount awarded did not equal the actual pecuniary injury sustained; and this construction was followed in Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367 , 5 S. W. 867 , 9 R. 602 .

1907Co., 40 Minn. 249 , 41 N. W. 974 , where it was held that, if the statute be held to apply to railroad corporations as such, it would be invalid and unconstitutional as class legislation, for it is beyond the power of the Legislature to single out a . particular class of employers and impose upon them a distinct rule of liability for personal injuries; but, if construed to apply to the character of the employment, the legislation was valid.

1907Co., 40 Minn. 249 , 41 N. W. 974 , where it was held that, if the statute be held to apply to railroad corporations as such, it would be invalid and unconstitutional as class legislation, for it is beyond the power of the Legislature to single out a . particular class of employers and impose upon them a distinct rule of liability for personal injuries; but, if construed to apply to the character of the employment, the legislation was valid.

1898Nichols v. Sennitt, 78 Ky., 630 .

1887The suit authorized by the statute of the ninth of March, 1854, is the converse of the legal action of ejectment.' See Pomeroy, supra. And this court in Woolfolk, &c., v. Ashby, &c., 2 Met., 288 , having decided that an action of ejectment will lie against as many persons as hold an adverse possession of the land, although each one holds the possession of a distinct parcel from the other, and by a distinct claim of right, it follows that, under the statute, supra, in an action to quiet the title to land, all persons setting .up claim thereto, whether or not each claims a separate parcel of the

1880(Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 2 Met., 10 ; Stephens on Pleading, —.) The statement of the facts as set up in the petition made a prima facie case within the statutory exemption, and devolved the duty on appellee to-allege and prove that appellant was excepted out of the general provision.