distinct test in Ohio

2009In reviewing a record for sufficiency, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, 574 N.E.2d 492 . "[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the *Page 11 trier of facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , paragraph one of the syllabus, 227 N.E.2d 212 . {¶ 32} "A claim that a jury ve

2009In reviewing a record for sufficiency, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, 574 N.E.2d 492 . "[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the *Page 11 trier of facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , paragraph one of the syllabus, 227 N.E.2d 212 . {¶ 32} "A claim that a jury ve

2006In reviewing such a challenge, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 . 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 61 L.Ed.2d 560 . {¶ 193} A claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence involves a separate and distinct test that is much broader. “ ‘The court, reviewing t

2006In reviewing such a challenge, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 . 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 61 L.Ed.2d 560 . {¶ 193} A claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence involves a separate and distinct test that is much broader. “ ‘The court, reviewing t

2009The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" State v. Scott , 101 Ohio St.3d 31 , 2004-Ohio-10 , at ¶ 32 , quoting State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 . {¶ 33} "Knowing possession" is an essential element of the offense, which must be satisfied before the jury could find Mr.

2004In reviewing such a challenge, `[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 . {¶ 38} "A claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, on the other hand, involves a separate and distinct test which is much broader. `"Th

2021Mahoning No. 12 MA 110, 2013-Ohio-3587, ¶ 15 .

2019No. 12 MA 110, 2013-Ohio-3587, ¶ 15 .

2025Co. of Youngstown v. Great Lake Plaza, Ltd., 2012-Ohio-3420 , ¶ 21 (11th Dist.) (a request for attorney fees contained within a general prayer for relief and “not laid out as a separate and distinct claim,” is construed as impliedly overruled by the trial court where it is not addressed in the judgment). {¶7} In his sole assigned error, Duebelt contends: {¶8} “The trial court’s judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellee is against the manifest weight of the evidence and erroneous as a matter of law.” {¶9} When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews “‘

2025See Ryan, 2021-Ohio- 3539, at ¶ 12; Pacheco, 2019-Ohio-2954, at ¶ 24 ; Ellis, 2007-Ohio-4920 , at ¶ 6 (stating that “both defenses” of voluntary abandonment and refusal of an offer of suitable alternative employment “affect a claimant’s eligibility for temporary total disability compensation, but they derive from different compensatory theories and involve distinct analyses”).

2023No. 10CA0018-M, 2010-Ohio- 4286, at ¶ 9 "[S]uppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself[.]" Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 , 171-72 89 S.Ct. 961 , 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).

2023No. 10CA0018-M, 2010-Ohio- 4286, at ¶ 9 "[S]uppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself[.]" Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 , 171-72 89 S.Ct. 961 , 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).

2023With estoppel, it is not necessary to intend to relinquish a right.” Id. {¶ 45} That is, “‘[e]quitable estoppel prevents relief when one party induces another to believe certain facts exist and the other party changes his position in reasonable reliance on those facts to his detriment.’” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 116 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2008-Ohio-67 , 880 N.E.2d 892 , ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel.

2021No. 07CA34, 2008-Ohio-1365, ¶ 10 .1 1 In cases, such as this, where the plaintiff does not invoke a specific statutory or rule authority as a basis for its request for attorney fees and, instead, simply includes an unspecified request for attorney fees in the prayer for relief, appellate courts do not view the general request for fees as a separate and distinct claim for purposes of Civ.R. 54(B).

2019Lorain No. 11CA010005, 2011-Ohio-6748, ¶ 7 , quoting State v. Redding, 9th Dist.

2018Gates v. Leonbruno , 2016-Ohio-5627 , 70 N.E.3d 1110 , ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing Hardesty v. Alcantara , 2015-Ohio-4591 , 48 N.E.3d 127 (8th Dist.).

2016Id.

2016The complaint also asserts standing under the public-right doctrine, citing ProgressOhio.org, 139 Ohio St.3d 520 , 2014-Ohio-2382 , 13 1 Ullmann does not develop a distinct claim of taxpayer standing, either in her complaint or in her brief to this court.

