15 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1880–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mosier v. McFarlandgreen2 sentences2020If malice was to be inferred from want of 17 probable cause alone, then there would be no necessity for having a distinct requirement that malice be proven, for want of probable cause would then be the only element necessary to be established. 106 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1937) (internal citations omitted). 2020If malice was to be inferred from want of 17 probable cause alone, then there would be no necessity for having a distinct requirement that malice be proven, for want of probable cause would then be the only element necessary to be established. 106 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1937) (internal citations omitted). | 6 | 6 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yanero v. Davis
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bowling v. Kentucky Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 485 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Illinois Central Railroad v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1937Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Anderson, 206 Ky. 600 , 268 S. W. 311 . 1937Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Anderson, 206 Ky. 600 , 268 S. W. 311 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Bingham v. Continental Casualty Co.
neutral
1 sentence1932The rule was also recognized in Bingham v. Continental Casualty Co., 219 Ky. 501 , 293 S. W. 968, 970 , in these words: “Where a policy contains a general clause containing a promise to pay and also a separate and distinct clause which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something which would otherwise be included in it, a party relying on the general clause may, in pleading, set out that clause only, and it then devolves on the insurer to plead and prove the facts bringing the case within the exempting clause.” But in that case the plaintiff had by her pleading affirmatively al | 1 | 1932–1932 |
McCarty v. Blanton
neutral
1 sentence1932The rule was also recognized in Bingham v. Continental Casualty Co., 219 Ky. 501 , 293 S. W. 968, 970 , in these words: “Where a policy contains a general clause containing a promise to pay and also a separate and distinct clause which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something which would otherwise be included in it, a party relying on the general clause may, in pleading, set out that clause only, and it then devolves on the insurer to plead and prove the facts bringing the case within the exempting clause.” But in that case the plaintiff had by her pleading affirmatively al | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Grant v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. Grant and Another v. Same
green
1 sentence1931Each letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act.’ It is not, as in the case of In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274 , 30 L. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
In Re Snow
green
2 sentences1931Each letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act.’ It is not, as in the case of In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274 , 30 L. 1931Ed. 658 , 7 S. Ct. 556 , a continuous offense, but it consists of a single isolated act, and is repeated as often as the act is repeated. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Taylor v. Howser
neutral
1 sentence1909In the early case of Taylor v. Howser, 12 Bush, 465 , the contention was made that the section of the Code under consideration was divisible into two parts, each stating a distinct rule of practice; the first part providing that in no action for an injury to the person or reputation could a new trial be granted on account of the smallness of the damages, the second that a new trial might be granted in actions not involving an injury to the person or reputation if the damages did not equal the pecuniary loss sustained. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Ray v. Jeffries
neutral
2 sentences1909But the court rejected this construction of the section, and held that whether the action be for an injury to the .person or reputation or rested on other grounds a new trial might be granted if the amount awarded did not equal the actual pecuniary injury sustained; and this construction was followed in Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367 , 5 S. W. 867 , 9 R. 602 . 1909But the court rejected this construction of the section, and held that whether the action be for an injury to the .person or reputation or rested on other grounds a new trial might be granted if the amount awarded did not equal the actual pecuniary injury sustained; and this construction was followed in Ray v. Jeffries, 86 Ky. 367 , 5 S. W. 867 , 9 R. 602 . | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Lavallee v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1907Co., 40 Minn. 249 , 41 N. W. 974 , where it was held that, if the statute be held to apply to railroad corporations as such, it would be invalid and unconstitutional as class legislation, for it is beyond the power of the Legislature to single out a . particular class of employers and impose upon them a distinct rule of liability for personal injuries; but, if construed to apply to the character of the employment, the legislation was valid. 1907Co., 40 Minn. 249 , 41 N. W. 974 , where it was held that, if the statute be held to apply to railroad corporations as such, it would be invalid and unconstitutional as class legislation, for it is beyond the power of the Legislature to single out a . particular class of employers and impose upon them a distinct rule of liability for personal injuries; but, if construed to apply to the character of the employment, the legislation was valid. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Nichols v. Sennitt
neutral
1 sentence1898Nichols v. Sennitt, 78 Ky., 630 . | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Commonwealth v. Powell
neutral
1 sentence1880(Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 2 Met., 10 ; Stephens on Pleading, —.) The statement of the facts as set up in the petition made a prima facie case within the statutory exemption, and devolved the duty on appellee to-allege and prove that appellant was excepted out of the general provision. | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.