distinct exception in Oregon

2026See, e.g., Miller, Cite as 350 Or App 670 (2026) 683 375 Or at 200-01 (noting, in the context of Article I, sec- tion 9, that “[the] defendant does not contend that [the offi- cer] improperly coerced her into agreeing to have her blood drawn to check her BAC or that she merely acquiesced to [the officer’s] demand” and “[i]nstead, she contends that, because of her intoxication and physical condition, she could not understand what she was being asked to do”).

2026See, e.g., Miller, Cite as 350 Or App 670 (2026) 683 375 Or at 200-01 (noting, in the context of Article I, sec- tion 9, that “[the] defendant does not contend that [the offi- cer] improperly coerced her into agreeing to have her blood drawn to check her BAC or that she merely acquiesced to [the officer’s] demand” and “[i]nstead, she contends that, because of her intoxication and physical condition, she could not understand what she was being asked to do”).

2026See, e.g., Miller, Cite as 350 Or App 670 (2026) 683 375 Or at 200-01 (noting, in the context of Article I, sec- tion 9, that “[the] defendant does not contend that [the offi- cer] improperly coerced her into agreeing to have her blood drawn to check her BAC or that she merely acquiesced to [the officer’s] demand” and “[i]nstead, she contends that, because of her intoxication and physical condition, she could not understand what she was being asked to do”).

2026See, e.g., Miller, Cite as 350 Or App 670 (2026) 683 375 Or at 200-01 (noting, in the context of Article I, sec- tion 9, that “[the] defendant does not contend that [the offi- cer] improperly coerced her into agreeing to have her blood drawn to check her BAC or that she merely acquiesced to [the officer’s] demand” and “[i]nstead, she contends that, because of her intoxication and physical condition, she could not understand what she was being asked to do”).

2018See Village at Main Street Phase II, LLC II v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR 52 , 56–57 (2015), vac’d on other grounds 360 Or 738 , 387 P3d 374 (2016).6 Observing that the court’s rules contemplating counterclaims “cannot expand upon or alter the statutory requirements with respect to matters brought to the Regular Division,” the court held that defendants who feel 6 See also Work v. Dept. of Rev., TC 5286, WL 3135940 at *11, *13 (Or Tax, July 20, 2017) (restating its holding that “each party requesting affirmative relief from a magistrate’s decision must file its own complaint in the Regular Division

2018See Village at Main Street Phase II, LLC II v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR 52 , 56–57 (2015), vac’d on other grounds 360 Or 738 , 387 P3d 374 (2016).6 Observing that the court’s rules contemplating counterclaims “cannot expand upon or alter the statutory requirements with respect to matters brought to the Regular Division,” the court held that defendants who feel 6 See also Work v. Dept. of Rev., TC 5286, WL 3135940 at *11, *13 (Or Tax, July 20, 2017) (restating its holding that “each party requesting affirmative relief from a magistrate’s decision must file its own complaint in the Regular Division

2018See Village at Main Street Phase II, LLC II v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR 52 , 56–57 (2015), vac’d on other grounds 360 Or 738 , 387 P3d 374 (2016).6 Observing that the court’s rules contemplating counterclaims “cannot expand upon or alter the statutory requirements with respect to matters brought to the Regular Division,” the court held that defendants who feel 6 See also Work v. Dept. of Rev., TC 5286, WL 3135940 at *11, *13 (Or Tax, July 20, 2017) (restating its holding that “each party requesting affirmative relief from a magistrate’s decision must file its own complaint in the Regular Division

2017We concluded that “[t]he error could be harmless if the trial court did not consider the evidence related to the other charges when it found the defendant guilty.” Id. (citing State v. Klontz, 257 Or App 684, 702-03 , 308 P3d 214 (2013) (concluding that the harmless error analysis in a bench trial where the trial court failed to mention contested evidence when explaining its disposition is “contextually driven” and that we must ask “[w]as the disputed evidence ultimately material to the resolution of issues disputed at trial?”)); see also State v. Miller, 287 Or App 135, 152 , 401 P3d 229 (201