2016The complaint also asserts standing under the public-right doctrine, citing ProgressOhio.org, 139 Ohio St.3d 520 , 2014-Ohio-2382 , 13 1 Ullmann does not develop a distinct claim of taxpayer standing, either in her complaint or in her brief to this court.

2014“A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency of the evidence claim unless reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion the trier of fact did.” Chaffins at ¶ 24, citing State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162 , 749 N.E.2d 226 (2001). {¶10} “Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); Drummond at ¶ 193 (“A claim that a jury verdict is against

2014“A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency of the evidence claim unless reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion the trier of fact did.” Chaffins at ¶ 24, citing State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162 , 749 N.E.2d 226 (2001). {¶10} “Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); Drummond at ¶ 193 (“A claim that a jury verdict is against

2014Cuyahoga No. 99573, 2013-Ohio-5126, ¶ 12 , quoting State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2006-Ohio-5084 , 854 N.E.2d 1038 , ¶ 193.

2010Bd. of Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 198 , 2008-Ohio-5510 , 897 N.E.2d 641, ¶ 30 , we held that “under the plain language of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), as read in the context of the entire statute, peace officer training is not acceptable to constitute course credit under R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), because it is already included in the eligibility requirements in R.C. 311.01(B)(8).” (Emphasis added.) We reasoned that “R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already specifies that peace officer training is a distinct requirement, along with specified employment.

2010Bd. of Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 198 , 2008-Ohio-5510 , 897 N.E.2d 641, ¶ 30 , we held that “under the plain language of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), as read in the context of the entire statute, peace officer training is not acceptable to constitute course credit under R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), because it is already included in the eligibility requirements in R.C. 311.01(B)(8).” (Emphasis added.) We reasoned that “R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already specifies that peace officer training is a distinct requirement, along with specified employment.

2009In reviewing a record for sufficiency, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, 574 N.E.2d 492 . "[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the *Page 11 trier of facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , paragraph one of the syllabus, 227 N.E.2d 212 . {¶ 32} "A claim that a jury ve

2009In reviewing a record for sufficiency, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, 574 N.E.2d 492 . "[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the *Page 11 trier of facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , paragraph one of the syllabus, 227 N.E.2d 212 . {¶ 32} "A claim that a jury ve

2009That is, "an inmate must allege that he submitted to the sentencing judge, or the judge's successor, a request for the disputed documents, and that the judge then issued a decision expressly finding that he needed the documents to support a justiciable claim." Cohen , 2004-Ohio-3340 , at ¶ 6 . {¶ 13} In the instant action, our review of relator's allegations indicates that he sought a copy of the "parole hearing" transcript for the purpose of examining the "new" evidence which respondent had presented about the underlying facts of his criminal case.

2009Russell v. Thornton , 111 Ohio St.3d 409 , 2006-Ohio-5858 . 1 {¶ 12} In light of the distinct requirement for a state prisoner, this court has held that a mandamus claim before us will not state a viable cause of action unless the claim contains specific allegations in relation to R.C. 149.43 (B)(8).

2008This means that the State must prove that the offender knew or was reckless in knowing the victim's age, but not that the offender was reckless in engaging in sexual conduct. {¶ 28} The Ohio Supreme Court considered a similar sex-related statute in State v. Maxwell , 95 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2002-Ohio-2121 , 767 N.E.2d 242 .

2008This means that the State must prove that the offender knew or was reckless in knowing the victim's age, but not that the offender was reckless in engaging in sexual conduct. {¶ 28} The Ohio Supreme Court considered a similar sex-related statute in State v. Maxwell , 95 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2002-Ohio-2121 , 767 N.E.2d 242 .

2008Choices for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2005-Ohio-5362 , 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 40 . {¶30} Although the board and Aey assert that the language of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) should be broadly read to include the credits for peace office training, R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already specifies that peace officer training is a distinct requirement, along with specified employment.

2008Choices for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2005-Ohio-5362 , 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 40 . {¶30} Although the board and Aey assert that the language of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) should be broadly read to include the credits for peace office training, R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already specifies that peace officer training is a distinct requirement, along with specified employment.