2017We concluded that “[t]he error could be harmless if the trial court did not consider the evidence related to the other charges when it found the defendant guilty.” Id. (citing State v. Klontz, 257 Or App 684, 702-03 , 308 P3d 214 (2013) (concluding that the harmless error analysis in a bench trial where the trial court failed to mention contested evidence when explaining its disposition is “contextually driven” and that we must ask “[w]as the disputed evidence ultimately material to the resolution of issues disputed at trial?”)); see also State v. Miller, 287 Or App 135, 152 , 401 P3d 229 (201

2012See Caperton, 556 US at 889-90 (explaining that due process “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.

2012See Redwine v. Starboard, LLC, 240 Or App 673, 682 , 251 P3d 192 (2011) (addressing only the federal standard where, despite “invoking] the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard”); see also State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 268 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (“Although responsible treatment of the state claim is preferable, as stated above, if it is abandoned the court

2012See Redwine v. Starboard, LLC, 240 Or App 673, 682 , 251 P3d 192 (2011) (addressing only the federal standard where, despite “invoking] the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard”); see also State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 268 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (“Although responsible treatment of the state claim is preferable, as stated above, if it is abandoned the court

2012See Redwine v. Starboard, LLC, 240 Or App 673, 682 , 251 P3d 192 (2011) (addressing only the federal standard where, despite “invoking] the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard”); see also State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 268 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (“Although responsible treatment of the state claim is preferable, as stated above, if it is abandoned the court

2012See Redwine v. Starboard, LLC, 240 Or App 673, 682 , 251 P3d 192 (2011) (addressing only the federal standard where, despite “invoking] the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard”); see also State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 268 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (“Although responsible treatment of the state claim is preferable, as stated above, if it is abandoned the court

2011See State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 263 , 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 28 , 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (reviewing, for errors of law, the trial court’s determination that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply). 7 *682 Although Sawyer invoked the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard.

2011See State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 263 , 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 28 , 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (reviewing, for errors of law, the trial court’s determination that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply). 7 *682 Although Sawyer invoked the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard.

2011See State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 263 , 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 28 , 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (reviewing, for errors of law, the trial court’s determination that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply). 7 *682 Although Sawyer invoked the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard.

2011See State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 263 , 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 28 , 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (reviewing, for errors of law, the trial court’s determination that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply). 7 *682 Although Sawyer invoked the privilege under Article I, section 12, as well as the Fifth Amendment, both parties have conflated their analyses of the two constitutional provisions, with neither proposing a distinct analysis under Article I, section 12, or arguing against our adoption of the federal standard.

2003See generally Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II, 327 Or 9 , 956 P2d 960 (1998);Rustvold v. Taylor, 171 Or App 128 , 14 P3d 675 (2000), rev withdrawn, 332 Or 305 (2001). 3 Plaintiff responded by acknowledging that, under Horwell , she could not recover emotional distress damages for “the loss of her baby.” She argued, however, that she had adequately pleaded a distinct claim for her own suffering and emotional distress, based on the alternative theories that she was a direct victim of defendants’ professional negligence or that she had suffered a physical impact as a result of that negligence s

2003See generally Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II, 327 Or 9 , 956 P2d 960 (1998);Rustvold v. Taylor, 171 Or App 128 , 14 P3d 675 (2000), rev withdrawn, 332 Or 305 (2001). 3 Plaintiff responded by acknowledging that, under Horwell , she could not recover emotional distress damages for “the loss of her baby.” She argued, however, that she had adequately pleaded a distinct claim for her own suffering and emotional distress, based on the alternative theories that she was a direct victim of defendants’ professional negligence or that she had suffered a physical impact as a result of that negligence s

1981See also Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 280 Or 647 , 572 P2d 620 (1977).

1981See also Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 280 Or 647 , 572 P2d 620 (1977).